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ABSTRACT
This study provides a historical analysis of the 1995 Chicago School Reform Act,
as well as an analysis of the tenures of Chicago Public Schools Chief Executive Officers
Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan. It provides an analysis of words and actions of the two
CEOs through the interpretive framework of Thomas Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority. The sources of authority are bureaucratic, psychological, technical-rational,
professional and moral. Each source of authority represents certain assumptions that are
dominant if the particular source is primarily utilized.
This dissertation will answer six questions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five
Sources of Authority: What were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor
Daley sought from the CEO position for Paul Vallas; what were the skills knowledge and
dispositions that the mayor sought for the CEO position for Arne Duncan; how did Paul
Vallas and Arne Duncan respectively fulfill the CEO role, how did the leadership styles
of the two CEOs compare; and what implications does the CEO model have for school
governance and school leadership.
Newspaper sources such as the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times
provided a rich source of data for the purposes of analyzing the words and actions of the
CEOs related to how they fulfilled their roles. Board reports and proceedings gathered
from the Harold Washington Library as well as the Chicago Public School website were
greatly utilized, along with primary documents held at the Chicago Public Schools
viii

archives located at the CPS Central Offices located in downtown Chicago.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study
This dissertation will examine the tenures of two Chicago Public School (hereby
referred to as CPS) Chief Executive Officers (hereby referred to as CEO): Paul Vallas
and Arne Duncan. The purpose of this examination is to define the role of “Chief
Executive Officer” as it applied to the new leadership structure of the Chicago Public
Schools, and to provide evidence of how well the role of CEO was carried out by Vallas
and Duncan.

The researcher will use documents to examine the policies and practices

of the two CEOs. Paul Vallas’ administration spanned from 1995 to 2001, while Arne
Duncan’s administration spanned from 2001 until 2008, when he was nominated to be
Secretary of Education by then president-elect Barack Obama. The researcher will
provide a synopsis of the characteristics of a CEO in the private sector, as well as a
synopsis of the district’s priorities as recommended by Governor Jim Edgar which
influenced characteristics that Mayor Richard M. Daley required of the position and use
those to determine the degree by which the two CEOs fulfilled the CEO role.
In order to define the CEO position for CPS, a comprehensive examination of
each of the tenures of Vallas and Duncan will be provided. In examining the tenures of
the two CEOs, the researcher will specifically review their backgrounds and professional
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experience, major programs and initiatives that were implemented, problems that
occurred during their tenure as well as inherited problems, along with their words and
actions as well as Mayor Daley’s words and actions related to educational decision
making during each of their tenures. Statements issued by Governor Edgar leading up to
the signing of the Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act will be provided to serve as a
framework as for the expectations of how the new governance structure was to be utilized
to improve the district as far as the State was concerned. The researcher will also provide
a synopsis of how each CEO handled the change in authority vested into the school
system, examining the manner by which Paul Vallas led as CPS’ first CEO, and
reviewing how Arne Duncan functioned with those duties in comparison how Vallas did.
The words and actions of Daley, Edgar, Vallas and Duncan will be examined
through the lens of Thomas Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority. The five sources
and their characteristics are as follows:
1. Bureaucratic Authority: Micromanaging, teachers are subordinates, do what I
say or else, expect and inspect, teacher performance is narrowed - who should
I follow
2. Psychological Authority: Teachers have needs, and if they are met at work,
the work gets done as required, what is rewarded gets done, congenial climate,
teachers don’t respond without rewards, performance is narrowed, why should
I follow
3. Technical Authority: Evidence defined by logic and scientific research, use
research to identify best practice, standardize the work of teaching,
performance is narrowed, what and how I should do something
4. Professional Authority: Teachers respond in light of common socialization,
professional values, accepted tenets of practice and internalized expertise,
purpose of scientific knowledge is to inform not prescribe practice, give
teachers as much discretion as they need, require teachers to hold one another

3
accountable for meeting practice standards, performance is expansive, what
is rewarding gets done
5. Moral Authority: Communities are defined by shared values, beliefs and
commitments, people are motivated by emotions, felt obligation and duties
derived from widely shared community values, ideas, and ideals, use of
purposing and local school autonomy leads to covenantal communities and the
source of authority changes from bureaucratic to moral, from secular to
sacred, grounded in what is best for kids, performance is enhanced and
sustained, what is good gets done
Using the Five Sources of Authority as an interpretative framework provides a basis by
which the researcher can compare the words and actions of the mayor as well as the two
CEOs and determine the values that are used in decision-making processes. Traditional
leadership theory as related to the management and administration of educational
organizations tend to endorse technical-rational expertise, bureaucratic authority and
utilitarian motivational techniques as a basis for organizational decision-making.
For the purposes of this dissertation, CEO decisions will be judged based on the
source of authority that the CEO utilized to ensure the compliance of CPS employees
regarding the decision. The decisions will fall into a particular source of authority based
on “why” they should follow the directive. The researcher will also use all available
documentation to provide background information which led to the particular decision
that was made by each CEO.
Sergiovanni argues that the moral dimension of leadership is often ignored and
needs to be placed at the forefront. Although bureaucratic principles have their place,
Sergiovanni contends that when the bureaucratic source of authority is emphasized,
leaders prefer that the led do not question why they are doing things – they are supposed
to just do them. The reason behind following orders lies in the leader’s bureaucratic
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position in the organization. When the bureaucratic source of authority is emphasized
along with psychological authority, the leader must micromanage to get things done. The
organization then reflects a “top to bottom, bottom to top” hierarchy that keeps people in
their respective places within the organization. In schools, teachers rely on leaders to
dictate which tasks are to be done as well as how and when to get them done. This
reliance causes teachers to fall into a subordinate role rather than one of followership,
which consists of individuals who are committed to the professional ideal and who are
motivated by what is good. Leadership that is based in professional and moral authority
encourages self-management that reduces the need for direct leadership.1 In examining
the tenures of the two CEOs appointed after the 1995 Chicago Amendatory Act, this
dissertation will illustrate the sources of authority emphasized by Mayor Daley as well as
Vallas and Duncan to determine the framework that Daley believed was best in managing
the Chicago Public School District.
Background to the Study
In 1987, U.S. Secretary of Education, William Bennett, called Chicago’s schools
the worst in the nation: “If it isn’t the last, I don’t know who is. There can’t be very
many cities that are worse. Chicago is pretty much it.”2 The complex mix of machine
politics, deindustrialization, “white flight,” business influence, financial troubles,
ineffective board governance, failed desegregation attempts and teacher union influence
makes it difficult to ascertain the predominant causes of the status of the Chicago Public
1

Thomas J. Sergiovanni, Moral Leadership: Getting to the Heart of School Improvement (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992).
2

Casey Banas and Devonda Byers, “Chicago’s Schools Hit as Worst,” Chicago Tribune, 1987.
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Schools at that time. In 1988 and 2005, the city would experience two important reform
efforts that greatly affected the governing structure of the school system. The first reform
effort would dramatically change the school governance structure of the Chicago Public
School System, decentralizing authority from the central office into neighborhood
schools. The second reform act would amend the first set of reform efforts, keeping a
great deal of community control while centralizing a great deal of authority at the top of
the bureaucratic hierarchy.
In 1988, the Illinois State Legislature passed the Chicago School Reform Act as a
result of the efforts of grassroots school activists, public school advocacy groups,
business leaders and legislators.3 The goal of this legislature was to decentralize central
office authority and place power in the hands of individual school councils at each of the
district’s schools. The Local School Councils (LSCs) consisted of eleven members,
which comprised of six parents, two community members, two teacher representatives,
and the principal of the school. LSCs were granted the power to hire and fire the
principal, to set school policy, made budgetary decisions, as well as other key educational
decisions. Principals were taken off the tenure track and issued four-year performance
contracts that LSCs monitored. They were also given greater autonomy in hiring staff as
well as allocating school funds.
The 1988 law also created professional personnel advisory committees at each
school that were made up of teachers. The purpose of those committees was to deliver
input regarding educational programming. Sub districts would consist of a cluster of

3

Illinois State General Assembly, Chicago School Reform Act, Public Act 85-1418, 1988.
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schools separated by neighborhood boundary lines. Each sub district was led by a sub
district superintendent who was hired and fired by a group of representatives comprised
of individuals from the various LSCs. Another important change that the law
implemented was an expansion of the central school board from 11 to 15 members, and a
nominating commission that was created to select board members. The nominating
commission consisted of 22 parent and/or community members elected from each of the
district’s sub district councils and five members appointed from the mayor. The mayor
selected the board members from a pool of three candidates nominated by the
commission per school board position.
The 1988 reform measures marked an attempt to share decision-making and
accountability within the Chicago Public Schools. Failed efforts at reform at the sub
district level influenced reform advocates in Chicago to focus decision making at the
school, instead of the sub district level.4 Alfred G. Hess Jr., one of the architects of the
1988 reform act who had studied Chicago schools for over 25 years as a post-doctoral
fellow at Northwestern University and later as executive director of the Chicago Panel on
Public School Policy and Finance, argued that the vision of the process was one of
collaboration. Professional personnel advisory committees gave input on academic
related items. Principals had greater autonomy to make most important day-to-day
decisions regarding the management of the school. LSC members hired and fired
principals and were a part of the school’s financial decision-making process. Community

4

A. G. Hess, Jr., “Community Participation or Control? From New York to Chicago,” Theory into
Practice 38, no. 4, The Politics of Participation in School Reform (Autumn 1999): 220.
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members facilitated the hiring and firing of sub district superintendents. It was geared
to be the perfect blend of local decision-making.
After seven years decentralized decision-making, the mayor, along with state
policy makers and various groups of stakeholders grew very frustrated with the
decentralization structure.5 Wong and others argued that the dissatisfaction came from a
number of sources. First, student performance did not show significant improvement.
Second, the formation of LSCs did not bring about a significant increase in parental
involvement in school-related matters. Third, a budgetary crisis ensued, causing the
opening of school on time in September of 1995 to be in question. Fourth, the school
board was unable to restore public confidence in the system, and the aptitude of its top
administrators was questionable. Finally, Mayor Daley was frustrated because of the
limitations placed on his ability to select board members.6
In 1995, the Republican-controlled legislature passed a series of amendments to
the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act. This legislature was named the Chicago School
Reform Amendatory Act.7 Among the major features of this reform was an attempt to
institute a more effective set of checks and balances to the governance system, while
ultimately centralizing the main governance functions. The Amendatory Act changed

5

Kenneth K. Wong and Gail L. Sunderman, “How Bureaucratic Are Big-City School Systems?,”
Peabody Journal of Education 76, no. 3/4, Global Issues in Education (2001): 18.
6

Ibid.

7

Illinois State General Assembly, Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act, Public Act 89-0015,

1995.
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four major areas in CPS governance: the management structure, fiscal areas, the Board’s
relationship with the Chicago Teachers Union, and school board governance.
The management structure of the CPS was transformed into one that closely
resembled a corporate-style management system. The top positions within CPS were
eliminated, and were replaced with corporate titles. The superintendent position was
eliminated, and replaced with the “CEO” distinction. Daley was given the complete
authority to appoint the CPS CEO. In addition, the system would now be managed by a
chief financial officer, a chief educational officer, a chief operating officer, and a chief
purchasing officer, none of which were required to have educational credentials.
Fiscally, the Board was not given additional funding, but was granted greater
financial flexibility by streamlining state funding for the district by creating two block
grants, one to pay for general education and one for educational services. Also, sixteen
of the district’s property tax categories were collapsed into a single operating levy. The
law also removed restrictions on outsourcing, allowing the district to accept bids for
outside services. The School Finance Authority was suspended, giving the Board of
Trustees and Mayor Daley sole control over the management of finances.
In regards to CPS relations with the Chicago Teachers Union, the law effectively
limited the items on the table during contract discussions and placed a moratorium on
strikes for eighteen months. Important items taken off of the bargaining table were class
size and teacher assignments. Daley knew that those restrictions would lead to strained
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relations between him and the union, and called them together to ask them not to fight
the law. In return, he would rescind most of those restrictions.8
The school board would also experience a makeover. The fifteen member board
would be converted into a five member corporate-style board. The nominating
commission was abolished, and Daley was granted the authority to appoint all board
members of his choosing. Daley’s chief of staff Gerry Chico would be installed as the
president of the new Reform Board of Trustees. To the surprise of many, Local School
Councils remained in tact.
Significance of the Study
In naming the former Chicago Transit Authority President Ron Huberman to run
the Chicago Public School system in 2009, Mayor Richard M. Daley passed over Chief
Education Officer Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins, who was widely credited with sparking
some of the system’s biggest improvements. Eason-Watkins was the favorite candidate
of U.S. Education Secretary and former CPS CEO Arne Duncan. Huberman praised
Eason-Watkins as “an unsung hero of the Chicago Public Schools.” Many were not
happy with the mayor’s decision. In a prepared statement, Chicago Teacher’s Union
President Marilyn Steward expressed disappointment that he did not appoint someone
with a strong background in education. “He has to understand that we are working with
children with emotional and social issues coming into the classroom” Steward said.
“You cannot manage something that you do not understand.” Reverend Jesse Jackson

8

Dorothy Shipps, “Updating Tradition: The Institutional Underpinnings of Modern Mayoral
Control in Chicago Public Schools.” In When Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, edited
by Joseph Viteritti (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 124.
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said that Daley should have selected Eason-Watkins and called his selection
“political.” Julie Woestehoff, executive director of Parents United for Responsible
Education, called the move “a disservice to the city of Chicago.”
Mayor Daley’s decision revived a long-running debate in urban education over
who makes the better leader: the lifelong teacher-turned-administrator, or the superbusiness manager that has never set foot in the classroom. Daley has been clear about his
preference: “The system repeatedly failed our children. It is only after we separated the
two—skilled educator and strong manager—that we started to see real reform.”9 Daley
first executed this philosophy in 1995 when he was given complete control over
managing the Chicago Public Schools. The 1995 Illinois legislation allowed the
Democratic mayor to select a “Chief Executive Officer” for the schools and appoint a
powerful five-member board of education.10
In light of the “Superintendent versus CEO” debate, this study will examine CPS
CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority to assist in answering the question regarding why Daley chose non-educators to
run the district after the 1995 Amendatory Act. While the Amendatory Act changed
CPS’s governance structure and created the CEO title, Mayor Daley selected individuals
to fill the roles that he believed were able to formulate solutions for the problems
plaguing the district up to the 1995 Amendatory Act. The words and actions of Daley

9

Quotes from Huberman, Jackson, Woestehoff, and Daley taken from Sadovi, Carlos, and Dan
Mihalopoulos. "Daley Standing by School Chief Choice - Huberman Appointment Called Political,"
Chicago Tribune, January 29, 2009.
10

Ann Bradley, “Chicago Mayor Poised to Take District’s Reigns,” Education Week 14, no. 39
(1995): 1-2.
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and the two CEO’s as related to their educational philosophies, political agendas,
policies and practices during their tenures will be utilized to reveal the definition of an
“Education CEO” according to CPS.
After the 1995 Amendatory Act, Mayor Daley appointed individuals that did not
have educational backgrounds to the CEO position.11 Shortly after former budget
director Paul Vallas was appointed to the CPS CEO position in 1995, he stated: "There
will be some headaches; there will also be improvements in what happens in the
classroom. First, we'll be reaching out to all these interests, and then we'll have to have a
meeting of the minds. But whatever the case, the mayor has put Gery and me over here
to bring financial stability to the system and improve education. And we don't expect to
fail."12 Clearly, the goal of the mayor was to ensure that the Chicago Public Schools was
run by an individual that could cut costs and balance the budget. This would require an
individual that could manage the massive CPS bureaucracy. Wong and Sunderman
argued that the word “bureaucracy” has gathered negative connotations over time, and it
is simply seen as central control that exists to frustrate individuals whose charge is to
carry out orders.13 In analyzing the Chicago Public School System, they argue that
bureaucratic organization facilitates effective management by making it possible to create

11

Paul Vallas claimed that he taught elementary school for a short period of time, but an
investigation questioned if that was truly the case. For the purposes of this dissertation, the researcher will
classify him as a non-educator.
12

John Kass, ”City Schools Get Chief Who Rejects Failure,” Chicago Tribune, 1995.

13

Wong and Sunderman, 20.
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efficient systems to carry out financial and management tasks, and enhances the ability
of the central office to tend to the interests of the district as a whole.
Additionally, this study intends to provide educational leaders with information
to help them determine why educational reformers that backed the 1995 Chicago School
Reform Act determined that the district should run like a business instead of utilizing a
more traditional approach in line with school districts headed by an educational leader.
Examining leadership decisions, the types of initiatives implemented by each leader, and
the manner in which initiatives were executed through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five
Sources of Authority will help educational leaders to understand how the educational
governance philosophy of the district affects the leadership philosophy throughout the
district, all the way down to the classroom.
Research Questions
This study will answer the following research questions:
1. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, what were the
skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought from the CEO
position for Paul Vallas during the years of 1995-2001
2. Through the Lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, what were the
skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought from the CEO
position for Arne Duncan during the years of 2001-2008?
3. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, how did Paul
Vallas fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO
position?
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4. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, how did Arne
Duncan fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO
position?
5. How did the leadership styles of the Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan compare
through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority?
6. What implications does the CEO model have for school governance and
school leadership?
Proposed Methodology
Gary McCulloch, in his book Documentary Research: In Education, History and
the Social Sciences argues that documents can provide potent evidence of continuity and
change in ideals and in practices in private and in the public arena.14 In the spirit of that
argument, the methodology utilized for this study will be historical documentary
research. Primary and secondary sources will be used to gather words and actions of
various individuals and applied to Sergiovanni’s framework to conduct the analysis.
There are important distinctions between primary and secondary sources. A
primary source is a document or physical object which was written or created during the
time under study. These sources were present during an experience or time period and
offer an inside view of a particular event. Some types of primary sources include:


14

Original Documents: Diaries, speeches, manuscripts, newspapers, letters,
interviews, news film footage, autobiographies, official records

Gary McCulloch, Documentary Research: In Education, History and the Social Sciences (Social
Research and Educational Studies Series, 22) (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2004).
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Creative Works: Poetry, drama, novels, music, art



Relics or Artifacts: Pottery, furniture, clothing, buildings

A secondary source interprets and analyzes primary sources. These sources are one or
more steps removed from the event. Secondary sources may have pictures, quotes or
graphics of primary sources in them. Some types of secondary sources include:


Publications: Textbooks, magazine articles, histories, criticisms,
commentaries, encyclopedias

Examples of secondary sources include:


A journal/magazine article which interprets or reviews previous findings



A history textbook



A book about the effects of WWI

Through this study, the researcher will utilize public records from the Chicago
Public Schools Archive located at 100 S. Clark Street in Chicago, and the Harold
Washington Public Library in Chicago, including memos from Paul Vallas and Arne
Duncan, and Board of Education Proceedings. Other sources utilized will be doctoral
dissertations related to CPS school leadership, educational journal articles, Chicago Sun
Times and Chicago Tribune newspaper articles, Chicago Teacher’s Union publications,
and televised speeches and presentations. Documents such as Board Proceedings, state
legislative documents, and other related documents will provide the evidence necessary
to outline policies and procedures while newspaper accounts and other related sources are
utilized to give readers a feel for how individuals responded to certain situations at that
time. Direct quotes are utilized often as a rich source of evidence to illustrate how the
mayors and CEOs utilized media savvy to promote their agendas.
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In analyzing historical documents, issues of reliability, bias and authenticity
become relevant. The researcher of this study must take those issues into consideration
when using particular documents to tell a story. Newspaper articles that may describe
particular initiatives implemented by a CPS CEO may not be objective in its reporting of
a story. An article in a Chicago Teacher’s Union journal may not accurately reflect
unbiased information. However, the usage of such documents is critical in examining the
reaction of the public when certain initiatives were implemented and also in gauging who
was involved in the implementation.
Limitations of the Study
The researcher acknowledges that this study is subject to certain limitations. In
researching the words and actions of Governor Jim Edgar, Mayor Richard M. Daley, Paul
Vallas, and Arne Duncan, the researcher is limited to available documentation that may
not always completely illustrate the true feelings of the speaker. With newspaper articles
as a primary means of capturing the statements of individuals regarding particular events
and actions, the speaker will usually utilize caution in revealing information, which may
limit the perspective that is presented concerning the individuals that are examined in this
study.
Another limitation of this study includes the failure to include direct interviews
from the individuals examined in this study. Although the researcher contends that this
study will provide sufficient perspectives through available documentation, it would have
been interesting to include interviews from the individuals examined in this study if it
were feasible to do so. This study is designed to utilize documents to present an account
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of the individual’s words and actions at that time, as opposed to their current
perspective in retrospect.
Finally, this study is limited to the words and actions of individuals examined in
this study to determine the definition of the educational CEO in Chicago. Although
similar circumstances exist in other major cities, Chicago’s public school history is
unique and therefore resulted in a different approach to their educational governance
structure. Therefore, this study provides a historical background of mayoral control in
the public school systems of several major cities, but does not intend to present a
framework as to how major public school systems should be run.
Biases of Researcher
The researcher acknowledges personal biases that could potentially affect the
presentation of information within this study. In order to maintain the integrity of this
study, the researcher has identified all potential biases and maintains a personal journal
for the purposes of recording personal reactions and opinions formed throughout the
collection and presentation of data.
The researcher acknowledges that he is African-American male, who personally
attended a Chicago Public School from grades kindergarten through fourth grade. The
researcher did not have a particularly positive experience in general, and was removed
and placed into parochial schools after completing the fourth grade. This negative
opinion of public schooling could skew the presentation of information presented.
The researcher acknowledges that he is an educational leader in a Chicago Public
School under the current educational governance structure that is examined in this study.
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He has personally been affected by decisions made as a result of the current
governance structure. He has participated in conversations with other CPS administrators
that have questioned the effectiveness of a non-educator leading our school system. The
researcher acknowledges that in order to maintain the integrity of this study, it is vital that
his personal opinions regarding the governance structure of CPS do not affect his
research or presentation of information.
Proposed Chapters
Chapter II, A Historical Perspective of Mayoral Control of Schools in the United
States, will provide a historical summation of state takeovers of school districts, as well
as cities that have instituted varying degrees of mayoral control. This historical review
will give readers a background of problems and issues that have plagued other major
urban school districts as well as a framework for how they have elected to repair their
schools with increased mayoral control. Major cities that experienced significant
mayoral control included Boston, who would begin the charge in 1991, followed by
Chicago in 1995, Baltimore in 1997, Cleveland in 1998, New York City in 2002, and the
District of Columbia in 2007 (partial in 2002). The chapter ends with an in-depth
examination of the history of mayoral control in 20th century Chicago, events leading up
to the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act, followed by an examination of the Chicago
School Reform Amendatory Act, which were major revisions that were implemented in
1995. The major revisions included an abolishment of the 15 member board of education
to allow for the mayor to appoint a five member School Reform Board of Trustees, the
elimination of the “General Superintendent” position in favor of a “Chief Executive
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Officer,” increased authority for principals, a reversal of previous decentralization
efforts, a decrease in the Chicago Teachers Union bargaining rights, and increased
flexibility in the use of state and local funds for the school board. This chapter will also
illustrate the rationale for the implementation of the two acts. Finally, this chapter will
analyze the words and actions of Governor Edgar as well as Mayor Daley leading up to
his selection of the first CPS CEO to determine the skills, knowledge and dispositions
that he sought from the CEO as well as compare those traits to the traits of a corporate
CEO.
Chapter III will examine the tenure of CEO Paul Vallas and analyze his words
and actions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority. Vallas was the
first to function under the title “CEO.” Preceding this title change was a perception that
the system was prone to all sorts of problems stemming from a lack of focus on learning
and effective fiscal management. The State of Illinois, after years of providing
considerable resources and emergency funding worked with the city to develop a plan to
bring better management into the Chicago Public Schools. In 1995, a reform movement
passed by the State and supported by the City of Chicago led to the mayor’s appointment
of a new oversight Reform Board of Trustees. With that change, a new management team
was formed to lead the Chicago Public Schools. Along with the new management team,
the law eliminated the title of “General Superintendent” and replaced it with “Chief
Executive Officer.” The CEO title came with increased flexibility across certain funding
categories, and broader powers of remediation to intervene in failing schools. This
allowed the CEO to hold schools more accountable for results, which made
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“accountability” a major theme of Vallas’ tenure.
Chapter IV will examine the tenure of CEO Arne Duncan and also analyze his
words and actions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority. In 2001,
Mayor Daley showed displeasure in the decrease in student achievement test scores and
shortly thereafter, the school board president resigned, followed by CEO Paul Vallas.
Mayor Daley then turned to the former Deputy Chief of Staff to Paul Vallas, Arne
Duncan. Duncan’s tenure would be marked by his management of the district in light of
the No Child Left Behind Act, signed by former president George W. Bush in 2002.
The final chapter will contain an analysis of the words and actions of the two
CEOs as compared to the words and actions of Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley in
regards to what type of leader he wanted for the purposes of running the school system,
as well as initiatives that came directly from the mayor. This chapter will also contain a
comparison between the leadership styles of the two CEOs to analyze similarities and
differences in how they ran the district during their tenures. The researcher will use the
comparison to determine if there are trends and patterns of decision making that are
exclusive to each leader according to the Five Sources of Authority. Additionally, this
study will apply the arguments of Wong and Sergiovanni in regards to their views on
effective school leadership. Wong argues that when power and authority are
decentralized and dispersed throughout the system, it leaves room for organized groups to
emphasize their own agendas.15 Sergiovanni argues that individuals inherently work best
when the work is satisfying and meaningful. In this instance, individuals work for the
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professional ideal and for what is good. A top down bureaucracy will not cultivate
followership, which is necessary to transform organizations. For the school leader, this
dissertation will provide an examination into the tenures of Vallas and Duncan to
highlight policies and reform efforts designed to improve the state of the Chicago Public
Schools. Although the focus of this dissertation is not to judge the effectiveness of their
leadership styles on student achievement, school leaders will be able to draw some
conclusions regarding the usage of the CEO model to run a school system and its effect
on producing effective school governance outcomes. This chapter will also contain
implications for leadership as well as implications for further research.
Key Terms
Bureaucracy – A way of organizing work through an administrative structure
that defines authority and specifies the actions of those who occupy hierarchically
arranged offices. Authority is exercised through the hierarchical ordering of relationships
and systems of communication. Central to bureaucratic management is the specialized
professional knowledge possessed by the person holding a particular office. Impersonal
relationships are assumed to assure the detachment necessary for efficiency to govern
administrative decisions.16
Busing – Mandatory busing plans were implemented to transport students from
all black schools to all white schools. The objectives for mandatory busing included
relieving overcrowding in sending schools, the promotion of stabilization in the
communities involved, increase the desegregation in the areas involved, and to improve

16

Ibid., 19.

21
the educational experiences for all students involved.17 It is widely argued that
mandatory busing led to “white flight.”
Chief Executive Officer – Top executive responsible for a firm’s overall
operations and performance. He or she is the leader of the firm, serves as the main link
between the board of directors and the firm’s various parts or levels, and is held solely
responsible for the firm’s success or failure. CEO implements and maintains corporate
policy as established by the board and may also function as the chairman of the board.18
Decentralization – In regards to school reform, there are two perspectives related
to decentralization. The managerial view refers to the transfer of authority from a higher
level of a bureaucracy to a lower one in order to give local officials more flexibility in
responding to particular needs. The second view is termed local mandate representation,
which states that a representative should respond to the individual’s best interest so that
the individual is pleased. In order to properly respond to community needs, extensive
community involvement in decision-making is necessary to ensure that administrative
decentralization is not an empty gesture. In other words, managerial decentralization can
take place without citizens playing any role, and thus comes a failure to implement
community wishes.19
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Desegregation – The term “desegregation” literally means to cease to be
segregated. In regards to school enrollment patterns and the racial composition of
students in public schools, the landmark Brown v. Board case dealt only with de jure
segregation, which is intentional segregation. Since then, a great deal of attention has
been placed on de facto segregation, which is segregation that occurs as a result of the
racial segregation that occurs as a result of neighborhood settlement patterns.20
Inequalities between schools with a majority white student enrollment and schools with a
majority black student enrollment were found in the 1950’s, and schools in major urban
areas would soon have to implement mandatory desegregation plans. Resistance to
desegregation efforts would ultimately render court ordered mandatory desegregation
meaningless because there were so few whites left in the public school system by the
1980’s.21
Deindustrialization – This term is generally used to refer to the structural change
in the economy that occurs as a result of the shift from a goods-producing manufacturing
industrial economy to a more high-technology service-producing economy. A direct
impact of this structural change is the loss of manufacturing jobs in the inner cities, and
an increase in the demand for service-producing workers who typically need a relatively
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high level of education. Those trends suggest a link in the formation of poverty areas
in major metropolitan areas.22
Educational Crisis – CPS schools that met the criteria to of a school in the midst
of an educational crisis would receive intervention from central office, the principal could
be fired and the LSC members could be removed. Examples of the criteria that could be
used were: The failure of the principal to develop or implement a school improvement
plan, the failure of the principal to provide a safe building for students and staff, and a
non-functional LSC.23
Intervention – Different from reconstitution, a school that was determined to be
in intervention status were placed under the direct control of the CEO who could dismiss
teachers directly for non-performance.24
LSC – Elected bodies which consist of six parents, two community members, two
teachers, and the principal. The LSC chairperson must be a parent representative. LSC’s
major responsibilities are to approve the school budget and school improvement plan,
evaluate the principal every year and to decide on the renewal of a principal’s contract
every four years.
Patronage – Political patronage is a form of constituency service that serves the
electoral needs of incumbent politicians. Chicago political machines regained control of
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the public schools in part through the issuance of patronage appointments in the nonteaching positions.25
Political Machines – A political machine is a political organization where the
boss gains the support of followers who receive rewards for their efforts. In Chicago,
machine politics were infused in the schools by the use of the expanding school system to
reward business and machine supporters with custodial jobs and building projects. Black
Chicago was eventually brought into the machine though the building of additional
schools in black neighborhoods.26 This practice inadvertently reinforced the segregation
of students in neighborhood schools.
Primary Source – Refers to basic raw materials (such as government papers,
diaries, and newspapers) which were created within the period of time that is studied.27
Reconstitution – The process of reconstitution involves the re-staffing of all
employees in a school. Each employee of the school would have to interview for their
positions. If not hired, they would be put into a reserve pool where they would be paid
until they found another job. The decision to utilize reconstitution was determined by the
CEO.
School Board – Local school boards exercise responsibility for the decision and
policymaking for individual school districts. Local school boards of education are
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charged with creating the conditions within their school districts that will foster student
achievement and for engaging the community in support of this central mission. Primary
duties include establishing specific priorities for improving student learning and school
performance, ensuring staff and resource allocations meet district goals, aligning
programs and initiatives with student achievement priorities, and leveraging resources to
address the needs of all students.28
Secondary Source – The books and articles produced later by historians studying
a particular period of time, making use of primary documents within.29
White Flight – Refers to the change in school enrollment patterns due to the loss
of middle class white students in the Chicago Public School system due to
suburbanization, and enrollment of white students in to private and parochial schools.
This loss is argued to be due to onset of desegregation efforts.30
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MAYORAL CONTROL OF
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Historically, the management of American schools was treated as other city
municipalities, and was the direct responsibility of the city mayor.1 Progressive era
reformers of the 20th century did not approve of that arrangement, determining that
mayors were subject to the political machines that often dominated local politics.2
Progressive reformers fought to separate the educational system from other governmental
departments by creating separate school districts with dedicated revenue streams.3 As of
late, city and state takeover of public school systems has gained prominence as a school
reform strategy. This has been a manifestation of the growing concern of policymakers,
educators and parents regarding the state of the nation’s public schools. The 1990’s in
particular saw the emergence of a “new style” of mayor interested in taking a strong
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leadership role in their city’s school system.4 Major cities that experienced significant
mayoral control included Boston, who would begin the charge in 1991, followed by
Chicago in 1995, Baltimore in 1997, Cleveland in 1998, New York City in 2002, and the
District of Columbia in 2007 (partial in 2002).5
Mayor-appointed school districts are often the manifestation of the state takeover
of school districts. As of 2002, 24 states had enacted policies that allowed them to take
over a school district if it was experiencing academic difficulties. States could also take
over a school district due to financial mismanagement, corrupt governance and failing
infrastructure.6 In a policy brief for the Educational Commission of the States, Todd
Ziebarth outlined many opposing perspectives on the state takeover of schools. He
argued that according to proponents of the approach, state takeovers are a necessary
extension of a state’s constitutional responsibilities, they provide a good opportunity for
state and local decision makers to combine resources and knowledge to improve
children’s learning, allow a competent executive staff to guide the effective
implementation of improvement efforts, and use achievement data collected from school
districts and schools to bolster accountability efforts. He also argues that opponents of
this approach assert that state takeovers imply that the community has the problems and

4

Kenneth K. Wong, Francis X. Shen, Dorothea Anagnostopoulos, and Stacey Rutledge, The
Education Mayor: Improving America's Schools (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007).
5

Michael Kirst, “Mayoral Control of Schools: Politics, Trade-offs, and Outcomes.” In When
Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, edited by Joseph Viteritti (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 46.
6

T. Ziebarth, State Takeovers and Reconstitutions Policy Brief. Prepared for the Education
Commission of the States, 2002.

28
the states have the answers, place poorly prepared state-selected officials in charge, use
narrow learning methods, focus on cleaning up incompetent administration and fail to go
to the root of the social problems facing disadvantaged students in urban school districts,
and foster negative connotations and impressions that hinder the self-esteem of school
board members, administrators, teachers, students and parents.7
Extent of Mayoral Control
For school districts that have been turned over to the mayor for reform, the
amount of mayoral control varies by the city. Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen have
done extensive work regarding the research of mayoral control of school districts and the
effects that mayoral takeover have on school performance. In an essay written for
education week, they outlined the powers of mayors in regards to the selection of school
boards8, and in their book, The Education Mayor: Improving America’s Schools, they
provided a chart of characteristics of school districts with mayor-led integrated
governance.9 A summary of that research is provided to illustrate some of those
characteristics for major cities that have elected to utilize various degrees of mayoral
control.

7

Ibid.

8

Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen, “Mayors Can Be Prime Movers’ of Urban School
Improvement,” Education Week 14, no. 7 (2009): S11-S13.
9

Wong, Shen et al., The Education Mayor.

29
Major Cities With a Significant Extent of Mayoral Control of Schools
In Boston, Massachusetts as of 1992, the mayor picks a seven-member school
committee from a list of names nominated by a screening panel and then the committee
chooses the superintendent. The mayor selects the majority of the school board but does
not have full appointment power. In Chicago, Illinois as of 1995, the mayor directly
appoints a Chief Executive Officer, and also selects the seven members of the board of
education. He appoints all of the board members and has full appointment power. In
Baltimore, Maryland as of 1997, the mayor and governor jointly appoint the nine
members of the school board from a list of qualified individuals submitted by the state
board of education. This means that the mayor does not have full appointment power. In
Cleveland, Ohio as of 1998, the mayor appoints the nine members of the school board
from a slate of nominees selected by a local nominating panel. In this instance, the
mayor appoints all of the board but does not have full appointment power. In New York
City, New York as of 2002, the mayor has the authority to appoint the chancellor of
schools (equivalent of traditional superintendent), and 8 of 13 members of what is called
the Panel for Educational Policy. The mayor has full appointment power. In
Washington, D.C. as of 2007, the mayor has governance authority previously held by the
D.C. board of education but city council retains budgetary oversight.
Smaller Cities With a Significant Extent of Mayoral Control of Schools
In New Haven, Connecticut, since 1990, the mayor actually serves on the board of
education, and appoints the seven additional members of the board with full appointment
power. In Providence, Rhode Island beginning before 1990, the mayor appoints the nine-
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member school board from a slate of candidates developed by the Providence School
Board Nominating Commission. In Trenton, New Jersey, beginning previously to 1990,
the mayor appoints the nine-member board of education with full appointment power. In
Yonkers, New York, since previously to 1990, the mayor appoints the nine-member
board of education. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania as of 2000, the mayor appoints all five
members of the board of education and has full appointment power.
Cities With Lesser Degrees of Mayoral Control
In Oakland, California from 2000-2004, the school board was expanded from
seven to ten, which the three new board members appointed by the mayor. The mayor
has full appointment power for the three board members. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
the mayor appoints two of the five members of what is called the School Reform
Commission, and the governor appoints the other three. Unlike in Baltimore, the mayor
and governor’s selections are separate instead of jointly done. In Hartford, Connecticut,
as of 2005, the mayor appoints five of nine board of education members, including the
president of the board. Before 2005, the school board was appointed by a mix of mayoral
and state authorities, but currently, the mayor has full appointment power. In Detroit,
Michigan from 1999-2004, the mayor appointed six of seven school board members. The
seventh member was the state superintendent of public instruction. The mayor had full
appointment power. In 2004, Detroit residents voted in a 2004 referendum to return to an
elected school board for five years, and then the mayor would appoint all seven members.
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Cities in Which Mayoral Control Has Largely Taken Hold
Boston
In the 1970’s Boston, like many cities in the country, struggled with the
integration of African Americans into public schools. Boston’s racial issues were so
highly publicized that business and political leaders vowed that their city would never
again be “dragged through the mud.”10 Usdan and Cuban argue that the backlash against
the racial conflict and the national embarrassment that took place as a result of their
struggles with integration led to the early efforts of the city reformers to press for
restructuring the way Boston schools were governed. The 1970’s through the 1980’s saw
the Boston schools become political battlegrounds. In addition to desegregation issues,
the separation of the school department from the general government created
fragmentation and limited accountability. Infighting between departments made
desegregation efforts even more difficult. Although reform efforts surfaced starting in
the early 1970’s, those efforts were overshadowed by the fact that between 1974 and the
late 1980’s, the U.S. District Court had issued more than four hundred court orders
involving school closings, personnel decisions, textbook adoption and community
partnerships.11
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Typically, Boston’s mayor did not involve himself in school administration.
However, in the early 1970’s, it was becoming increasingly clear to Boston Mayor Kevin
White that if changes were not made, court ordered desegregation would occur and he
would be forced to deal with them. This would prompt White to attempt to gain control
of Boston’s schools. That attempt was unsuccessful. In October of 1980, after racial
tensions led to fighting between black and white students at South Boston High School,
White was asked if the Boston Schools were in “crisis.” He replied: “Yes, I think the
schools are traumatized, but that is not the fault of the mayor. The Mayor had nothing to
do with South Boston High School…”12
In the 1980’s, criticisms of Boston’s education system continued, and in 1983, the
school committee grew from five members to thirteen. In 1984, the newly elected
Raymond Flynn would declare his wishes for control of the Boston Public School
system:
For the longest period of time there has been aggravation and hostility (in
relations between the city and the school committee).13 I think it’s real
important to send a real positive message. I hope to see, in the near future,
public education returned to the city. We have to build up confidence that
we are, in fact, serious about moving public education forward.14
In his first year, Mayor Flynn was invited to serve on the school board as an ex-officio
member without voting privileges. He never fully assumed the seat, but attended some
committee meetings. He would later find out that his unofficial status meant that he had
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very little leverage with the school board. In January of 1985, the school board hired
nine individuals and promoted three, despite the mayor’s educational advisor’s
recommendation not to do so.15 For the next few years, Flynn hesitated to involve
himself heavily with school politics.
By 1989, public education in Boston was the target of widespread criticism.
Flynn then began to push education reform to the top of his agenda. In September of
1988, Flynn appointed an eleven member advisory committee to examine Boston school
governance and other problematic issues. John Portz cites that the study declared that
“frustration with school performance (in Boston) has reached an all time high.”16 The
advisory committee reached a consensus in favor of turning the 13 member school
committee into a panel appointed to the mayor, citing that the current structure made
critical decision making difficult. When Flynn was directly asked if he was ready to
campaign for an appointive school committee, Flynn’s response was “I’m going to play it
on the basis of what I think will work. If I see it, we’ll go for it. We have to find out
what has the confidence of the people of the city.”17 However, Flynn was clearly
expressed frustrated with the current school governance structure of Boston Schools:
Being mayor, if the parks of this city aren’t working, or the swings are
broken, or the benches are broken, I know what I’ll do. I’ll get on the
phone to the parks commissioner and growl, and they’ll get fixed. But
calling the School Department with such a request is to confront a system
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that some up with 59 different answers… a central bureaucracy that goes
around in circles at Court Street without ever making a decision.18
The Flynn administration would seek three important changes in the Boston School
System: A new student assignment plan to make busing more efficient, more authority
and accountability for school leaders and teachers, as well as changes in how the schools
were governed.
In November of 1989, a citywide advisory referendum on the issue would take
place. Leading up to the nonbinding referendum, Flynn spent approximately $65,000 on
a last minute advertising campaign. Flynn urged voters to give Boston school children “a
new school board that will stop wasting time and tax dollars.”19 Flynn would continue to
openly criticize the school governance structure and the Boston School System:
Right now everyone has the right to vote and look at what they’re voting
for. It’s a terrible school system. Individually, they’re fine people but it’s
the structure that’s inherently flawed. No matter who is on the committee,
the first thing they have to worry about is getting reelected. I think that if
you want to get into politics, then run for City Council. Politics does not
belong in the schools.20
Later in the year, Flynn would even solicit parent support, sending letters to 100 parents.
Despite strong efforts to sway voters, the referendum yielded mixed results. An equal
number of committee members supported an appointed committee as well as opposed it.
This would temporarily freeze efforts to convert to an appointed committee until efforts
resumed in 1990, and in April of 1991, the city council voted to forward a petition to the
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state to create a seven-member committee appointed by the mayor. Under the new
system, a thirteen-member nominating committee would be appointed by the mayor to
review applications and recommend three individuals for each open committee position.
Black members of city council continued to strongly debate the decision to change the
governance structure, arguing that an appointed board would not represent and address
the concerns of the black community. Despite criticism, Flynn appointed seven
individuals out of the people recommended from the nominating committee to begin their
terms in January of 1992.
This significant shift to mayoral control in Boston would begin an era of change
which changed many roles and left questions as to how leadership would function with
the new control issued to the mayor. Superintendent Lois Harrison-Jones, who was hired
by the previous board who was elected, would now have to answer to the new mayorelected board. Mayor Flynn and Harrison-Jones began to have disagreements which
would often become news stories in the Boston Globe. In addition to that, Flynn
appointed his top aide, Robert Consalvo, as executive secretary of the committee. This
was a position that did not exist previous to Flynn gaining control. Questions would arise
concerning his appointment, where board members as well as community members
openly criticized the appointment because of the cost of his position, as well as the
possibility that he was there to ensure that the mayor controlled the board. Controversies
would continue as the newly appointed school board made decisions in an attempt to
improve the Boston School system. Many accused the new board of being the mayor’s
“rubber stamp.” The controversies would subside some when Mayor Flynn resigned to
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join the Clinton administration as the ambassador to the Vatican in mid-1993. Thomas
Menino, the city council president, became acting mayor, and later won the special
election held that November.
Menino would immediately begin the process of change by demanding the
resignations of all of Boston’s city department heads-all but the superintendent of
schools, Lois Harrison-Jones. “I look forward to working with Lois Harrison-Jones to
improve the quality of education for all the students of Boston,” says Menino. “As far as
I’m concerned, her job is secure.”21 Many of Boston’s public was surprised by his
decision not to ask for her resignation. Although the school superintendent and the heads
of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Department of Health and Hospitals
could not be fired by the mayor because they were appointed by the boards that run those
agencies, that did not stop Menino from asking everyone except Harrison-Jones to resign
anyway.
Intent on taking an active role in the decision making process within Boston
Schools, Menino did not take long to assume an active role in school governance. A little
over a month after becoming the mayor, he would unveil plans to create a year-long boot
camp for fifty of Boston’s most troubled students. Menino stated: “It’s an alternate
program for these kids to get them back into the mainstream. It’s better to do this than
spend $50,000 on putting them in jail.”22 This plan would soon draw criticism from the
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NAACP, and supposedly drew disappointment from Harrison-Jones, who reportedly
wondered why she was not included in the planning of the boot camp.23 This would
serve as the beginning of a series of disagreements that ultimately ended with Menino
asking Harrison-Jones to resign.
Menino continued to exert direct influence on educational affairs, setting a
deadline on plans for improving schools for the Boston Compact, which was a
partnership of businesses, higher education, parents and community agencies. Menino
stated:
The goals we put forth today are the right goals. I am now challenging
everyone who pursues partnerships and collaborative efforts in our schools
to develop a strategic plan…that will detail how these efforts fit together.
And I want this strategic plan on my desk by June 15.24
In a move that was done to help improve his working relationship with Boston’s
Superintendent, Menino invited Harrison-Jones to serve on his cabinet. “Lois HarrisonJones will be the person who sits on the Cabinet,” Menino said. “This is my way of
reaching out. The schools are so important to me. If we don’t do something in the next
two years, they are gone.”25 However, this truce would only last a short time. By the end
of the year in 1994, the Boston Globe put out several reports indicating that board
members and the mayor encouraged Superintendent Harrison-Jones to step down from
her post. In January of 1995, she delivered the following quote:

23

Peter Canellos, “Boot Camp Idea Draws Criticism From Two Fronts,” Boston Globe, 1993.

24

Jordana Hart, “Menino Sets a Deadline on Plans for Improving City’s Public Schools,” Boston
Globe, 1994.
25

Chris Black, “Menino Asks Harrison-Jones to Join Cabinet,” Boston Globe, 1994.

38
The superintendent is the leader, the person who should set the pace. The
difference between Boston and other places is that Boston will not respect
the agenda or the plan or the vision put forth by the superintendent. It has
happened here for the past two decades…I am very serious about my work
and I work hard at what I do. I have very little time or inclination for
politicizing children’s lives and education. If Boston is to take its schools
seriously, it has to get politics out of schools.26
Harrison-Jones stood strong and did not step down from the superintendent position.
However, she was later informed that her contract which would expire in July would not
be renewed. After a broad search process, Thomas Payzant, assistant secretary in the
United States Department of Education, and former superintendent, was offered Boston’s
superintendent position and assumed the post in September of 1995.
Portz and Schwartz argued that at this point in Boston School history, the key
ingredients for the governance of school reform were now in place.27 At this point, the
mayor had been responsible in directly appointing five of the seven board members, as
well as the superintendent. Payzant remained superintendent for nearly eleven years,
which broke a trend in Boston (as well as other major urban school districts) which saw a
new superintendent about every five years or less. Mayor Thomas Menino, since elected
in 1993, continues as mayor as of this writing. The chair of the school committee would
maintain her post for ten years. The president of the Boston Teacher’s Union served at
his post for twenty years, until 2003, when he would be replaced by a long-time Boston
teacher and union member. Portz and Schwartz would contend that this alignment of
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individuals played an important role in fostering communication and cooperation
around school improvement.28
In January of 1996, Mayor Menino would make a statement that solidified his
stance on the improvement of the Boston School system and informed the public as to
who to blame if it failed:
I want to be judged as your mayor by what happens now in the Boston
public schools. If I fail to bring about these specific reforms by the year
2001, then judge me harshly.29
The Boston public was behind him, and the current school governance structure
continued to earn support as well, as evidenced by the results when the issue was put on
the ballot for voters in November of 1996. The ballot issue gave voters the choice of
keeping the seven-member mayor-appointed committee, or reverting back to the thirteenmember elected committee. The appointed committee won 53 percent of the votes while
returning to an elected committee got 23 percent of the vote (23 percent of the ballots
were blank on this issue).30
With public support behind him, Mayor Menino would launch a number of major
educational reforms during his tenure. In 1996, he proposed a five-year reform plan for
Boston schools called Focus on Children. This plan had an emphasis on instructional
improvement, and highlighted six areas: literacy and mathematics instruction, applying
student work and data, professional development, replicating best practices, aligning
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resources with an instructional focus, and community engagement. Other important
reform initiatives would include the adoption of citywide learning standards, a rigorous
promotion policy, a restructuring of large high schools into smaller learning
communities, a full day program for all five year old students, a plan to reduce class
sizes, and a technology initiative that increased the number of computers available in the
classroom.31 Those reforms had resulted in a general increase in student academic
achievement as evidenced by Boston standardized test scores. However, Menino’s
“judge me harshly” statement would be used against him in a 2001 mayoral debate.
When asked about student performance by a member of the national board of directors of
the Black Alliance for Educational Options, Menino responded with the following:
Well, we have made progress…The long slide in the schools is over, and
you have to continue to work with us on the improvement of the school
system. It is unfortunate that we had a system where education wasn’t the
important issue and we just continued to promote kids. Now that has
stopped. We have mandatory summer school for kids and we are also
starting this very extensive after school program. But education in urban
areas is not as easy as some people think it is.32
The debate over if mayoral control in Boston has truly brought about positive increases in
student achievement continues, but Boston would serve as the first of many cities to
utilize mayoral control as an educational reform. Chicago would be the next city to place
the governance of the school system in the hands of the mayor, which will be discussed
in detail at the end of this chapter. Baltimore would follow Chicago in 1997.
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Baltimore
Historically, Baltimore already had a school structure that was mayor dominated.
Baltimore’s 1899 City Charter provided that the mayor appoint all nine members of the
Board of School Commissioners, which gave the mayor considerable power over school
affairs.33 Baltimore’s school superintendent officially reported to the school board, but in
reality, depended on a large amount of mayoral support. The mayor also had
considerable budgetary authority, with spending over $300 requiring the approval of a
five-member Board of Estimates, which the mayor controlled by holding a seat and
appointing two of its members.34 Frustrated with reform efforts, Maryland state officials
would succeed in reversing a great amount of mayoral control and took on a considerable
amount themselves, creating a city-state partnership.35 Cibulka argues that the partial
state takeover was a result of poor student performance and mismanagement that can be
traced back to the policies of former mayor Donald Schaefer, who held office from 1971
until 1986.36
As a result of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board, Baltimore
would desegregate quickly without the conflict that was typical in other major cities.37 In
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1963, school board president Eli Frank would appoint an ad hoc committee to prepare
a report regarding desegregation efforts. The report was called Seven Years of
Desegregation in the Baltimore Public Schools: A Report. The report charged the system
with purposely segregating schools and overcrowding schools attended by African
Americans by not building enough schools in the inner city, “districting” white schools to
keep African Americans from enrolling, and refusing to issue transfers to African
American students who attempted to enroll in predominately white schools.38 The school
system would ultimately purchase enough school buses to transfer five thousand students
to bus African-American students into many all-white schools. This integration would be
met with little opposition, which was an extremely liberal transformation.
By the time Mayor Schaefer took office in 1971, Baltimore’s white population
would begin to shift to the suburbs, and by the late 1970’s, black residents made up the
majority of Baltimore’s population. Naturally, these trends would be reflected in school
enrollment patterns. By 1980, only 20 percent of Baltimore’s school population
composed of whites. As percentage of black students grew, the black community wanted
the demographics of school administration, teachers, and other school personnel to
change with this shift.39 In July of 1971, the school board would appoint the city’s first
African-American superintendent, Roland Patterson. Superintendent Patterson and the
mayor would clash often. Patterson immediately made significant changes to the
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administrative staff in Baltimore, reassigning white administrators and replacing them
with blacks. Patterson’s hiring, which was supposed to help relieve racial tension in
Baltimore ended up creating additional racial tensions.40 Wong contends that initially,
Schaefer and Patterson worked together without incident. But Patterson’s assertive style
and association with black community leaders began to cause a rift between the two.
Wong provided a quote from the state superintendent: “In conducting school business, it
is difficult to know who is in charge. Is it the president of the school board, the
superintendent, the mayor, the city council, or some combination of some or all of
them?”41 In 1975, Mayor Schaefer did not reappoint three school board members who
had been previously loyal to Patterson, and brought in his own board members. With this
influence of the school board, Patterson was removed from his post that July.
The 1970’s and 1980’s would see the building of relationships between Baltimore
administrators, city hall, and the school system.42 Mayor Schaefer would reach an
agreement with black leaders about how the school system would be controlled. Schaefer
would select John Crew, a former deputy under former superintendent Roland Patterson
as the city’s second black superintendent. Black representation would remain constant,
as two out of four deputy superintendents, thirteen of sixteen assistant superintendents,
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and three of six regional superintendents were black. Along with this, several
principals along with two thirds of the Baltimore teaching staff were black.43
Marion Orr argued that public education was not the main concern of Schaefer
during his administration. As a result of this, educational spending was sparse. Schools
operated with a shortage of books and low staffing levels in school support positions.
The system had little room for enrichment programs, and low teacher pay restricted the
system’s ability to recruit good teachers.44 Demographic shifts continued, and the white
population that remained in the city attended private and parochial schools. But as long
as Schaefer tended to the material needs of the black community, he continued to receive
the majority of black votes.45
By 1987, it was evident that Baltimore was ready to elect a black mayor. Cibulka
contended that a “new breed of urban mayor was emerging, people who saw the
improvement of their city’s schools as inextricably linked to the fate of the cities
themselves.”46 Kurt Schmoke was to represent this type of mayor and new generation of
African American leaders. Schmoke was the son of college educated parents, was a high
school and college sports star, and a graduate of Yale University and Harvard Law
School, as well as a Rhodes Scholar. During his mayoral campaign, we would express
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that the economic goals of Baltimore did not include neighborhood improvement. 47
He promised Baltimore that he would focus on public education.
Schmoke was elected mayor in 1987. By 1989, he would reject the school
board’s majority choice to replace retiring superintendent Alice Pinderhughes, and
instead endorsed his own candidate, Richard Hunter. Hunter would not last long, because
of a difference in fundamental educational administration philosophy between him and
the mayor. Schmoke would ask the school board not to renew his contract.48 Walter
Amprey would be hired to replace Hunter. By this time, Schmoke would begin to
express some frustration with the Baltimore School system. His commitment began to be
questioned when he reportedly considered taking his daughter out of the school system in
1992. Schmoke would be asked about the possible public reaction to that decision, and
he answered:
Both of my children have had experiences in public and private schools.
Different people will draw different conclusions. I think most people
understand that I have responsibilities as a father and that is to do what is
in the best interest of my child.49
Orr cites a report that was released in 1992 called A Report on the Management of
the Baltimore City Public Schools, which reported that many of the systems’ school
based and central office administrators were incompetent and a culture existed that did
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not allow for effective management.50 Few reform efforts were in place and
Baltimore’s students performed poorly academically.
However, Schmoke would demonstrate that he would be directly involved with
school affairs. He would take advantage of his control of the Board of Estimates to
increase the amount of local revenues that would be used for education. The amount of
funds allocated for educational purposes increased each year during his first term.51 In
1992, he would hire a private firm, Educational Alternatives, Incorporated, to run nine
Baltimore Public Schools. Schmoke believed that the company could illustrate that
giving schools more autonomy and utilizing private management techniques could
improve performance.52 The Sun ran a report calling the move “a courageous step to
improve the schools.”53 This partnership would end in 1995 when the company failed to
show significant improvements. Schmoke would also formulate a committee that
consisted of central office administrators, teachers and representatives from BUILD
(Baltimoreans United for Leadership Development) to develop a site-based management
(SBM) plan. The plan would gain little support from Baltimore’s schools.
Despite failed reform attempts, Schmoke won a third term in 1995. Leading up to
his victory, the state of Maryland would be among the first in the nation to adopt high
stakes testing, accountability reporting, and a program of intervention in low-performing
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schools. The state of Maryland declared that low-performing schools could be
“reconstitution eligible” if it were not making adequate progress.54 “Reconstitution
eligible” was another term for state takeover. The state would require that schools meet
an array of standards that include improved standardized test scores, attendance rates,
lower dropout rates, and higher promotion rates to avoid state takeover. State
Superintendent Nancy Grasmick, in a letter to The Sun, defined what the state’s
intentions were:
I am concerned that there has been a great deal of confusion and
misunderstanding about what reconstitution is and what we are trying to
achieve. Let me be absolutely clear. Reconstitution is not immediate state
“takeover” or “seizure” of a school. It is a process of identifying a school
in need of serious change and determining the appropriate actions for
turning that school around. More importantly, it is about rejecting that
time honored myth that some children are incapable of learning and that
we should therefore consign them to failing schools.55
She would go on to assert that the state was not interested in being in the business of
operating or contracting out the operation of individual schools, citing the importance of
cooperation between the state, local school systems and individual school communities.
Although the state superintendent claimed that the state was not in the business of
operating Baltimore schools, it would find that many were reconstitution eligible. The
state would ultimately determine that the district itself was the problem. An ongoing
lawsuit that was brought against Baltimore by a disability rights organization led to loss
of control to operate special education programs through the orders of a federal judge.
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As a result of this, the state superintendent requested that an oversight team be put in
place to review the all appointments of Superintendent Amprey above the rank of
teacher.56 As more lawsuits were brought, and the relationship between the state and the
city continued to worsen, the state and city would reach an agreement that placed the
state in charge of major management and educational reforms in 1997. Kurt Schmoke
would decide that he would not run for reelection.
Cleveland
In the decades leading up to 1998, Cleveland mayors, just as Boston mayors, did
not make public school reform a priority. Mirroring issues similar to other urban school
districts, Cleveland also experienced changes in the ethnic and racial background of its
students as they complied with mandatory desegregation orders. Because Cleveland was
so racially segregated, busing would be implemented in an attempt to desegregate its
schools. Galster argued that this would cause a chain reaction called “white flight,”
where white families moved to the suburbs, causing the schools to become even more
segregated.57 Student performance in Cleveland was generally poor. Rich and Chambers
argued that the concerns of Clevelanders became manifested in mistrust and
unwillingness on the part of many citizens, politicians and businesses to invest more
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funding into a system that was so broken.58 A fiscal crisis would soon develop,
leaving the city with an educational debt that would cause the state to have to put the
district in receivership for three years in 1981.59 Cleveland’s high dropout rates, low
achievement scores, and fiscal mismanagement would cause the city to begin the process
of reforming its public schools.
Unlike Boston mayors, Cleveland Mayor Michael White would at least attempt to
endorse a more collaborative approach to reforming Cleveland’s schools. White would
begin to respond to the city’s concerns by launching the Cleveland Summit on Education
in May of 1990. Participants of this summit would give recommendations that would
target nine key areas for reform. The summit would convene again in 1991, and review
prior recommendations as well as discuss securing the funding to implement additional
reforms. White told summit participants that they must be the driving force to initiate
change:
We must work like never before to ensure they (recommendations) are
implemented. We cannot relax. We cannot sit down. We cannot leave
this building today and say the work is done. All of us must dig in, roll up
our sleeves and work like never before.60
White would also provide support to what was known as the “Four L-Slate Reform
Coalition.” Those would be school board candidates whose names started with the letter
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“L.” His support would help them land school board election victories and
characterize the school board as being a “reform board.”61
Despite White’s efforts, Cleveland’s governor, George Voinovich, would begin to
intervene in Cleveland school reform efforts. He would publicly announce that he was
considering a plan that would replace the Cleveland Board of Education and
superintendent for up to three years. School board members spoke out against this plan.
Board member Martha Smith was quoted as saying that “he (Governor Voinovich) has
not been a friend of the Cleveland Public Schools. I have not seen him exhibit any
sensitivity or understanding of the district.” Board member Stanley Tolliver claims: “He
doesn’t discuss what he’s going to do about poverty, high unemployment, the drug
problem, and all the other societal ills that our kids face, but he thinks that changing the
governance will help the school.”62 Mayor White would claim to be shocked that the
governor was considering a state takeover. He would openly oppose:
I’m not looking for a confrontation and I don’t think bickering solves
anything, but I think his plan is premature. A state takeover will not
cleanse the schools. I am more concerned about getting citizens involved
from all segments to improve the schools…There is no quick fix. It takes
the involvement of all sectors of the community and a commitment to
bring about change. It will never happen with an edict from the
governor.63
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White would continue to build public support and consensus for school reform.
Governor Voinovich would later claim that he was prepared to be patient regarding a
school-takeover bill.
Towards the middle to late months of 1991, Mayor White would begin to exhibit
a loss of confidence in the Cleveland school board. As he continued to endorse his own
candidates for school board seats, he would openly criticize the incumbents:
I want the people of this city to make the decision. If they don’t make the
decision to get rid of these incumbents – the people who have destroyed
this system for their own gain, to maintain their own political bases – then
we’re going to deal with it on November 6, and the call will be loud and
clear and will be from all parts of this community for the state to take this
school system.64
While warning Cleveland of the possible consequences of not electing reform-minded
school board members, White continued to sharply criticize board members:
Today we have children who for weeks have eaten baloney sandwiches.
They try to learn in schools where the roofs are leaking. They sit in
classrooms where there are not enough books. They sit in classes where
there are not enough materials. And all we get from the school board is
more talk about politics more talk about the court order and more attempts
to divide this community, black against white.65
White reasoned that a new group of board members who shared his views would make
necessary fundamental changes to public policy.66
In 1993, Cleveland would have its third educational summit, which focused on the
implementation of Superintendent Sammie Parrish’s Vision 21 plan. The Vision 21 plan
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was presented by Parrish in late 1992, which was a reform plan that included
developing a long range education strategy, forging consensus in modifying the
desegregation order, developing a cost-cutting and overall financial plan, and creating a
building-use plan. This plan was extremely important in that reforms contained in this
plan was ultimately utilize to cause Judge Battisti to give preliminary approval to end
federal court supervision. The plan itself predicted that by the year 2000, the Cleveland
Public Schools would be recognized nationally for academic excellence. The vision of
the plan would encompass three main components:


A Comprehensive Core, created by work teams comprising the major
stakeholders in the education process and addressing the educational
foundation for all students by outlining steps required to “raise the floor;”



Enhancements to the Comprehensive Core, designed primarily to provide
equitable learning opportunities for African-American students but benefiting
all of our students by going beyond the core requirements;



Parental Choice, providing a dramatically improved magnet school program
and a new system of community school choices.67

The Vision 21 plan would not survive Superintendent Parrish’s tenure, which would end
in her resigning in 1995.
Leading up to 1994, Cleveland would again experience a fiscal crisis. Voters
rejected a 12.9 million dollar operating levy in 1994, and for the 1994-1995 school year,
the district overspent its $500 million dollar budget and was $125 million dollars in debt.
Superintendent Parrish would resign in February of 1995. Rich and Chambers argue that
the Parrish resignation, along with the failed levy attempts and new debt led to added
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uncertainty to the ongoing fiscal situation going on in the district.68 In March of 1995,
Judge Robert P. Krupansky would order the state to takeover the Cleveland Public School
System.
Rich and Chambers contend that by 1994, Mayor White began taking a less
visible role in the educational summits.69 Mayor White was away on business and did not
attend the 1996 summit. This summit drew a record two thousand attendees, including
many parents, who complained about Cleveland teachers, the lack of books and
computers in schools, the condition of school buildings, the lack of parental involvement,
and threats to student safety.70 Mayoral control was also a topic discussed during the
summit. Activists began to monitor progress being made in Chicago, who converted to
full mayoral control in 1995. Westside-Eastside Congregations Acting Now, a coalition
of churches and activists, endorsed the idea of the mayor taking control of Cleveland’s
schools: “The question being asked is, who is the most natural person to run the schools?
The conversation always comes back to the mayor.”71 Rich and Chambers pointed out
that support for mayoral control is typically not common within the African American
communities. They argue that the support shown here was likely related to Mayor
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White’s prior use of cooperative reform strategies.72 They were also of the opinion
that Mayor White became more convinced that an appointed school board would be more
effective than an elected one. In his 1996 State of the City Address, Mayor White would
call for a law that would grant him the authority to appoint all members of the school
board.
In September of 1997, the state legislature passed House Bill 269 which granted
the mayor control of the schools. Specifically, the bill gave the mayor the authority to
appoint the school board, transfers control of the district to the appointed school board
once the federal court order releases the district from state control, schedules the
referendum on the mayor’s authority to appoint board members for the general election
in the first even numbered year occurring at least four years after the federal court
releases the district from state control (2002), and requires that the mayor alone appoint
and dismiss a chief executive officer (CEO) of the district during the first thirty months
after the appointed board initially assumes control. After thirty months, the mayor is to
confer with the school board.
In a letter to Cleveland newspaper The Plain Dealer, White would explain that the
new proposal did not mean that the mayor would run the schools:
First, contrary to what its opponents say, the governance proposal does
provide for a public vote before any permanent change is made in the
current system…Second, the proposal does not call for the mayor to run
the schools. That is the job of the CEO. The proposal calls for the mayor
to make sure that the schools are being run by people who have the best
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interests of children in mind and who are willing to make difficult decisions to
improve conditions in schools.73
However, certain groups were not convinced that the mayoral takeover was right for
Cleveland. The mayoral takeover was met with many lawsuits. Former school board
president Stanley Tolliver filed suit, claiming that the takeover violated the city charter.
The Cleveland Teachers Unions and the Service Employees International Union Local 47
filed suit, as well as the NAACP. All lost their cases.
In 1998, White appointed Reverend Hilton Smith as chair of the newly created
nine-member school board. The mayor also appointed Barbara Byrd-Bennett, from New
York City, as the new CEO. Seemingly, the new CEO and Mayor White had a positive
working relationship. The school board was usually unanimous on decisions made.
During a telephone interview with Wilbur Rich, school board chair Hilton Smith would
claim that there were “no politics on the board. It is like any other board…(except) no
one is running for office.”74 In his 2000 State of the Union address, White would go so
far as to claim the board was the best board of education that Cleveland has had in the
past thirty years.
Everyone was not quite sold on the new governance structure. A poll conducted
by the Plain Dealer would reveal that the majority of Clevelanders wanted to return to
the previous governance structure, where the school board was elected.75 Many would
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point to the fact that fiscally, the district continued to struggle. Cleveland’s continual
struggles can be connected to how it uses property taxes as a primary source of revenue.
Chow has done extensive research on neighborhood social conditions in Cleveland. His
research points out that in the 1980’s, one third of the city’s population would become
“family breakout areas.” These areas would be saturated with African-American, single
parent families with female-headed households, with low income levels. He would go on
to describe outlier areas, where residents typically had not completed high school, and
relied on public assistance as income levels were extremely low. Public housing was the
major housing stock in that area. Chow argued that as the economic structure of
Cleveland continued to change with deindustrialization, working class blacks became
victimized by this trend.76 With these trends became more intense in the 1990’s, the
declining tax base left school budgets in deficit. Although an operating levy that
generated $67 million dollars per year had been passed in 1996, giving the district much
needed stability, the district still had many areas where improvements in schools has not
been addressed.77
Currently, the district is facing a $53 million dollar deficit for the 2010-2011
school year has a high school dropout rate of about 54 percent, severely declining
enrollment, and close to 75 percent of its schools are listed under academic emergency or
watch status. Overall, the district is in “academic watch” status, since in all elementary
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grade levels, student math and reading scores are well below state averages.78 Rich
and Chambers wonder whether Cleveland schools’ future policy options will lead to
improved academic performance. This was supposed to be the purpose of their reform
efforts.79
New York
The New York Public School System is the largest in the world, educating more
than one million students in over 1,500 public schools. It is over twice as large as the
next largest district that will be examined in this chapter, Chicago Public School District
299. Historically, the physical size of the school district made governing a difficult task.
In April of 1842, the legislature allowed for a board of education to be formed in New
York City. The board consisted of thirty four people, and schools were broken up into
seventeen wards. Each ward was to function as if it were a separate town under state
law.80 School reformers would begin to push for governance changes in 1867. They
wanted to replace the elected board with a smaller, appointed one. By 1873, legislature
would pass a law that reduced the size of the board and gave the mayor the power to
appoint the new twenty-one member board. Control of schools would be centralized
under this board. This system would remain until reformers complained that board
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members were too political and successfully convinced the state legislature to further
consolidate the school board.81
As New York City solidified its boundaries in 1898, and established its five
boroughs, each borough would have its own school board. After complaints of disunity
between the boroughs in regards to uniformity in educational practices, William Henry
Maxwell would be chosen as the superintendent for the entire city of New York.
Criticism of the borough system would result in the state legislature eradicating the
borough boards and establishing a single board of education again in 1901.82 This time,
the board would be expanded to 46 members, with varying numbers of representatives
from each of the five boroughs. The city was split into 46 districts, and each of the
districts had a seven-member local school board. In 1917, at the urging of New York
Mayor John Mitchel, the legislature reduced the size of the board from forty-six all the
way down to seven. This system of governance featuring a central board appointed by
the mayor, with local school boards would last until 1969.
In January of 1968, Mayor John Lindsay sent a letter to New York Governor, as
well as the state legislature, supporting decentralization. Within the letter, he explained
that “The goal of decentralization is the improvement of the quality of education in the
New York City public school system, to be achieved by liberating the system from the
constraints that have smothered it and by reconnecting the parties concerned with public
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education in a constructive, creative effort.”83 In 1969, the decentralization issue
would heat up as public hearings on the topic took place. During one hearing that took
place in Brooklyn in the month of January, a speaker had to be removed from the hearing
by the police because he refused to give up the microphone after his five minutes
elapsed.84 Minority communities demanded racial integration or community control.
Protestors argued that to improve the condition and quality of the schools, it was
important that the individual communities had a voice in school governance. A report by
Marilyn Gittell would report that decentralization was necessary because of the new
reform board and the fact that its troubles over integration, decentralization and other
issues led to a great deal of turnover amongst them. The positions were held by twenty
persons at various times.85 In another document, Gittell acknowledged that the need for
greater community involvement was evident, but an effective decentralization plan must
outline (1) the procedure for the selection of the board; (2) the method of appointment of
the local superintendent; (3) the control of the budget plan; (4) the determination of the
deployment of personnel; and (5) the setting of boundaries for local districts.86 The
difficulty in agreeing to terms prolonged the development of the decentralization plan.
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On May 3rd of 1969, the state senate came up with a resolution after working for ten
straight days, resulting in the drafting of the decentralization law.
The new law would drastically change the structure of New York school
governance once again. A summary would be prepared by the Office of Education
Affairs outlining the many changes that were to take place.87 The new law required that
there would be between 30 and 33 community districts, none fewer than 20,000 students
in average daily attendance. Each community school district was to have a community of
board of between seven and fifteen members. Each member would be elected into their
positions. The city board would consist of seven members, five paid by the city council,
and two appointed by the mayor. Generally, the community boards were to have same
powers previously possessed by the city board, except for those reserved for the
chancellor. The chancellor would be appointed by the city board with a general authority
as the chief administrator, as outlined in the law. The community boards had the
authority to select the superintendent of the community district.
Ravitch argued that criticism of decentralization would emerge as community
school boards would occasionally become enmeshed in political scandals, such as selling
jobs, taking kickbacks, and buying school services from friends and family.88 She also
contended that decentralization affected student achievement in that more affluent
districts produced better achievement results than impoverished ones. The school board,
according to Ravitch, seemed unable to set a clear agenda for the improvement of
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schools. Some mayors complained of the inability to take over school boards. The
decentralization debate would continue behind the scene for over thirty years until
Rudolph Giuliani became mayor in 1994.
Ramon Cortines was selected as New York’s Chancellor in August of 1993, and
Giuliani was inaugurated as mayor of New York City in January of 1994. In February of
that year, Giuliani would unveil the financial plan, which called for $291 million dollars
in school cuts. After this was proposed in a meeting between the mayor and the
chancellor, Cortines questioned the mayor’s authority to order the cuts that he proposed.
Giuliani asked for a “bureaucratic head count” of all eligible workers. Cortines would
turn in a figure that was less then half the actual amount. After another count revealed
that those numbers were off, Giuliani announced that we would appoint a fiscal monitor
to watch over the board of education. A midnight meeting between the chancellor and
the mayor’s office resulted in an agreement for the chancellor to cut 2500 positions over
two years. Giuliani also demanded that he dismiss two aides or he would appoint the
fiscal monitor. After the chancellor missed the deadline to dismiss the aides, Mayor
Giuliani announced the appointment of Herman Badillo as fiscal monitor, and Cortines
resigned an hour later. In response to the resignation of the chancellor, Giuliani would
remark:
I’m sorry he did this, but we really have to move on and reform this
system. There are some people who are capable of doing it, and some
people who maybe won’t make personnel changes for one reason or
another. You can’t reform the system by magic or all by yourself…He’s
had months to make internal changes. He’s made no changes. He’s
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sitting there with the same bureaucracy that brought you the bloat in the first
place.89
The New York governor, Mario Cuomo, would remediate. As a result of remediation,
the chancellor decided to return after his aides were allowed to stay, and he would accept
Badillo as counsel to the mayor on education.
Although the two sides reached an agreement on that issue, the school budget
issue would remain a point of contention. Chancellor Cortines, acting as an advocate for
schools, demanded additional school funding. Mayor Giuliani would be viewed as the
“bully,” denying those requests. Schools were overcrowded, and Cortines asked for
additional capital improvement funding to build additional room. Giuliani denied the
request. Cortines endorsed an agreement between the Board of Education, and the school
custodians. Giuliani rejected the tentative agreement. The mayor would begin to openly
back reform plans designed to eliminate the central administration of the New York City
Board of Education. He would be in favor of redistributing the central board’s power to
the local boards. In September of 1994, Giuliani would outright denounce the New York
Board of Education:
We are spending $8.5 billion on our schools, so when you don’t see
money getting into your classroom and your schoolroom, it’s because of
the bureaucracy. It’s because of decisions that they make, and it’s because
we have this system that allegedly is independent, and I can’t revise the
budgeting of it…I would cut out, massively cut our and crush the
bureaucracy of the school system at a level that the bureaucracy of the
school system isn’t ready for yet.90
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Giuliani would continue to demand cuts that sparked talks of a shortened school day or
school year. Clashes between Giuliani and Cortines continued, and the board backed
Cortines who was the seventh New York City chancellor in ten years, and Giuliani
wanted to have input on selecting a new chancellor.
In regards to the state of educational affairs in New York at that time, Diane
Ravitch, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Education, wrote an article for the New
York Times, stating that the New York City’s public school system needed to be
“reinvented from the ground up.”91 She argued that the system became a “bureaucratic
monster” that mismanages funds that should be allocated for instruction. She provided
statistics from the State Commissioner of Education which reported that 63 of the state’s
worst 77 schools were in New York City. Fewer than half of the ninth graders graduate
within four years. She went on to contend that although Chancellor Cortines was
energetic and hands-on, he lacked the tools to bring about the changes that were
desperately needed to renovate bad schools.92 She called for a drastic altering of the
system’s governance structure. Giuliani wanted the power to appoint all board members,
but this would not be granted to him during his tenure. However, in 1996, the
decentralization-centralization “see-saw” would produce another change in the way the
schools would be governed. In December, the New York State Legislature passed a new
statute that weakened the authority of the community school boards, giving the
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chancellor broader powers to hire and fire community superintendents, and remove
individual board members.93
Michael Bloomberg would become the next mayor of New York City in 2001.
He declared that the New York City schools were in a “state of emergency,” and previous
to his election, he revealed his plans to push for the abolishment of the Board of
Education and to be allowed to directly select the chancellor.94 Bloomberg would be
successful in convincing the legislature to pass legislation in 2002 that abolished the
board of education and the elected local school boards. The legislature granted the mayor
the sole authority to appoint the school chancellor. The statue also created an education
panel in the place of the school board, which would be comprised of eight members
which would be appointed by the mayor. This panel would later be perceived as a rubber
stamp for decisions made by the chancellor and the mayor.95 This mayoral takeover
would serve as one of the most comprehensive of the major cities that have adopted this
model as a means of school reform.
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Washington, D.C.
In the 1840’s, Washington’s City Council voted to establish a public school
system. Initially, it was open to just whites. In the 1860’s, schools were opened for
black students. As educational appropriations increased, the Washington City Council
passed an act that created the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The mayor vetoed the
act, stating that the superintendent should be appointed by the mayor. In 1858, the
Council passed a law which granted the mayor the authority to appoint the school
trustees. In 1869, the Council passed legislation that granted the mayor to appoint a
Superintendent of Schools to oversee the schools under the guidance of the board of
trustees.96
In 1871, Congress would merge the separate cities of Washington City and
Georgetown City, along with some surrounding rural county area under a single
government called the District of Columbia. The President appointed a Governor, who
assumed the responsibility for appointing superintendents for the three separate areas.
The governor would appoint one superintendent that would be responsible for the three
school boards that ran each school system. Black schools had their own board of trustees
and superintendent. That structure would be later abolished, and the governor would be
replaced by a three person commission, a Board of Trustees, and two superintendents.
In 1900, conflict regarding the governance of the school system would resurface.
The superintendent of the white schools was released, and the Senate District Committee
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would examine the system of school management in Washington to determine that the
Board of Trustees authority was too indistinct and easy to control by the
Commissioners.97 This would lead to a restructuring of the school system by Congress.
They would create a seven member Board of Education, who was appointed by the
Commissioners, which had the authority over all administrative matters in the public
schools, including the power to appoint a single superintendent and assistant
superintendents over all of the schools, as well as other employees including teachers.
In the decades to pass, Washington D.C. experienced many problems with the
school governance structure. The Board of Trustees constantly battled with the
Commissioners over school financial needs. The Organic Act of 1906 would be
established, which shifted the responsibility for the selection of the school board from the
Commissioners to the courts. The act would also give the superintendent the authority to
appoint and dismiss all of his or her subordinates. This system would remain in place for
the next 62 years.
In the wake of the landmark Brown v. Board case that legally ended segregation
in schools, Washington, D.C. would experience case law unique to their location.
Decided alongside the Brown case, Bolling v. Sharpe was a case that was relevant to
D.C. because a difference in the law. The petitioners were refused admission to a public
school attended by whites because of their race. After appealing to the courts for
admission, their case was dismissed. The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment disallows states from exercising racial segregation in public schools.
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However, the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does
not contain an equal protection clause as the fourteenth amendment, which applies only
to the states.98 The Supreme Court would ultimately decide
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools in the
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.99
Washington D.C. would respond quickly to the decision of the court, and ended the dual
school system. Eight days after Bolling v. Sharpe, the school board developed a
desegregation policy. By November of 1954, three quarters of the district’s white
students attended schools with black students.100
The next important discrimination case would take place thirteen years later. The
1967 Hobson v. Hanson case would examine substandard education of the poor:
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case the court must act in
an area so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these
great social and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by
other branches of government. But these are social and political problems
which seem at times to defy such resolution. In such situations, under our
system, the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to
assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.101
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Judge Wright, in delivering his decision, delivered these words as he accused
Washington D.C. schools of practicing “criminal” discrimination against poor black
students. Judge Wright held that the substandard education of the poor was
discriminatory, regardless of race, and ordered the busing of blacks to predominately
white schools, teacher integration, and the ending of academic tracking. He also ordered
a bar against economic discrimination, holding that the annual per pupil expenditure in
black schools was $100 less than in white schools. This case was significant because it
would begin to outline what equity in education truly meant.
Washington D.C. implemented an elected school board in 1969, and Congress
established an elected mayor and council in 1973. The school board structure that was
implemented consisted of eight members elected by ward and three elected at-large.
Henig argued that during the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the school board became the
focal point for individuals and groups to build political power because it was the only
major elected local office in the district.102 He went on to characterize the period of time
following the elected school board as one where “few thought that the schools were
working as well as they should be during this period, but neither was there a sense that
matters were wildly out-of-control.”103
The 1990’s would bring about major problems in the Washington D.C. public
school system. Unsatisfactory student academic performance as a whole led to the hiring
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of Frank Smith as superintendent, who had success in Dayton, Ohio. Conditions
would not significantly improve during his tenure. The structure of the school board was
brought into question. There was a notion that the different entities that raised school
revenue versus spent the funds for school education would not ever reconcile the feeling
that either enough money was allocated for the schools, or on the other end, the money
was not used wisely enough. Second, the ward based membership of the school board
created members who provided constituent service rather than broad policy setting.104
In 1995, Congress passed a law creating a Presidentially-appointed District of
Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Board (Control Board), and a Chief
Financial Officer appointed by the mayor. The mayor was granted the power to appoint a
seven-member board from a list of fifteen nominees selected by the U.S. Secretary of
Education. The Washington Post reported that the control board produced a report that
blamed the superintendent for spending heavily on office operations while teachers
lacked the necessary materials to adequately educate the city’s students. During Smith’s
tenure, the report stated, student test scores declined, the district has a high dropout rate,
and buildings are crumbling and abysmal financial, personnel and contracting practices
took place.105 John Hill Jr., the control board’s executive director, said the
superintendent and school board deserve “An absolute F.” The report stated:
The deplorable record of the District’s public schools by every important
educational and management measure has left one of the city’s most
important public responsibilities in a state of crisis, creating an emergency
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that can no longer be excused or ignored. In virtually every area, and for every
grade level, the system has failed to provide our children with a quality
education and safe environment in which to learn. This failure is the result
of not the students—for all students can succeed—but of the educationally
and managerially bankrupt school system.106
Superintendent Smith claimed that the report was filled with outdated information that
painted an unfairly grim picture: “All of us know this school system is not where it
should be. We haven’t made the progress we should have made. You don’t need to put
stuff out to make it look worse than it is. It is already bad enough as it is.”107
In 1996, shortly after the Control Board report was released, the control board
took drastic measures. They fired the superintendent, and stripped the elected school
board of most of its authority until June of 2000, and gave oversight of the system to an
appointed nine-member Board of Trustees. A reform group named the DC Appleseed
Center began in late 1997, to examine the Control Board’s operations to make a
determination if the system would be in adequate shape for local control. In September
of 1999, they would release a report entitled Reforming the D.C. Board of Education: A
Building Block for Better Public Schools. In this report, they recommended that the
school board’s size should be reduced from the then current number of eleven members,
with their rationale being smaller bodies work better as a unit.108 They also discussed
advantages and disadvantages associated with a fully or partially appointed board. They
acknowledged that mayoral control would centralize accountability, but also came with
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risks, if the mayor did not appoint school board members who represent the concerns
of the entire city.
As a result, Kevin Chavous, Chair of the Committee on Education Libraries and
Recreation introduced the School Governance Act of 1999 and the School Governance
Companion Act of 1999, which recommended some important changes, including the
reduction of the Board of Education from eleven members to nine, required that the
members be elected by D.C. residents, and the president be elected at large. D.C. mayor
Anthony Williams would take those recommendations a step forward, and asked for an
even smaller board and argued that he should select all board members as well as the
school superintendent.109 A compromise would ultimately be reached, and as part of a
referendum that took place in June of 2000, the school board was reduced to nine
members, general election voters would select five of nine members, and the mayor with
the advice and consent of the Council, would select the other four members.
Mayor Williams would not end his efforts of gaining direct control of the troubled
D.C. public school system. In 2003, he lobbied to strip the Board of Education of most
of its power and take direct control of the system: “The schools ought to be under mayor
and the council. I’m ultimately accountable for what happens to the students.”110 In
February of 2004, he would release a school governance reform proposal. The purpose
of the reform according to the report was to centralize accountability to ensure greater
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programmatic and fiscal oversight, strengthen the role of the superintendent, increase
opportunities for improved coordination of district services in support of student
achievement, and maintain the Board of Education as an “important avenue for citizen
input.”111 Mayor Williams proposed that the structure of the board remain intact, but the
board would be reestablished as an advisory board, and all current policy, oversight and
rule making authority would be transferred to the mayor, who would determine what
would be delegated to the Chancellor which the mayor appointed. Adrian Fenty would
be elected mayor and assume office in 2007. Fenty would continue to push for mayoral
control, leading to the District of Columbia Public Education Reform Amendment Act of
2007. This act gave the mayor the authority to govern the public schools in D.C., as well
as over all curricula, operations, functions, budget, personnel, labor negotiations and
collective bargaining agreements, facilities, and other education matters. The mayor is to
decide which of those responsibilities to delegate to a designee as he or she determines is
warranted. The act also eliminated the position of “Superintendent of Schools”, and
replaced that with the position of “Chancellor.”
Chicago
In October of 1996, Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley discussed the topic of
educational reform in a room full of area educators, business leaders, parents and
community activists. Boston mayor Thomas Menino, who was given school board
appointment power in 1992, was also in attendance. Daley told the group that “Because
of Mayor Menino’s dedication to school reform, I’ve asked him to chair a U.S.
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Conference of Mayors task force on education. That task force will work to put the
education agendas of cities at the top of the national education agenda.”112 Daley
discussed various reforms such as a back-to-basics curriculum, mandatory homework,
performance contracts for school principals, an academic probation period for schools
which are failing their students, and a zero-tolerance policy on weapons. “Mayors need
to set the standards for the community, to give people direction so that they can make a
difference. That is why it is important for mayors to be accountable.”113
In 1995, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar signed a Republican-drafted bill that put
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley in charge of the Chicago Public Schools (CPS). The
governor claimed “This bold, innovative approach should bring more accountability,
better fiscal management and a higher quality of education to a system that desperately
needs an overhaul.”114 The bill would follow the footsteps of reform efforts implemented
in Boston in 1992, and would prompt several cities to adopt some form of mayoral
control for its schools. Major features of this bill included the authority for the mayor to
select a “Chief Executive Officer” and appoint a powerful five member “corporate style”
board of education. Kirst and Bulkey contend that Chicago has the most extreme form of
mayor impact.115
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Jim Carl argues that Chicago has had a long tradition of varying levels of
mayoral school control. Before the 1995 reform, Chicago school reformers have “all
encountered Chicago’s mayors at the top of the school bureaucracy.”116 Chicago, as one
of few cities that have never had an elected school board, has always experienced
mayoral-appointed school boards. Until 1979, mayors were directly in charge of school
budgets. The varying degree of mayoral control was highly depended upon the mayor’s
style and political aims. Most Chicago mayors supported the governance of schools by
educational experts. Few mayors endorsed any major reform efforts related to the
governance structure, including Richard M. Daley.
Chicago’s first schools were established in the 1830’s. Funds for early schools
were sparse, and one teacher would often supervise classes of 100 or more students. As
the student population grew, Chicago’s first superintendent would be hired in 1854. John
Dore was appointed by the city council, and worked for higher quality for teachers,
improved facilities, and separation of grade levels. After the school population grew to
more than 27,000 students, the state legislature created a Board of Education, which
consisted of members appointed by the mayor to oversee school governance throughout
Chicago. The school system grew steadily, and the Board of Education responded by
publishing curriculum guides and sponsoring teacher institutes for the purposes of
improving instruction. By 1897, the Chicago Teachers Federation was formed to help
improve the working conditions for the expanding teacher population that grew to over
5,000.
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The first major attempt at reform would take place in 1897, when Mayor Carter
Harrison II, encouraged by University of Chicago President William Harper, sought
approval to appoint a commission to investigate the Chicago Public School system. In
1898, the committee would finish its work and produced a comprehensive report that
would become known as the “Harper Report.” The beginning of the report contained
communication from the mayor that was presented to the City Council of Chicago that
outlined the rationale for the work of the commission:
With the continual growth of the city, additional burdens keep coming to
the door of the board of education, which is seriously handicapped by
having to deal with new conditions and difficult developments in the
harness of antiquated methods. A change is needed, a change is essential
in regard to the educational and business conduct of the school system,
and to that end, I request power to appoint a commission to consist of
nine, two to be members of the city council, two to be members of the
board of education, and five to be outside citizens. The objective of this
appointment of the commission is to utilize all that is good in the present
system, to discard all that is defective and apply new methods where
needed.117
The major recommendations outlined in the report were a mayor-appointed board with a
reduction in the number of board of education members, more power for the general
superintendent of schools, a business manager that was left free to exclusively handle
executive work, and an increase in the qualifications needed to become a CPS teacher.
The Chicago Teacher’s Federation did not embrace those recommendations because of a
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perception that its members would be left out of decision making processes.118 They
were ultimately able to block the passage of the Harper Bill.
Carl would describe the next mayor, William “Big Bill” Thompson as a machine
politician who used schools to galvanize voters.119 Urban political machines were built
fundamentally on the votes of various immigrant populations. Successful machines
provided jobs, political appointments and welfare benefits in exchange for political
loyalty. Carl argues that the expanding school system allowed Thompson to dole out
building projects and patronage appointments to reward his business and machine
supporters. Thompson would take an anti-labor position and was instrumental in
dismantling the Chicago Teachers Federation.
Thompson successfully convinced the city council to investigate the state of
Chicago Public Schools in 1916. The committee published a report entitled
Recommendations for Reorganization of the Public School System of the City of Chicago.
The recommendations were similar to those published in the Harper Report. By 1917,
the Otis Law was passed by the Illinois Legislature. This law would include provisions
that dramatically changed the structure of Chicago school governance. Main features of
the law begins with an strengthening of the superintendent position, extending the term
from one to four years, allowing the superintendent to hire and fire teachers, and clearly
defined the superintendents responsibilities. The school board experienced an expansion
of its power, which included more separation from the city council, the authority to buy
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and sell school property, as well as the ability to borrow up to 75 percent of the taxes
for the following school year. Teachers would receive better job security with tenure
after three years, and dismissal only when formally charged and a board investigation
took place.120
Mayor Thompson would also directly influence educational policy after he
determined that textbooks used in many Chicago Public Schools were “unpatriotic.”
Supposedly, materials used by the teachers in painted American colonists in a negative
light. One of the books was used by school teachers in a course at the University of
Chicago as part of the coursework necessary to become a history teacher. Thompson
claimed “If public school teachers studied and believed this book ‘New Viewpoints in
American History,’ they would not be human if they did not pass on seditious viewpoints
to their students.”121 Thompson would ultimately use this to launch a campaign to
appoint a “patriotic” school board and drive out the superintendent, William McAndrew.
Anton Cermak would become the next mayor of Chicago and took office in 1931.
Cermak was considered the first of a democratic machine that lasted for decades. The
school district at that time was in the middle of a financial windfall. He asked the school
board to consider deep cuts, but was assassinated before any changes were implemented.
Edward Kelly would announce that he planned to follow Cermak’s plan for the Chicago

120

Paul E. Peterson, “Research C. National Opinion, and Others,” Organizing Schools in Pluralist
America, 1870-1940. Final Report, 1983, 265.
121

Anonymous, “Bill Points Out 'Unfit' Passages in School Books,” Chicago Daily Tribune (19231963), April 18, 1927.

78
Public Schools.122 In 1933, the terms of five board members ended, and he appointed
individuals that would carry out his wishes in regards to school cuts. Kelly was able to
bring the schools more fully under machine control, and developed a relationship with
President Roosevelt that helped to create more federally funded jobs that he doled out as
patronage jobs.123 Carl noted that Kelly would ultimately be taken to task by the National
Education Association (NEA) who questioned how the school system cut, demoted and
transferred teachers while disproportionate amounts of money was put into maintenance
and other non-education related services. Pressure related to NEA reports resulted in the
establishment of a nominating committee which appointed new board members. Along
with this, the state legislature gave the responsibility of hiring a general superintendent of
schools whose educational requirements were defined by the law and who would be in
charge of business and legal departments to the school boards.124 Carl argued these
changes only gave the mere appearance that public school governance was detached from
mayoral interference.
As the Democratic county chairman and nominee for mayor in 1955, Richard J.
Daley spoke in support of a wider use of city schools, a sales tax hike to aid schools, and
pay increases for teachers. Known as a “family man,” he spoke positively of teachers:
“Parents should teach their children to have full respect for their teachers, policemen, and
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other adults.”125 During Daley’s tenure as Mayor, he believed that a good government
management style kept teachers together as well as other patronage workers. He
practiced partisan politics and rewarded friends and punished enemies, and also managed
the budgetary and city planning aspects of being mayor.126 Daley supported
neighborhood construction projects and advocated for sufficient school facilities. Other
than that, he maintained a distance from school affairs.127
As Daley endorsed the building of schools, racial politics would become a focus.
The schools were used to support the machine as contracts for the building of schools
went to his loyal constituency. Dorothy Shipps argued that “patronage was re-instituted
with a vengeance” under Daley’s mayorality.128 During the 1950’s and early 1960’s,
more schools were built in areas that were predominately black than any other area, as a
reward for their vote. But those same building patterns would lead to keeping black
students in what Carl described as “densely populated ghettos.”129 Surprisingly enough,
Daley was able to capture the black vote without initially responding to desegregation
expectations set forth from the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955.
Mirel noted that through the 1960’s and 1970’s, Mayor Daley’s aim was stopping
white flight by maintaining the current composition of the neighborhood structure rather
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than racial integration of the schools.130 The fear of neighborhood integration
prompted small white demonstrations regarding school integration or housing reform in
the early 1960’s. A group of demonstrators at Bogan High School located on the
southwest side of Chicago successfully convinced the superintendent, Benjamin Willis, to
remove Bogan from a list of schools that was supposed to receive voluntary transfer
applications from black students which was designed to relieve school overcrowding.131
Rury argued that the fear of losing white support caused the mayor not to care the state of
the city’s schools, but instead, the protection of his power of the Democratic political
machine, and protecting the existing distribution of status and privilege in Chicago.132
The prevailing thought was that the white vote could be lost, but blacks would continue
to vote for Daley. So instead of working to desegregate schools, Superintendent Willis
did the opposite. He addressed the problem of school overcrowding in predominately
black neighborhoods by ordering the erection of temporary mobile classroom units that
would be situated near the main school building on vacant lots. These buildings would
be referred to as “Willis Wagons.” Willis would ultimately assist Daley in keeping the
status quo in the city, and Mayor Daley allowed Willis to take the heat with any
community displeasure.
Richard J. Daley’s management of political machines and silence on matters of
desegregation set the stage for a collapse in the governance of the Chicago Public
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Schools. The Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) was empowered by Mayor Daley
leading into the 1970’s and several teacher strikes took place. In order to maintain order,
Daley settled strikes by negotiating in the favor of the teacher’s union, but the city did not
have the money that he promised. He was able to convince state legislators to alter state
aid formulas and lessen limitations on school borrowing, and utilized shady accounting
practices to keep the districts’ bonds unrealistically high.133 This fiscal mismanagement
would lead to the formation of the School Finance Authority which was controlled by
Chicago’s bankers. They would be in charge of managing CPS financial issues. Daley’s
death in 1976 would weaken machine politics and set the stage for the anti-machine
Democrat to take over as mayor in 1983, Harold Washington.
In summary, the years after Richard J. Daley’s death would bring a shakeup of the
political machine, and more involvement in school governance by business leaders. One
organization that would become heavily involved was the Commercial Club of Chicago,
founded in 1877. The Commercial Club was a social club for some of Chicago’s
commercial and industrial giants. The purpose of the club, as Shipps notes, was to
“insure the success of their own businesses while building the prestige of Chicago in the
eyes of the more established Easterners who had invested in their city.”134 The club
publicly attempted to reduce corruption in the city government and to spend educational
funds more efficiently during the 1930’s. The most frequent meeting topics would be
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infrastructure, municipal reform and education.135 In the early 1900’s, they would
attempt to influence school policy by advocating for vocational education. They would
ultimately lobby for an independent system of public vocational schools. Although the
club repeatedly brought their proposal to the state government, this system would not
ever be instituted. They were successful in helping to centralize the Chicago Public
School System. They believed that principles of business efficiency would work in the
schools as it had in their businesses.136 They would also attempt to take control of the
Chicago’s worsening school financial situation in 1930.137
Another entity that would become more involved in educational policy was
Chicago United. The formation of Chicago United would arise as a result of civil unrest
with the city’s black leaders. In 1966, Martin Luther King came to Chicago to assist in
eliminating slums in Chicago’s ghettos. After a giant rally at Soldier field, King taped a
list of demands regarding open housing on the door of city hall. Non-violent marches on
white working class communities ensued. Although they were not successful in changing
the racially segregated housing patterns in Chicago, their efforts led to a mayoral summit
which included a prominent Commercial Club member. Summit meetings would result
in the formation of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, which
was to monitor compliance to open housing, educate the public about the effects of
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housing discrimination and seek federal injunctions against those who discriminated.138
The Leadership Council would not be able to stifle the resentment and anger in the black
communities however. Neighborhoods were torched in frustration after King’s
assassination. Some of the leaders of the Commercial Club were victims of arson as
well, including Carson Pirie Scott department store and Montgomery Ward. Jesse
Jackson insisted that the mayor call a conference of the leading businessmen in order to
be made aware of the problems in black ghettos. Chicago United was formed by
Commercial Club leaders as an avenue to facilitate communications between black
leaders and white businessmen.139 Ultimately, Chicago United would work with Chicago
Superintendents and members of the school board in an attempt to decentralize the
board’s responsibilities in order for the board to deal with policy, and for the schools to
be accountable for student performance.140
After years of working behind the scenes, the Commercial Club as well as
Chicago United would look to take a more significant role in public educational policy
making. The two organizations, along with the newly formed Civic Committee of the
Commercial Club would be authorized to serve as decision makers in the policy making
process by a governor and two mayors.141 As a result, the organizations formulated the
School Finance Authority, which would have an oversight role in school financing, and
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selected an entire school board. Their growing authority and influence led to the
school reform act of 1988.
Harold Washington took office as Chicago’s mayor in 1983. Carl contends that
Washington helped define and implement an approach to urban school reform that
emphasized grass roots initiatives and stressed equitable levels of funding in the context
of the city’s racial segregation.142 The black population of Chicago grew, but more
importantly, the percentage of the city’s black population grew between 1950 and 1980
as a result of large percentage of whites that moved to Chicago’s suburbs. As a result of
those migration patterns, and because of minority poverty rates, the rate of low income
student enrollment increased while white enrollment decreased. In 1950, whites
consisted of 62 percent of CPS student enrollment. By 1983, white enrollment was less
than 17 percent.143 Washington did not focus on desegregation because he did not
believe that it was realistic to expect equitable desegregation with the number of white
students in the district. Furthermore, Washington attended predominately black schools
while enrolled in Chicago schools himself and believed in excellent black schools.
Washington solicited the advice of the Commercial Club and Chicago United
business leaders and gave them authority in the policy formation process in the CPS.
Washington would select Chicago United to select a new school board and they were to
be heavily involved in a city wide summit to address the high dropout rate as well as poor
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achievement status. In 1985, an attempt would be made to convince the Illinois
General Assembly to approve an elected school board that failed.144 But demands for
school improvement increased, and it was becoming evident that governance changes
would have to take place. Washington would find himself in a precarious position when
it came to school reform. Washington advocated for fairness in educational opportunities
and equality in the quality of education and educational funding. Grass roots community
leaders who helped him get into office were hoping for drastic school improvement
measures. However, many of Washington’s supporters worked for the Board of
Education. Many of the calls for a change in governance could greatly impact the
teachers, administrators, and central office workers who also supported Washington.145
He would begin planning an educational summit to address the high school dropout rate,
and the lack of jobs available for CPS graduates by working with the business
community, which he did not build his platform with. His sudden death in 1987 would
cause the summit to lose momentum.
In 1987, U.S. Secretary of Education, William Bennett, called Chicago’s schools
the worst in the nation: “If it isn’t the last, I don’t know who is. There can’t be very
many cities that are worse. Chicago is pretty much it. How can anyone who feels about
children not feel terrible about Chicago schools? You have an educational meltdown.”146
Bennett went on to contend that a first step in solving the problem is reducing the systems
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bureaucracy, and to create a program of school-based accountability. Without
Washington’s guidance, the grassroots school activists, public school advocacy groups,
business leaders and legislators that he brought together were responsible for advocating
for the 1988 legislation that would be known as the Chicago School Reform Act. This
act would create school-based accountability measures that Bennett spoke of. Three
major provisions of the act were:


Goals were established for the school system in areas such as reading,
writing, and math. The law also set specific graduation, attendance,
promotions, and achievement test levels that schools would have to
meet by the 1993-1994 school year.



The allocation of resources to reduce the size of the central
bureaucracy, placing a cap on administrative costs and transitioning
funds from central office to the schools.



An eleven member local school council (LSC) was established,
consisting of six parents, two community members, two teachers, and
the principal who together would set policy and make important
educational and budgetary decisions in the city’s individual schools.147

The local school council’s parent and community members would be elected by the
geographical area that the school served, and the teacher members would be elected by
teachers in the school building. Also, the new law required the formation of a
Professional Personnel Advisory Committee in every school, which consisted of teachers
and the principal, who were responsible for formulating a school improvement for the
LSC to approve. The law also created sub district (broken up by geographic boundaries)
councils which were composed of parent and/or community representatives in each LSC
in the sub district that had the authority to hire and fire sub district superintendents. The
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law also created a school board nominating committee consisting of five mayoral
appointees and eighteen additional people that were elected from the sub district councils
that recommended prospective school board members to the mayor.148
The elements that were unique about the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988
centered on its success in decentralizing the district. The law truly reduced the size of the
central bureaucracy. It shifted a great deal of power to the individual schools, and put it
in the hands of the community. Principals, who normally accrued tenure in the position,
were stripped of tenure and performance contracts were put in place. However,
principals were given increased abilities to remove teachers, as well as more control in
other areas. There were important aspects to the Chicago Public School System that did
not change as a result of the law. One element that remained unchanged was educational
funding. Although the need for additional funds existed, the individual schools would
have to function under the same financial constraints. Also, the School Finance
Authority remained in charge of finances, but with increased authority. Third, the
nominating committee was created to limit the mayor’s choices for school board
members, but the mayor still retained the right to appoint all of the school board
members. The new law expanded the number of board members from 11 to 15. Finally,
the teacher’s union still had to negotiate with the central board rather than LSC’s.
The late Richard J. Daley’s son, Richard M. Daley would take office in April of
1989, inheriting the new reform act. By 1995, dissatisfaction with the reform act would
result in major amendments to the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988. Wong and
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others, and Ziebarth outlined sources of dissatisfaction with the act. Among them was
the fact there was not any improvement regarding student achievement. Second, the
LSCs did not encourage an increase in parental involvement in schools. Third, another
budgetary crisis ensued, putting the opening of schools on time in 1995 in jeopardy.
Fourth, the school board and top administrators failed to restore public confidence in the
system. Lastly, Mayor Richard M. Daley was frustrated by constraints over the
appointment of school board members.149,150
The Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act of 1995 would dramatically shift
power over the school district back to the mayor. Ziebarth outlined the major features of
this act:
 Gave the mayor the authority to appoint all school members and top
administrators, and decreased the number of central board members to five
 Created “corporate style” positions in regard to the top administrative offices
and replaced the “general superintendent” position to “chief executive officer”
 Eliminated the School Board Nominating Commission and the School Finance
Authority
 Expanded the financial authority of the board
 Restricted the bargaining power of the Chicago Teachers Union
 Gave school board the power to hold LSCs accountable to system-wide
standards
 Gave district flexibility in utilizing private agencies to provide certain services
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 Gave the CEO the authority to place poorly performing schools on
remediation, probation, reconstitute or close them151
The new law also placed a moratorium on teacher strikes for eighteen months following
the passing of the bill. Also, managerial employees would not be able to join the union.
The bill did not change the structure of LSCs, nor limit their power. Individual school
governing would still be in the hands of the local school councils, as long as the school
was not on academic probation.
Jim Edgar, Mayor Daley and the Corporate CEO
Why a CEO for Schools?
The new CEO position for the Chicago Public Schools did not require candidates
to have educational credentials to take the position, but that individual was granted all of
the control that the general superintendent had, including over the district’s curriculum.152
After the Amendatory Act was passed, Mayor Daley would subsequently appoint two
CEOs without an educational background: Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan. Shipps argued
that Daley did not trust educators to run the school system, and demanded loyalty to him.
She quoted one of Daley’s former aides who claimed that Daley thought that it “isn’t
realistic” to ask an educator to “run a $3 billion operation.”153 In terms of direct quotes,
Mayor Daley did not outwardly discuss credentials that he looked for in selecting a CEO
to run the Chicago Public School District. However, there were statements made by
Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley that revealed which school related issues would be
151

Ibid.

152

Shipps, “Updating Tradition,” 122.

153

Ibid., 123.

90
made a priority which illustrates why he selected non-educators to assume the CEO
position.
The Corporate CEO
There is a plethora of research related to leadership and CEO’s. However, in
regards to the knowledge, skills and dispositions of a CEO, the research was relatively
sparse. Rock (1977) outlined the nature and scope of the accountabilities reserved to
chief executive positions. He described those accountabilities as:


Goal Setting – Setting the fundamental goals of the company and establishing
priorities



Strategy – Formulating the overall direction, including guidelines and longrange plans



Character – Setting the standards regarding how the company is to conduct
business



Resource Allocation – Establishing a strategic framework for the allocation of
the resources of the corporation



Acquisitions and Mergers



Organizational Structure – Developing the grand design of the corporate
structure, assigning functions



Human Resource Management – Selection, development, assessment,
motivation, and rewarding of top executives



Review and control – Reviewing short and long term strategies related to the
attainment of company objectives



Tactical Supervision – Ensuring the execution of operating plans



Finance – Ensuring the soundness of the organization’s financial structure,
monitoring indications of company’s financial health, determining the
company’s present and future capital requirements, arranging for outside
financing

91


Key success factors – Making certain key decisions such as product pricing,
sourcing or design that impact corporate performance



Relations with board of directors – Ensures board’s full understanding,
constructive review, or final approval of management policies, direction and
objectives



External relations – develops and maintains key external relationships154

Upon reviewing several job descriptions seeking an individual to fill the CEO position
for several companies in Illinois, there were several CEO descriptions that were common
among the many companies. Common CEO responsibilities, skills, knowledge, and
dispositions included:


Developing a strategic plan to advance the company’s mission and objectives



Promote revenue, profitability and organizational growth



Insure production efficiency, quality, service and cost-effective management
of resources



Implementing strategies for generating resources and/or revenues for the
company



Review financial statements to determine progress and status in attaining
objectives



Building a fundraising network



Working knowledge of public relation techniques



Strong written and communication skills



Strong or strategic leadership skills; superior management skills
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There were several references to “leadership” and “management” skills. Many times,
those terms were used in the same line. The job descriptions did not contain a definition
of leadership or management.
The CPS CEO
In passing the 1995 Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act, Illinois lawmakers
purposely ensured that the law included specific language that shifted the governance
structure of the Chicago Public School System. In addition to the corporate-style
positions of chief financial officer, chief educational officer, chief operating officer, and
chief purchasing officer, the law eliminated the previous position of “General
Superintendent” and replaced it with “Chief Executive Officer.” Some of the words and
actions of former Governor Jim Edgar, and Mayor Richard M. Daley reveal some of the
reasons why this specific change in governance took place.
In January of 1995, Edgar warned CPS that the state would not bail them out of
the system’s anticipated budget deficit which threatened the opening of classrooms that
fall: “It is up to the Chicago schools to look internally at ways to cut costs. If they expect
to be bailed out by the state, it isn’t going to happen. The day of reckoning is coming.”155
As plans to overhaul the CPS system of governance were unveiled in April of 1995,
Mayor Daley expressed reservations about it. Although the reform law contained
elements that Daley asked for, including the authority to abolish the current management
structure, appoint board members, and give him more flexibility in spending state funds,
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money was still Daley’s bottom line: “There has to be an understanding that, if this all
takes place … then they are going to help us with (funding),” Daley said. “To me, there
has to be an understanding that you don’t reform something in structure without having
accountability, without having some new money going into the system.”156
After the school reform law was signed on May 30th of 1995, Edgar provided a
written statement describing the reform effort: “This bold, innovative approach should
bring more accountability, better fiscal management and a higher quality of education to
a system that desperately needs an overhaul.”157 As Daley and other critics complained
about the lack of provisions for additional funding for schools, Edgar added: “As all of us
recognize, money alone will not improve education.”158 After Mayor Daley installed
Paul Vallas as CEO, he acknowledged that changes needed to be made at central office:
“You have to change management,” Daley said. “There’s a lot of management problems
there.”159 One of Daley’s senior aides made a statement regarding how the change in
management might look in terms of structure: “The board and the senior staff will be
doing most of the work. The mayor won’t be imposing his education vision on the
schools in a formal way. The idea is to bring in the budget people and the educators and
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get out of the way and let them do their jobs.”160 When asked how he would erase the
funding deficit at a June meeting at Healy Elementary School, Daley was still unsure:
“I’d be a miracle worker if I could (answer) that.”161
After officially naming his new five member team and senior management team
at the end of June of 1995, Mayor Daley revealed a bit more of his educational agenda.
He quickly announced his position regarding the priority of the district: “Today, we begin
a new era in the history of public education in Chicago by putting children first. From
every neighborhood school in Chicago to every office in Pershing Road, people will be
held accountable for the quality of the students we produce and the money we spend.”162
He later announced his position on special interest groups including unions, politically
connected contractors, and Democratic Party patronage bureaucrats: “Business as usual is
over. The special interests will move to the back of the line. The bureaucrats who stand
in the way of change will be removed and their powers dissolved.”163 CPS was facing a
150 million dollar school funding deficit and a budget gap double for the next year.
Daley spoke of how costs had to be cut to balance the budget for long-term financial
stability: “We must continue to fight for every dollar in Springfield, because the state has
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not met its (funding) responsibility. But clearly we must also make progress here in
controlling costs before expecting any further help from the state.”164
The words and actions of Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley leading up to the
Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act and shortly thereafter reveal that there was a
conflict regarding the need for school funding between the mayor and the governor.
Mayor Daley voiced the city’s need for additional school funding on several occasions.
Governor Edgar made it clear that the state would not provide additional funding and
pointed out that if the state covered Chicago’s shortfall and treated every other school
district equally, it would cost one billion dollars: “Well, there isn’t a billion, I have to tell
you, in the budget for new money.”165 Common themes in the language of the governor
and mayor leading to the selection of the new CEO were accountability, fiscal
management, management problems, controlling costs, and money. Mayor Daley
ultimately selected Paul Vallas as the first CPS CEO. Vallas was a former Chicago city
budget director who reformed the city Revenue Department and was the former executive
director of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission. Upon taking the position of
CEO, Vallas revealed the focus of his new position according to the mayor: “But
whatever the case, the mayor has put Gery and me over here to bring financial stability to
the system and improve education. And we don’t expect to fail.”166

164

Ibid.

165

Hardy and Davis, “Edgar Won’t Bail Out City Schools.”

166

Kass, “City Schools Get Chief Who Rejects Failure.”

96
The next chapter will examine the words and actions of Paul Vallas to provide
evidence regarding how he carried out the role of CPS CEO according to the expectations
of Mayor Daley and later analyze those words and actions according to Sergiovanni’s
Five Sources of Authority. The researcher will also provide an analysis explaining
similarities and/or differences in how Vallas carried out the role of CEO as compared
with the characteristics of a corporate CEO as defined in this chapter.

CHAPTER III
PAUL VALLAS: CPS’ FIRST CEO
Background
Illinois Legislative Public Act 89-15 would become known as the 1995 Chicago
School Reform Amendatory Act because of alterations to the original 1988 School
Reform Act that dramatically changed the governance structure for the Chicago Public
Schools. The term Board of Education was struck, and replaced by Chicago School
Reform Board of Trustees. Specific language was in place specifying that the direct
appointment of their positions would be made by the mayor, without the need for the
consent of the city council. Following that language was the creation of a “full-time
compensated chief executive officer” appointed at the mayor’s discretion.1 The language
embedded in the Amendatory Act clearly outlined the purpose for the changes:
Sec. 34-3.3. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees; powers and
duties; chief operating, fiscal, educational and purchasing officers. The
General Assembly finds that an education emergency exists in the Chicago
Public Schools and that a 5-member Chicago School Reform Board of
Trustees shall be established for a 4 year period to bring educational and
financial stability to the system.2
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As outlined in the Amendatory Act, the Reform Board of Trustees and the CEO were
empowered and directed to:


Increase the quality of educational services in the Chicago Public
Schools



Reduce the Cost of non-educational services and implement costsaving measures including the privatization of services where deemed
appropriate



Develop a long-term financial plan that to the maximum extent
possible reflects a balanced budget for each year



Streamline and strengthen the management for the system



Ensure ongoing academic improvement in schools through the
establishment of an Academic Accountability Council



Enact policies that ensure the system runs in an ethical as well as
efficient manner



Establish within 60 days after the effective date of the Amendatory
Act, develop, and implement a process for the selection of a local
school council advisory board for the trustees



Establish any organizational structures, including regional offices



Provide for such other local school council advisory bodies as the
Trustees deem necessary3

The Amendatory Act also defined the position of chief executive officer and
stated that “The mayor shall appoint a chief executive officer who shall be a person of
recognized administrative ability and management experience, who shall be responsible
for the management of the system, and who shall have all other powers of the general

3

Ibid.

99
superintendent…”4 Mayor Daley originally offered the CEO position to former chief
of staff member Gery Chico, who reportedly declined the position in order to further his
law career. He did accept the post of President of the Reform Board of Trustees, which
was even more powerful. Daley next asked Paul Vallas, the former Chicago budget
director with a reputation of cutting costs. Daley claimed that he chose Vallas because of
“his analysis of managers and the whole idea of management performance and
accountability.”5
The 43-year-old Paul Vallas began his career as a teacher in the 1970’s, who
briefly taught in elementary school and college. He then served as Director of Policy for
the president of the Illinois State Senate, and next as executive director of the Illinois
Economic and Fiscal Commission where he was responsible for reviewing, analyzing and
assessing the legislative impact of state finances on state and local taxes. In the 1990’s,
he worked for the city of Chicago as revenue director, and later as budget director, and
was able to close Chicago’s then $125 million dollar budget gap. He received the first
unanimous city council vote for the passage of a city budget in over 40 years. City hall
insiders claimed that Vallas did this by working around the clock. Then City Hall
Spokesman Jim Williams stated that “In all my many years of working, I have never met
anyone who has the determination, the intellect or the level of energy that Paul Vallas
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has.”6 Vallas claimed that his combination of experience with education, policy and
finance helps to explain why Mayor Daley selected him for the CEO position: “You
cannot work for the Illinois legislature and not get a least some sense of politics. And you
cannot survive as an effective staff person and not understand at least some of the
fundamentals of consensus and coalition building.”7
The language embedded in the Amendatory Act called for a non-traditional
approach in the selection of the new CEO position, and Paul Vallas possessed experience
regarding the new priorities for the district as outlined by the Amendatory Act. Vallas
summed up his intentions for his role in the district in a 1999 quote:
I'm in a great position. I don't want to be a lifetime school superintendent.
I don't want to be an education consultant when I'm done here. I'm not
setting the stage for a political office. If I physically survive this job and
accomplish what I hope to accomplish and what the mayor hopes to
accomplish, then my ticket is written: I'm going to heaven. I can go back
and become a normal person and try to raise my kids and spend time with
my family.8
In order to accomplish what the mayor wanted him to accomplish, his first order of
business would be to change the philosophy of the structure of the district, which is
illustrated with the following Vallas quote: “This district has got to evolve and become
more like a corporation. This is essentially a $3 billion dollar business, and we have got
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to learn how to leverage our buying power.”9 Vallas would set about making the
necessary changes without apologizing for any perceived lack of experience in working
in an urban school district: “If having that kind of experience was important, how come
there hasn’t been more success before now?”10
Early Cost Cutting Measures
Vallas immediately set about developing plans to improve the district, beginning
with communicating the new priorities of the district: “The mayor has said that
improving education in city schools is the top priority. Everything else takes a back seat.
What you’ll see as we develop our plans over the next few weeks are changes that will
help us accomplish that.”11 In a memo to all Chicago Public School employees, Vallas
communicated goals in greater detail:
The goal of the Chicago Public Schools is to educate our children and
prepare them for the challenges of the next century. To do this, we must
improve performance in the classrooms and the schools. We must also
become an efficient, cost-effective organization that gets maximum public
benefit for the taxpayers’ dollars. This means changes have to be made.
We are beginning to make these changes to succeed in meeting this goal.12
The first changes to be made immediately surrounded Vallas at CPS’ central office. In
July of 1995, Vallas confronted two top district administrators- the chief education
officer and the chief accountability officer, for upgrading their offices. He then banned
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all travel by central office managers, placed a halt on catered meals and demanded
that any orders for new furniture be cancelled: “No one. No one is to order anything new
unless it is specifically authorized by me.”13 Vallas also decided to retain the taxpayerfunded car, but rid himself of the personal driver and other amenities: “I don’t need
anyone to pick me up and drop me off at home. There will be no more coffee and rolls
paid for out of the schools budget. And there is plenty of furniture here. We don’t need
any desks or cabinets built. We don’t need anything new.”14 Vallas also cited that as of
July of 1995, the old school administration spent at least $90,000 since January on
catered food for meetings. Vallas put an immediate end to that practice: “The next time
we have a meeting, the coffee and rolls will be bought by me, out of my pocket.”15 A
food and refreshments policy soon followed.16
Vallas continued to identify cost saving measures at the central office level. He
determined that a shop facility at the central office headquarters, then located at 1819 W.
Pershing Road, was an unnecessary expense to the district and shut it down: “We have
people here whose main job has basically been to build furniture for administrators….We
ask them for a new lock, they bring us a whole new door….It’s ridiculous. Those
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workers should be in the schools fixing and building things.”17 He then instructed
school board painters and carpenters that were based at headquarters to be sent to local
schools. Many services would now be assigned to private companies.18
Upon inspecting one of the districts’ warehouses, school leaders found loads of
unused equipment that was covered with thick dust. Among materials found were nine
new pianos, two rowing machines, a Jacuzzi, several thousand student desks and chairs,
copier machines, vacuum cleaners and air conditioners still in boxes. Vallas stated: “This
reminds me of a warehouse you might see in the Kremlin. It’s centralized management at
its worst.”19 The chief operations manager immediately ordered all the equipment to be
dispersed to the schools that needed them, redeployed the majority of the custodial
workers that were stationed at the facility, and ordered the warehouse to be shuttered.
Vallas also ordered an end to the heating of the main garage at the central office,
and banned district-financed cellular phones for central office administrators: “We want
to make sure that we send the right message. This is not a perk-laden school district,”
Vallas stated. He later stated: “Image means a lot, and if you have catered meals and
you’re wining and dining people and spending money on conferences, working men and

17

Ibid.

18

Chicago Public Schools, Board of Education Proceedings. Board of Education, City of Chicago,
August, 1995. Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, pp. 5703-5706.
19

Jacquelyn Heard, “City Schools Find Embarrassment of Riches,” Chicago Tribune, 1995.

104
women see that, and it creates an atmosphere of public cynicism.20 Vallas also
adopted a travel policy to curtail travel expenses incurred by district administrators.21
Administrators also found that the district wasted a great deal of money on
telecommunications. They found that too many calls were made to 411, and in some
instances, to 900 numbers. The district paid 2.3 million dollars per year for stationary
telephone equipment while the City of Chicago (City Hall) paid $450,000. Chief
operating officer Ben Reyes and Vallas said they would use the administrative practices
of city government as a model for city schools. Vallas called the method “a sound
approach to cost management.”22 Vallas would quickly adopt a policy for
telecommunications.23
In November of 1995, Vallas found another instance of wasteful spending. After
auditing a commission that monitored the district’s desegregation program, it was
determined that the group spent $213,885 of their $325,800 budget on excessive items.
The audit uncovered over $6000 in cellular phone calls, over $600 for flowers and
Christmas cards, and almost $10,000 in meals at expensive steak houses, as well as bills
for massages, alcoholic drinks and theater tickets. The audit was released in response to
a lawsuit that the commission brought against the board for allegedly failing to provide
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the commission with additional finances and data. An outraged Vallas retorted:
“How dare they file a lawsuit against us! This audit speaks for itself. These people were
wining and dining at taxpayers’ expense.”24 Vallas was then accused by a commission
member of attempting to discredit black leadership and embarrass African Americans.
Vallas responded “Hogwash. They got their noses out of joint because we refused to give
them carte blanche to spend taxpayer money on frills and thrills. The fact is there was a
lot of wasteful spending here and we’re not going to put up with it.”25 Vallas moved to
downsize the commission to seven members and subjected the new commission to the
school board’s ethics guidelines.26
Balancing the Budget
After the initial cost-saving measures installed at the central office, the real work
of balancing the budget would begin. An important issue that loomed on the horizon was
the need to settle a new teacher’s contract. Within three weeks of officially taking over
as CEO, Vallas and his new management team announced that they had already
eliminated the $150 million dollar school funding deficit and were ready to offer a fouryear contract to teachers which included three percent pay raises over the duration of the
contract. Vallas stated: “We anticipate we’ll have a teacher’s contract before the budget
is introduced. We’ve been talking with the teacher’s union. We’ve developed a good
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working relationship with them; it’s a collaborative effort. It’s not confrontational to
look at the issues, narrow them down and get them resolved.”27 Vallas began to explain
what to expect in the upcoming CPS budget report:
I think there’s a consensus out there that central office needs to be
downsized, not shifting people around. A number of years ago they socalled cut the bureaucracy, and they ended up as subdistrict bureaucrats or
principals found them on their budgets, or they were hired back on
vouchers. Central office is going to be downsized. The public expects
that. The schools expect it. The principals expect it. The taxpayers
demand it. And in Springfield, the expectation is there.”28
Republicans in Springfield, Illinois were impressed with Vallas’ ability to control
spending. The Chicago Teachers Union president was pleased and announced that the
union had reached a tentative agreement with the new school board. Initially, Vallas kept
the details of how the budget was balanced under wraps.
In August of 1995, details of the new budget would slowly begin to spread around
the district. A major component of the trimmed deficit called for the cutting of over 1700
positions ranging from janitors to department heads. Vallas initially was vague with the
details of the cuts, but claimed: “The cuts are very tough, but that’s just the way it’s
going to be. We have to get serious. In the past, (school leaders) haven’t cut, they just
moved around the furniture.”29 Reportedly, Vallas had also freed up 35 million dollars to
fund new education programs including tutoring, mentoring, drop-out prevention, job
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training services, and alternative schools for troubled students. The new budget also
included a 13.2 percent pay increase for all of the principals in the district. In addition to
the job cuts, Vallas came up with additional revenue by proposing to:


Contribute less to the teacher’s pension fund



Keep some of the discretionary funds CPS schools got for low-income
students (Chapter 1 funds)



Putting 20 surplus properties up for sale



Shifting monies that financed after-school programs at field houses to
the general fund

The bulk of the money was to be used to maintain the balanced budget over time, and
also fund an extended class day and year, move violent students from regular classrooms
into alternative schools, fund tutors and mentors, and establish apprenticeship programs
for high school students in danger of dropping out of school. Vallas stated: “Student
performance improves when schools are better organized, when you have a longer school
year and when you get violent students out of the schools. Failure is not an option for us;
we have to deliver.”30
The mood at CPS headquarters grew extremely dismal following the
announcements of administrative cuts. Before central office cuts were officially
announced, extra security forces and metal detectors were put in place at central office in
preparation for potential actions that could have been taken by disgruntled employees.
Some administrators turned in their resignations in fear of their positions being cut.
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Many of those administrators had spent their entire career with CPS. At a budget
hearing, a parent would take Vallas to task about the layoffs and ask him why he cut so
many positions, as well as why he didn’t put more pressure on the state legislature to
come up with additional funding for the district’s schools. Vallas lost his usual patience:
“Look, you’re living in a fool’s paradise if you think we’re going to get more money
from Springfield,” he shouted. “We’ve got to take Chicago schools out of the headlines
and off the radar screen Downstate….We’ve got to get our (stuff) together.”31 Despite
the growing criticisms regarding his hard line approach, he received praise from Illinois
governor Jim Edgar: “I can’t think of anything that has been more enjoyable to watch.
They’ve gone in and done a lot of things that many people expected could have been
done long ago.” Governor Edgar continued to state: “Now that the Chicago Public
Schools have proven that they can help themselves, I think there will be more willingness
on the part of a lot of people to help them, not necessarily with more money, but with
more flexibility.”32
Early Initiatives
CPS Sports
After balancing the budget, CEO Paul Vallas began to turn his attention on
initiatives to improve the district. Surprisingly enough, one of earliest initiatives that
Vallas focused his efforts on was related to the improvement of the sports program.
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Vallas promoted J.W. Smith to oversee the sports programs for CPS high schools,
with the title of Director of Bureau of Health.33 Vallas stated:
Some of the finest athletes in sports have come out of the Chicago Public
league. But there have been too many instances of talented students being
denied the opportunity to participate. The three components of our plan
are to attack the issue of promoting more athletics, provide the facilities
and provide financial incentives for more teachers to become coaches and
role models. Money will be set aside to restore the depleted coaching
ranks.”34
Vallas went on to discuss his desire to renovate fields and build campuses with soccer,
baseball and football fields that “compare favorably with the nicest suburban schools.”35
The funding for this would come from a 600 million dollar capital bond program that had
not been approved yet. Vallas would give his reasoning for the importance of investing
in the sports program:
Take a drive now and you’ll see high schools surrounded by abandoned
buildings, vacant lots with weeds 3 feet high, or maybe a few bars and
garbage dumps. We will either buy the property or access to the property
and build fields for interscholastic and intramural sports. We’d rather
have the students involved in after-school programs rather than running
the streets….We realize sports and recreational activities are a crucial
supplement to what we do in the classrooms. It is a way to learn how to
achieve goals, build teamwork and expend energy in a positive fashion.”36
Vallas would soon back up his words regarding his commitment to improving CPS sports
by supporting the creation of a freshman only sports league, and team sports for
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elementary schools. Vallas explained: “What we’re trying to do is give our kids some
incentives, and offer them some of the same resources suburban students get. Research
has already shown that this type of thing helps.”37
Vallas’ support for the improvement of CPS sport programs also came with tough
decision making. In February of 1996, Vallas issued a verdict regarding the eligibility of
Farragut High School senior Larry Jackson. Jackson had recently transferred to Farragut
from Oak Park High School, a nearby suburban school. Jackson played basketball at Oak
Park until he was charged with misdemeanor battery for assaulting the Oak Park
basketball coach. Typically, central office did not involve itself in eligibility decisions.
After receiving a recommendation from a committee that examined the issue, Vallas gave
his verdict:
J.W. and the principals’ committee gave me no reason to decide otherwise.
This was not a question of eligibility; it was a question of ethics. We
cannot allow someone to violate school policy at one place and then
escape to another school. There was never any doubt in my mind that he
wouldn’t play. You can’t be afraid to make the right decision….It’s the
ethical thing to do. This would have set a bad precedent if we had decided
any other way. It is important to send a message to the whole school
system.38
Jackson’s family would file a federal lawsuit in an attempt to restore his ability to play.
The federal lawsuit argued that school officials had violated Jackson’s constitutional due
process rights in ruling him ineligible to play without a hearing. CPS’ decision was
upheld.
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On the morning of February 25th, 1996, Ronnie Fields was involved in a car
crash that left him with three fractured vertebrae and ended his basketball season, and
some would argue, ruined his professional basketball career prospects. Fields was a 6-3
senior who previously played alongside current NBA star Kevin Garnett at Farragut High
School. Fields often “wowed” crowds with high-flying slam dunk shots and was one of
the top basketball prospects in the country. Fields was in a rental car that was given to
him by Farragut assistant coach Ron Eskridge. The story of the accident caught fire
immediately, and sparked debates regarding the preferential treatment of student-athletes.
Vallas spoke on the issue: “Teachers and coaches should not be giving students,
especially star athletes, things such as money, rental cars or tickets to a Bulls game.”39
After surgery, Fields had to wear a large contraption around his neck and head for
stabilization.
As Chicagoans who followed high school sports got over their shock regarding
the catastrophic event, Vallas offered a different perspective: “This is a defining moment
for our system, a golden opportunity to drive home that we are about education. We need
to send a message that our mission is to educate children. Athletics should complement
that.”40 Soon after the accident, Vallas enacted what would be considered the most
dramatic change in Chicago Public Schools athletics in over thirty years. A revamped
ethics policy for sports would be approved by the Reform Board of Trustees. Some of
the most significant changes included:
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Students transferring from within or outside of the school district are
ineligible for sports for one year unless their petition for eligibility is
approved by the director of sports



Transferring student-athletes deemed not “in good standing” are
ineligible



Coaches and CPS personnel are prohibited from providing gifts
exceeding $20.41

Vallas explained his rationale for the strict ethics policy:
The whole episode with Ronnie Fields raises questions about the
preferential treatment of star athletes. We all realize from time to time,
teachers take money out of their own pockets to buy a child clothes or
food when that individual is lacking some of the basic necessities of life.
But teachers and coaches should not be giving students, especially star
athletes, things such as money, rental cars or tickets to a Bulls game.42
Vallas further clarified his stance and defined his flexibility regarding the new policies:
Until now, there had been a lot of gray area where things weren’t
expressly prohibited. Once this policy goes into effect, no one will be
confused on what’s right and wrong. Also in this ethics policy, any
student being disciplined or penalized in another school district who
transfers into the Chicago Public Schools will not be able to compete.
Period. End of story. No debate. No lawsuits.43
The Farragut assistant coach, Eskridge, was eventually banned from coaching in the
Chicago Public Schools system under the new ethics policy.
Next on Vallas’ agenda would be high school powerhouse King High School.
King was one of the top basketball schools in the state in the late 1980’s into the 1990’s.

41

Chicago Public Schools, Board of Education Proceedings. Board of Education, City of Chicago,
March, 1996. Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, p. 1033.
42

Bob Sakamoto, “Schools’ Get-Tough Policies Near OK,” Chicago Tribune, 1996.

43

Ibid.

113
King featured basketball stars such as former NBA players Marcus Liberty and the 7
foot 3 inch Thomas Hamilton, as well as the 7 foot 2 inch former professional basketball
player Rashard Griffith who predominately played in European leagues. King won
multiple state championships during that time period, coached by Landon “Sonny” Cox.
It was common knowledge in Chicago that King players allegedly received “perks” on a
regular basis, such as shoes, clothes, and money by King coaches. None of this was ever
proven, and Cox was informally considered untouchable.
However, in April of 1996, charges surfaced alleging that Cox attempted to get
grades changed for all-city guard Larry Allaway, and when he was unsuccessful, he
played Allaway anyway, despite the fact that he was ineligible. After the investigation,
Cox was found to be at fault for playing the ineligible player, and he was suspended from
coaching and assistant principal duties for 10 days. Vallas stated: “I’m putting all the
coaches on warning. This has to be cleaned up once and for all. The first time they mess
up, it’s a suspension. The second time, they get fired as coaches and could lose their
teaching jobs.”44 A few years after this ruling, King fell from the ranks of basketball
sports powerhouse.
School Overcrowding
Before the opening of the school year in 1995, a major issue confronting Vallas
and his staff centered around the issue of school overcrowding. The long-range solution
was a tentative plan to borrow 600 million dollars to construct additional schools and
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repair dozens of decrepit buildings between 1996 and 1999. Initially for the short
term, the team developed a busing plan. This plan was met with heavy criticism and
resistance from parents, causing Vallas to back away from the plan to explore
alternatives: “There is a big problem with busing. People don’t like it, and it causes
confusion. I’m not comfortable implementing it. What I want to do is meet Monday and
assess overcrowding school by school and come up with alternatives that will minimize
the need to bus.”45 Vallas and his team located twenty mobile units and bought them for
one-sixth of the cost, which cost them half of the cost of carrying out the busing plan.
After implementing several cost-cutting measures to balance the budget, including
massive layoffs, resolving contract negotiations, putting a plan in place to temporarily
relieve overcrowding, and ensuring that the first day of school went off with few hitches,
Vallas was ready to begin making a case for additional funding: “The fact is that we’re
not going to be able to attack problems such as class sizes and other major issues without
more money from Springfield. We know what we want and need to do, and we’ll make a
good start without more money.”46 Following those comments, a spokesman for
Governor Edgar praised Vallas and his team but stated that it was premature to start
talking about new funds. Without prospects for additional funding, Vallas and his team
began to push their educational agenda which included intense intervening in failing
schools, ending social promotion, decreasing the number of truant students, increasing
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the qualifications for prospective principals, and the requirement for low-achieving
students to attend summer school.
School Remediation
A controversial policy implemented by Vallas and his team was related to the
classification of whether a school was in an “educational crisis.” Schools that met the
criteria to of a school in the midst of an educational crisis would receive intervention
from central office, the principal could be fired and the LSC members could be removed
if Vallas deemed it necessary. Critics contended that Vallas was attempting to overturn
previous school reform efforts with the policy. Vallas defended the plan: “What if a
school principal is absent and a gang is taking over the third floor of a school? We can’t
just sit around and wait for 20-some (parent) groups to reach consensus. We’re not trying
to be vindictive or dictatorial. We’re not trying to undermine school reform. But we
can’t sit around fiddling while Rome burns.”47 Despite the complaints of critics, the
policy was unanimously passed.48
The plan featured 16 criteria that could be considered in determining if a school is
in educational crisis. Examples of the criteria were:


Principal fails to develop or implement a school improvement plan



Principal is unable to develop an effective working relationship with teachers,
staff and/or the local school council



Principal fails to provide a safe building for students and staff
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Local school council is non-functional and/or deadlocked on key issues
affecting the educational process of the school



Other factors which in the Chief Executive Officer’s judgment cause the
school to meet the definition of educational crisis49

Vallas retained the right to determine how many of the criteria had to exist in one school
for it to be determined that the school was in educational crisis.
Swiftly after the school crisis plan was approved, Vallas began to intervene in
failing schools, prompting a flurry of complaints and criticisms from school employees,
school reform groups, parents and community members. A week after the approval of
the school crisis plan, Vallas and his team declared Prosser Vocational High School “in
crisis” and quickly moved in to replace its principal, assistant principal and local school
council. Prosser reportedly had a number of issues, including reports of teachers getting
paid overtime to teach classes that did not exist, charges of grade fixing, complaints of
the failure of school administrators to report allegations of student abuse by a teacher,
and bullying tactics against teachers by administrators and LSC members. Vallas
commented on the importance of being able to take swift action rather than clearing
bureaucratic red tape:
It was important for us to move quickly (to replace) these irresponsible
adults who do not know how to put the interest of children before their
own. This will send a signal through the system that we won’t tolerate a
LSC, a principal, assistant principal or teacher abusing their positions like
this. No longer will pupils or employees have to put up with nonsense in
schools while (district leaders) sit around saying ‘I don’t have the
authority to do anything.’50
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This move attracted a tremendous amount of attention from school reform groups, who
charged that the administration moved too quickly in adopting the policies and failed to
include due process guidelines to allow for councils to review allegations and appeal
decisions. Two months later, the Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees revised the
policy and required that Vallas must state in writing all the allegations and reasons for
declaring a particular school in crisis and outline how other measures failed to resolve
issues.51
In January of 1996, Vallas and his team announced that the city’s lowest
achieving schools would receive intensive intervention, and disbanded the LSC’s at those
schools and removed two principals. Vallas claimed that it should serve as a wake-up
call for the district: “People have said that we’re taking action against LSCs because we
have a problem with LSCs. Well, we’re taking action against principals, teachers,
custodians and security personnel too. The bottom line is we’ve got to put away the
nonsense and focus on the primary goal of educating children.”52 Reform groups were
outraged, and wondered if the decision made against those schools had any legal
foundation. Vallas explained: “You can call it whatever you want, but we have the
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authority to take action when schools are not functioning for whatever reason and
that’s what we’re going to do.”53
Vallas and his team suffered a setback to their intervention plans when a federal
court ordered the reinstatement of Tilton School Principal Debrona Banks, citing that the
school board did not have the final authority over a LSCs contract with a principal. The
ruling stated that the board could not remove a principal without putting the school on
probation and holding a hearing, as opposed to merely putting them into remediation.
Vallas simply stated: “It just means I’m going to use the powers of probation. We are
contemplating putting a few on probation anyway.”54
In September of 1996, the district would find out what Vallas meant when he
claimed that they were contemplating putting a “few” on probation. The board
announced that they were placing 109 out of Chicago’s 557 schools on academic
probation. A school on probation would receive assistance with the supervision of
intervention efforts such as a back-to-basics curriculum, more classroom time on core
subjects, after-school programs and summer school. Probation teams were to consist of
the current principal, other active or retired principals, central office administrators with
principal experience, a local school council member and an outside representative from a
university or professional education organization. At high schools placed on probation, a
business manager would be employed to focus on day-to-day operations in order to free
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principals to focus on academics. The board retained the power to replace principals,
LSCs, or reconstitute the entire school if improvements were not made in a timely
manner. Vallas commented on the potential to fire principals and teachers: “We will do
what’s necessary to move the school forward. But we’re not going to go in and say
‘You’re fired, you’re fired, you’re fired.’ It’s hard to say how many we’re going to
remove.”55
In October of 1996, Vallas moved to reassign the principal of Marshall High
School, one of the 109 schools on probation. After a six-month audit of the school, the
audit uncovered evidence of the misuse of funds and personnel, failure to complete
accurate financial records over a five-year period, plans that were contrary to the school
improvement plan, and reportedly, the principal installed a $14,000 toilet and a shower in
his office. Vallas weighed in on the situation at Marshall: “If there was ever a school that
justified being put in educational crisis, it’s Marshall. There’s basically a meltdown.
There are things that are happening that are jeopardizing the education of the children.”56
Vallas found himself in federal court once again as the principal of Marshall,
Steve Newton Jr., challenged his dismissal as principal. During the hearing, the judge
asked the school board attorneys why Newton had to be removed before an educational
crisis hearing took place:
You’re in an area where there’s been no finding of a school in crisis. My
trouble is…you’ve got a lot of things that you say he hasn’t done well, but
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none of them seem to me to be the sort or nature to support your assertion that
if this guy’s in the school, our (probation) team can’t get in there. There’s
109 of these places on probation. Why is it so disastrous to have him
there?”57
A frustrated Vallas was interviewed after the November hearing, and he asked: “Can you
imagine a system where you cannot remove an employee while you’re conducting an
investigation, an employee that represents a threat to not only the education process but
the people in the school?”58 The School Board’s decision was ultimately upheld.
Newton was allowed to enter the school between the hours of 4:30 and 6:30 each day to
gather necessary documents to defend himself at the upcoming educational crisis hearing.
By December of 1996, Vallas recommended that Newton be permanently removed from
his post of principal at Marshall High School.59
Changing the Principal Selection Process
Vallas also fought to set tougher employment standards for principals. Vallas
argued that the improvement of schools was highly dependent on the quality of the
principal: “These principals are brain surgeons—they are molding the minds of our
children. If you have a bad principal, you are going to have problems no matter how
good a local school council is.”60 Despite dissent from reform groups who called the
move a step backward in the effort to decentralize governance, legislation was passed
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giving the School Board the authority to establish higher standards for selecting new
principals and renewing the contracts of current ones. The School Board collaborated
with the Chicago Principal and Administrators Association (CPAA) to create an academy
for leadership training. The goal of the CPAA was to “deliver services to develop a
leadership academy that will engage school leaders in learning activities that build
individual and organizational capacity skills necessary to increase leadership skills.”61
Prospective principals would have to go through the academy training in order to be
qualified to be placed on the “principal’s list.” LSCs were only allowed to interview and
hire individuals who were on that list.
Ending Social Promotion
Under the tenure of former CPS Superintendent Argie Johnson, a policy was put
in place mandating that a student would not be retained more than once in grades
kindergarten through eighth.62 The rationale behind this centered on the premise that the
traumatic social effects that retention had on students outweighed any benefits in having
the student to repeat the grade. Vallas disagreed:
Social promotion was a disaster, and we can see it with the dropout rate,
which is 42 percent. When you’re talking about social promotion, there’s
no pressure on the child or the school to reach the standards you much
reach before you go to the next level. So what social promotion did was
take away the incentive for the kid and the system to ensure what the kids
should be doing, and it also devalued our diplomas.”63
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In March, 1996, the Board approved a policy for elementary school promotion. Effective
with the 1996-1997 school year, the following students would have to attend mandatory
summer school:


Third grade students who scored more than 1 year below grade level in
reading or math on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS)



Sixth grade students who scored more than 1 ½ years below grade level in
reading or math



Eighth grade students who scored more than two years below grade level in
reading or math64

Failure to successfully complete summer school meant that the student would be retained
in the grade, with the exception of eighth grade students who would turn fifteen years old
prior to December 1st of that year.
By June of 2006, a reported number of over 72,000 students would have to attend
summer school. In addition to the 40,000 or so students who were expected to attend
Mayor Daley’s sport and recreational programs in Chicago schools that summer, almost
one-fourth of the districts’ students would be in some sort of summer program. Vallas
stated: “The mayor has always talked about year-round schools and this is kind of a
concept of a year-round school…all designed to get the kids off the streets into
meaningful (recreational) programs and academic programs. That’s a very, very positive
thing.”65 However, some teachers questioned the effectiveness of the summer school
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academic program, asking how would they be able to bring students up to standards
in such a short period of time. Vallas responded: “Are we going to be able to close the
gap in seven weeks? Not as much as we’d like. If, on the average, we close it by a year,
we can consider ourselves successful.”66
Truancy Program
In September of 1996, a new truancy plan was approved in order to help improve
student attendance. Vallas explained the need for the plan: “Ultimately, what’s going to
really make a dent in the area of truancy will be the ending of social promotions, summer
school, and a better education program. That said and done, you still need special
intervention programs.”67 As part of a plan designed to help improve student attendance,
the Student Attendance Improvement Policy included school based initiatives, which
involved the development of alternatives to out of school suspension, programs for at risk
students, and programs for chronic truants. The program also included system wide
initiatives, such as computerized attendance and automated calling. The Board also
created a 24-hour truancy hotline number to give businesses and residents a means by
which to report truant students. To hold schools accountable, a central office staff
member would conduct school attendance audits.68
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First School Year, Progress Made, More Progress Needed
After a full school year as CEO, Vallas and his team experienced significant gains
in elementary ITBS scores, but high schools posted some of the lowest scores of the
decade. Vallas restated the expectations: “The bottom line is the whole system has to
move forward. We realize that’s going to take time with the high schools, but
nevertheless the high schools have got to show the same progress as the elementary
schools are showing.”69 Many arguments involving the causes for the failure of the high
schools surfaced, including the previous policy of social promotion. In August of 1996,
the school board moved to end the automatic promotion policy for eighth graders that
turned fifteen before December 1st who did not pass summer school.70 Instead of being
automatically promoted, those eighth graders instead would have to attend a transition
center that provided intensive instruction.
Vallas would implement more intensive intervention measures to address failing
high schools. Vallas would use a process called reconstitution to intervene in several
failing high schools as well as some elementary schools. The process of reconstitution
involves re-staffing all of the employees in a school. Each employee would have to
interview for their positions. If there were not rehired, they were displaced from that
school. Initially, teachers who were displaced during that process were put into a reserve
pool where they were given twenty months to find another job in the district. They were

69

Michael Martinez and Janita Poe, “Chicago Grade Schools Pull Off Test Turnaround – High
Schools Perform Poorly,” Chicago Tribune, 1996.
70

Chicago Public Schools, Board of Education Proceedings. Board of Education, City of Chicago,
August, 1996. Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, p. 1880.

125
paid their full salary during that time period. Vallas explained his decision for using
such a drastic measure: “This is a pretty bold step, but we have schools that are not
showing progress and not improving and we have to use every instrument at our disposal.
Sometimes you just have to start over.”71
By the end of the 1996-1997 school year, seven high schools would be identified
as schools that would be reconstituted.72 Reasons given for the utilization of this measure
were low test scores, poor attendance, high dropout rates, and failure to follow
improvement plans. During the school board meeting, Vallas stated: “The bottom line is
we are trying to fix things. We’re into kids, not job security.”73 Also as a result of that
board meeting, the 20-month time period given to reserve teachers was reduced to 10
months. This infuriated Chicago Teacher’s Union representatives. Vallas explained:
“There is not lifetime job security. We cannot financially afford to guarantee that. Most
of the teachers who move into the reserve teachers’ pool probably will find other
employment opportunities quite easily (in the system).”74 Out of those seven high
schools, one third of the teachers lost their assignments.
Tommye Brown, principal of Englewood High School, which was one of the
seven high schools that was reconstituted, was promoted to the post of director of
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alternative schools previous to the announcement that Englewood would be
reconstituted. Englewood was considered one of the worst high schools in the state, and
had a slew of gang problems. Brown was considered a savior for the school; working
around the clock and with a disregard for his own personal health as evidenced with his
swift return to work after a mild heart attack. When the move was made, it sparked
questions concerning if Englewood was already identified as a school that would be
reconstituted. Vallas was criticized for his plans to move Brown who helped the school
get rid of a great deal of gang activity and made positive academic gains in the school.
Vallas claimed that the move was made because Brown had asked for a less stressful
assignment and a promotion: “He had heart surgery, and he wanted a promotion, and he
wanted to take over the alternative schools, and I’m not going to deny it to him. He’s
earned it.”75
School Safety Concerns
The 1996-1997 school year also experienced a host of school safety issues. One
of those issues took place at Clemente High School. Reportedly, the dean of students at
Homewood-Flossmoor High School, Jerry Anderson, turned down an offer for the
principalship at Clemente extended to her by the LSC because of death threats that she
received. Supposedly, the threats came from a violent Puerto Rican gang who supported
another candidate for principal. Vallas responded: “I’m taking over the school. The
bottom line is that Clemente has brought this on themselves. We have been very patient
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with Clemente. Clemente is going to have its independence of politics. The political
exploitation of Clemente students is over.”76
In April of 1997, students at Jenner Elementary School, located in the heart of the
Cabrini-Green Chicago Housing Authority high rises, were moved into the hallways of
the school several times because of gunfire outside of the school. Cabrini-Green was
considered one of the most dangerous housing projects in the city. An outraged Vallas
stated: “When do these actions begin to undermine the education process? When
children are at school, they should be focusing on school work. They shouldn’t have to
be going through emergency drills to avoid gunfire.”77 Vallas met with parents, teachers
and the principal of Jenner to offer them a temporary space, but they refused over
concerns of interrupting the school year and disrupting the learning process with busing
students.
In October of 1997, students at Jenner Elementary School witnessed a man
getting shot outside a school window. Vallas reopened the conversation regarding
moving the school:
If the local school council and the school leadership give us the word, the
kids could be out in a week. If they don’t give us the green light, we still
reserve the right to move kids if the situation does not immediately
improve. We’re not going to go through a school year worrying about
Jenner. Those kids should not have to be going to school in a war zone.78
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After meeting with about one hundred parents from Jenner, Vallas continued to
persuade them to reconsider their position:
We do not want to go through another year of distractions at Jenner. The
only thing that would keep us from moving is commitments from the
Chicago Housing Authority, the police department and community leaders
that will permanently change the status quo around the neighborhood. It is
my decision to make, but I want community support. If about 125 parents
want to move, we would operate a small school at Mulligan and leave the
rest at Jenner. However, I would prefer we move all the students before
we lose a life.79
Vallas backed off of the plans to move Jenner after the Chicago Housing Authority
promised to close down the high-rise buildings.
In December of 1997, a random search conducted at Foreman High School turned
up a large number of banned items such as pagers, knives and marijuana. Ninety students
were arrested as a result of the search. Vallas made the following statement regarding
the random search: “This is one of the larger ones but the point is we do them very often.
If you are going to have a zero tolerance policy…you’ve got to enforce that policy. So
we have random sweeps, and students can find themselves in big trouble if they bring
them (unauthorized items) to school.”80
Character Education and Service Learning
Vallas assembled a team of educators along with religious and community
members to develop a character education program that would be implemented in all
Chicago City Schools. The goal was to train teachers over the summer in order to
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implement the program in September of 1997. Vallas issued his opinion regarding
the need for character education:
I’ve had a religious upbringing where values and ethics and morals were
being reinforced. The most dynamic personality outside my father was
our parish priest. He’s an institution. He’s kind of our moral guiding
light. There are so many individuals like that in our communities who
have for all practical purposes been barred from our schools.81
Vallas’ plan was supported by the CTU, who felt that some of the responsibilities
regarding the teaching of morals and values that may not be taught at the homes of some
CPS students would have to be taught by teachers and coaches.
In addition to the character education program, CPS officials announced that sixty
hours of community service would be a prerequisite for high school graduation. To
fulfill this requirement, CPS students would need to work as tutors for younger students,
or volunteer in schools, churches, nursing homes or institutions serving the disabled.
Vallas spoke on the addition of the service learning requirement: “We are focusing on
academics, but it is important children learn ethics and develop a sense of community.
Getting kids involved is great. It also helps the community become more comfortable
with the school.”82 This plan received some criticism from education experts who argued
that the value of providing service is severely lessened when it is forced onto teenagers.
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Modified Magnet School Plan
In October of 1997, Vallas proposed a plan that would require for all CPS magnet
schools to reserve 30 percent of the enrollment for neighborhood children.83 Magnet
schools were a manifestation of efforts to desegregate schools in the early 1980’s and
encourage middle-class families to stay in Chicago. Magnet schools offer a variety of
different specialty curriculum choices and have citywide enrollment patterns. There are a
variety of procedures to gain admittance in to a magnet school, but most involved a
lottery and an application process.
Opponents to that plan felt that by reserving that space for neighborhood children,
it would defeat the purpose of the existence and purpose for magnet schools. Vallas
argued that it would promote neighborhood involvement and decrease transportation
costs. Vallas stated: “People across the city have felt for years that only the elite get into
magnet schools. What we are trying to do here is demystify the magnet school
program.”84 Part of the mystery surrounding magnet schools was a general belief that a
high percentage of white students attended the city’s magnet schools. In actuality, the
magnet schools all had a majority minority student population. The opponents to this
plan caused school officials to restructure the plan some, and decide to cut the 30 percent
number in half. After the first year, if the program was successful, the district could vote
to increase the percentage.
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Victory at Springfield
In December of 1997, Vallas and the Chicago Reform Board of Trustees
experienced a major victory in regards to school funding. Despite heavy lobbying efforts
from tobacco and gambling companies, the state approved a $485 million dollar funding
increase for the state’s poorest school districts. The revenue would come from raising
taxes on telecommunications, cigarettes and casinos. The funding issue had been raised
several times during Vallas’ tenure, and in November of 1997, the same funding plan had
been rejected by the House. But after Mayor Daley and Vallas urged Chicago residents
to call and email state House representatives, they decided to reconvene for a special
session. An elated Vallas proclaimed: “The children’s lobby has let their presence be felt
in Springfield…Any time the community can become organized, any time the community
can become mobilized, any time common people turn out in mass numbers on an
important issue, they’re going to overcome the special interests each and every time.”85
In a Chicago Tribune news article authored by Board of Trustee President Gery
Chico and Paul Vallas, they explained that the bill did not solve all the problems with
educational funding for schools in Illinois, but it allowed for the expansion and
continuance of several educational programs, including:


The adding of 1st and 2nd graders to the mandatory summer school program



The after school Lighthouse program



Reducing class sizes



Expansion of preschool programs
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Parents as Teachers First program



Cradle to Classroom program



The building of new schools and renovations to older buildings86

Vallas and Chico warned that the debate on educational funding had not ended, but the
increased funding would provide immense benefits for CPS.
Business as Usual
Over the next months after Vallas’ first two years at the helm of CPS CEO, many
of the initial controversies that surrounded the district were reduced as he continued to
push for initiatives that he believed would improve the district. In late 1997, criticism of
the district’s inability to fire displaced teachers surfaced. Vallas contended: “I’ve never
suggested that it’s easy to get rid of bad teachers. Removal of ineffective teachers
remains a difficult process and it will remain that way until state laws change.”87 Soon
after this, beginning in early 1998, Vallas explored options for an alternative step
between probation and reconstitution. Vallas explained the move: “The board is not
giving up its right to reconstitute, but the board is open to a union proposal to establish an
alternative step or an interim step between probation and reconstitution.”88
In October of 1997, Vallas and the Chicago Public Schools received high praise
from President William Clinton. During a visit to Chicago, Clinton stated: “You’ve
strengthened curriculum, renovated buildings, expanded pre-school education, kept
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schools open longer and in summertime to give children who need it extra help.”89
Vallas admitted that he and his team felt an adrenaline rush after those statements, and
early in the following year, he took advantage of the positive statements to remind the
federal government of its responsibility to education: “I think the federal government
should play a larger role in providing assistance to local school systems. Education is a
national security issue. If you don’t invest in education, you’re not going to be able to
compete internationally.”90
In response to violent outbursts in areas surrounding the Robert Taylor Homes
leading up to the December holiday break, a Chicago low-income housing area, Vallas
and the CPS leadership team launched a program which kept some schools open during
the winter holiday break so that students could participate in recreational camps. The
board also planned to hire parent workers to help escort children from the Robert Taylor
Homes to school. Vallas’s stated his rationale: “I’m not suggesting here that what we’re
offering is going to solve all the problems. We’re making a contribution. If the kids
aren’t in school, they’re not going to get educated. If we have to go out and get them
escorted, then that’s what we’re going to do.”91
When school resumed in January, Vallas kicked started the efforts to escort
students to school by personally assisting. Vallas climbed the stairwells of the dangerous
Robert Taylor Homes that Monday several times to assist kids to and from school. Vallas
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described the conditions at the Taylor Homes: “Does it affect their education?
You’re darn right it does. It’s all the more reason to have after-school programs. It’s
going to take time but you’ve got to have school-based all-day programs. Do I feel safe?
I don’t even think about it.”92 By the following week, the program was expanded to
include additional schools near the Robert Taylor Homes and a shuttle bus program
began, which transported students to the nearby Phillips High School through gang
territory.
Also in the month of January, Vallas launched a Saturday detention program for
students that were found to be in violation of serious first time non-violent offenses. The
Saturday Morning Alternative Reach-out and Teach (SMART) program was staffed by
off-duty police officers, counselors and ministers. Vallas described what the program
would not be, as well as his vision:
This is not going to be ‘The Breakfast Club.’ The kids are going to have
vision and hearing tests, and they are going to have drug counseling if they
need it. There’s going to be someone there to evaluate their academic
record and school prospects and career options and then they are going to
get a dose of character education and drug education. So this is going to
be pretty thorough.93
In April of 1998, Vallas was presented an award during the Chicago Business
Opportunity Fair for what was described as his unprecedented support and commitment
to minority and women owned businesses. This was in response to his selection of a high
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percentage of minority business for school construction business and other service
contracts.
Daley and Vallas Display First Signs of Public Disagreement
The triumvirate of Mayor Daley, CEO Paul Vallas and Board President Gery
Chico led a slew of reform efforts in a harmonious fashion during the first years of the
reform effort. Vallas was in the forefront, handling the day-to-day operations while
Chico mainly dealt with policy issues. While Chico and Vallas did not always agree,
they maintained a public respect for one another. Mayor Daley supported the team, and
publicly praised their efforts and mostly stayed out of affairs. However, when asked if
students who fail the Iowa test for a second time would be held back for a second year,
Mayor Daley said yes: “I will not socially promote children to high school, to allow them
to drop out and go on…You want to promote them? You go promote them. And then
you’ll see them in the criminal justice system and you’ll be complaining about your
taxes.”94
Vallas’ opinion on the matter was not as definitive. By that time, the board had
altered the promotions policy; giving principals and regional officers input on a case-bycase basis as to if it would be advantageous to hold a particular student back. Vallas
stated: “After the first retention, the social aspects of the retention are less of a concern.
But when you are talking about flunking for a second consecutive time, then obviously

94

Michael Martinez and Janita Poe, “Kids Who Flunk Twice Give City Schools Big Test – Daley
Would Deny Promotions, But Vallas has 2nd Thoughts,” Chicago Tribune, 1998.

136
the social aspects have a much greater impact.95 Later, when asked about a possible
difference in philosophy between him and the mayor, Vallas was reluctant to
acknowledge a disagreement:
I was pretty clear over and over again that I did not feel that the mayor’s
statement was in any way inconsistent with the policy. But you can take
the mayor’s strongest statement and take our weakest statement and imply
that there is some sort of contradiction…I’ve had conversations with the
mayor and we’re very consistent. We would like to think that (the student
promotion) policy is tough, but yet the policy does have the needed
flexibility so that we can make decisions in the best interests of the child.96
Although the minor disagreement between the men was downplayed by Vallas, it would
serve as the first sign of tension to come between him and the mayor.
Vallas Continues to Speak
The outspoken Vallas continued to speak on issues related to CPS and its
students. After the athletic shoe company Puma featured a CPS basketball player on a
commercial, Vallas weighed in on possible consequences: “The promotion, or over
promotion, of sports can shift students’ attention away from investing time and effort in
things of greater importance. Some students have a greater chance of being struck by a
meteorite than of making the NBA.”97 The commercial prompted a policy that banned
CPS students from promoting athletic products.
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Notable Events to Follow
After learning that three of Chicago’s seven charter schools scored poorly
on the Iowa test, Vallas stated: “We have enough poor-performing schools so
their charters will be revoked if they don’t make gains.”98


In May of 1998, Vallas installed a busing plan that was designed to save
money by requiring that two schools share one school bus. The plan affected
several magnet schools, which resulted in parent complaints. Vallas stated
“The basic policy is, in effect, done. If people want to communicate their
displeasure about the busing policy (at public hearings on the budget) they
can. But this is already our policy.”99



In June of 1998, CPS announced that ten new day-care centers for teen
mothers would be opened. Critics wondered if the centers would encourage
teens to have sex and have babies. Vallas believed that: “Rather than losing
two generations of children, this is an opportunity to save two generations of
children.”100



Paul Vallas, along with other officials were appointed by Governor Edgar to
examine the problem related to educational funding in the south suburbs of
Chicago.
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A special advisory council recommended that 15 CPS schools be
reconstituted. Although Vallas stated that he wanted to ensure that the board
did not make the same mistakes as they had with previous reconstitutions, he
would claim that he planned to rid the school of teachers and principals: “Will
there be staffing changes? Absolutely. The issue is if you are not going to
reconstitute, how are you going to get at ineffective teachers? Could there be
personnel changes? Yeah, there could be.”101



During an interview with Chicago Tribune education reporter Michael
Martinez, he was asked about his formula for success in the district, and about
his critics. One of his responses was:
When I came in, everybody made excuses why the kids couldn’t learn.
Now they are making excuses why the kids are learning. Really, that’s
an important issue: For example, supposedly we’re scaring the hell out
of everybody. Is fear a factor? Well, if fear is synonymous with
accountability, then I’ll take fear anytime.102



Vallas was given the authority to choose an interim principal when the LSC
has reached an impasse.103



In August of 1998, the CPS central office moved from Pershing Road to 125
S. Clark St. in Chicago’s downtown loop.
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A large number of students would be retained for a second time in 1998.
Vallas stated: “The point is we’re hanging tough. We’re not compromising on
our standards. Overall, I’m pleased with the progress, but we’re not satisfied
because we have a long way to go. The next year, you will ask the question,
will kids be triple retained? Ask me that next year.”104



As of October of 1998, the number of CPS schools on the Illinois State Board
of Education’s academic early warning list was significantly reduced. Along
with that, the district’s enrollment was up, and improvements were made in
attendance, dropout, truancy, and mobility rates. Vallas stated:
What’s making a difference is, first of all, labor peace and financial
stability. What’s making a difference is that we now have a system
that holds everyone accountable for the performance of the students.
And now we have more support programs such as extension of the
school day and after-school and summer school programs. I think it’s
a combination of things.105
Vallas Seeks Final Approval in Firing Principals

Vallas had made no secret of his wishes to have more input regarding the
selection and retention of CPS principals. In March of 1999, Vallas backed a bill that
was introduced in the Senate Education Committee to amend the 1995 Amendatory Act
to give central administration the final say in firing a principal. Advocates for the LSCs
created by the original 1988 Chicago School Reform Act were outraged, arguing that this
takes the LSCs most important power away from them. Vallas ultimately wanted LSCs
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to have the authority to renew a principal’s contract only if they receive a satisfactory
rating from central office, and cripple their ability to fire principals without their
approval: “I’m trying to reduce the selection of bad principals and prevent good
principals from being intimidated or influenced by overzealous members of LSCs. This
isn’t anything new, because I’ve been talking about this for four years.”106
Tension With Board President Emerges
Behind closed doors, it was common knowledge that CEO Paul Vallas and Board
President Gery Chico did not always see eye-to-eye on every issue, and tension would
build from time to time. Both men always publicly respected one another and played
down any difference of opinion. However, in May of 1999, their difference would be
made more public. During a three day educational conference headed by the mayor,
Vallas became upset when a video played at the conference labeled him as “deputy
superintendent.” City Hall, who produced the video, called it a production film error, but
it was reportedly the subject of jokes at the conference. A glossy brochure for the
conference reportedly included Chico’s name but omitted Vallas. Those behind-thescenes gaffes as well as other tension regarding personnel issues caused reporters to ask
Vallas about the tension and his future with CPS. This time, Vallas acknowledged that
there was tension, but claimed that he wanted to stay: “It’s really up to the mayor whether
or not he’s going to keep the team together. And he also has to make a decision
regarding the board too….So I’m not the only person whose fate is yet to be determined.
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If I was asked to stay, I would. I would be inclined to keep the management team
intact.”107
Other Notable Events 1999–2000


CPS decided that it would not retain students in the same grade for a third
time in a row.108 Vallas stated: “Let’s be realistic, this is not backing off (the
policy against social promotions). All policies have to be flexible. Look, our
retention policy is probably the toughest in the nation. It would be more of an
issue if we had more triple retainees.”109



CPS posted the fifth straight year of gains on the Iowa tests



When asked about his future, Vallas stated: “I personally feel that I need two
more years to institutionalize the changes and after the two years, we’ll see.
In two years, the system will probably have had enough of me.”110



CPS students posted low scores on the newly administered Illinois Standards
Achievement Test (ISAT) in 1999, which contrasted the improvements made
on the national Iowa test. This trend continued in the year 2000 as well.
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In May of 2000, Vallas introduced a “parent report card” which would be
implemented during the following school year. Vallas gave specifics
concerning the program:
I am referring to it as a check list. Every five weeks, we’ll send a
check-off list home to parents: is your child bringing his eyeglasses to
school? A lot of our kids have health problems like asthma: Do kids
have their inhalers? Have kids been vaccinated? Are kids bringing
books to school? Are kids dressed appropriately?111



Fewer students required summer school after the 1999-2000 school year than
in previous years based on Iowa test results.



CPS received the highest rating that it had experienced in over forty years
from Standard and Poor’s, an A-plus. This would allow the board to save
money on borrowing for school construction.



CPS placed six schools under their direct control, implementing a measure
called intervention.112 Vallas described the intervention process:
“Intervention may prove to be the most controversial because intervention
allows you to go in and selectively remove staff for non-performance. After
you do the evaluation, you can dismiss individual teachers based on the
evaluation.”113
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In July of 2000, CPS announced a change to the promotions policy, adding
an element that allowed teachers to evaluate a student’s classroom grades,
classroom reading and math tests, attendance, homework completion
percentage and conduct in determining a final decision regarding a student’s
promotion status. Vallas explained: “This is the natural progression of our
rising standards. This is something we have wanted to do for a long time.”114
Vallas and Daley Bump Heads Again

Despite a major back-to-school campaign for the 2000-2001 school year
publicized by Mayor Daley, a record number of students were absent on the first day –
over 100,000 students. CPS officials believed that the reason for the low turnout was
related to a possible backlash to the back-to-school rally, which asked that parents walk
their children to school for the first day. The result was a higher than normal turnout of
parents to go along with the low turnout of students. Vallas believed that the rally may
have been a factor, but blamed the low turnout on the earlier than normal start: “While I
think those are factors, I think the major factor is the very early start. We have to figure
out a way to have a three-week break instead of a two-week break.”115
Mayor Daley did not quite agree with Vallas’ rationale for the low first day
attendance. Daley commented: “It’s like saying, ‘Do I have to go to work at 9 o’clock?’ I
mean, ridiculous. I mean we know school’s going to start. They can’t keep making
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excuses now ‘Well, it started too early.’ ‘Well, we should start Oct. 1.’”116 Vallas
continued to publicly disagree and stated that he would start school later the next year.
The End of the Tenure of Paul Vallas
Leading up to the end of the tenure of Paul Vallas as CPS CEO, reports of a
flattening of test scores surfaced, as well as reports of continued poor performance by
CPS students on the state’s new ISAT test. One particular Tribune newspaper article
written in November of 2000, which title began: Another Bad Year for City Schools
highlighted the districts’ failure to produce positive ISAT test scores.117 Vallas took
exception to the article, and in particular the headline. He did not think that it was fair to
judge the success of the school year according to ISAT test results, as evidenced by an
article that he wrote for the Chicago Tribune a week later. He argued that the following
facts did not constitute a “bad year” for CPS (in his words):


This is the fifth consecutive year that Chicago Public Schools
elementary school students have improved their scores on the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills



This is the fourth consecutive year that Chicago Public Schools high
school students have improved the scores they earned on the Test of
Achievement and Proficiency



This is the third consecutive year that the number of Chicago Public
Schools students taking and passing the advanced placement tests has
increased



This is the third consecutive year that our dropout rate has declined
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This year’s increase in the graduation rate puts it as a 15-year high



This is the third time in the last four years that ACT scores have risen
while the national composite scores have remained the same.118

Vallas went on to state: “Our students, teachers, principals and administrators have
worked too long and too hard to achieve the positive results as listed above to be labeled
as failures, based on the results of a single test administered before the standards could be
covered. This is neither responsible nor fair.”119
Mayor Daley did not seem satisfied with the state of affairs for CPS. At his
annual State of the City speech in February of 2001, he expressed frustration with the
slow progress in CPS student reading abilities and claimed that schools would need to
utilize non-traditional ideas and think “outside of the box” to help students improve:
When you go into a school, you see kids who deal with technology faster
than any of us, who can sing a rap song better than anyone else, but they
have a problem reading…With every child there is ability. How do we get
it out of them? ... I think we have to go outside of the box.120
Vallas claimed that he was planning three initiatives that would enhance performance.
He revealed that one of his proposals would include a standardized curriculum from
central office: “The studies have indicated that the schools where we go in and dictate
curriculum are the schools that seem to be doing the best.”121 He also took a shot at 1988
decentralization efforts: “This whole concept of having 600 schools doing 600 different
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things, the whole premise of the first school reform movement in 1987—what we are
learning is that the probationary schools, the schools where we intervene and go in and
dictate models, are the ones making the most significant gains.”122
At this point, speculation regarding Vallas’s future with CPS increased. In
addition, there were several rumors regarding Vallas’s possible interest in running for
governor of Illinois. Vallas dispelled those rumors on several occasions, which did not
stop the speculation. A supposed reconciliation between Vallas and Daley took place
after a couple of weeks of comments between the two after the mayor’s statement
regarding the direction that the reform efforts should be focused. Vallas stated: “We’re
frustrated too. The mayor’s call for new ideas and new innovations, we don’t shy away
from those things. My response was to be defensive about what we’ve accomplished and
the gains we have made, but to also acknowledge that we need to do more. So the mayor
and I are in full agreement.”123 However, the speculation continued.
Adding to the speculation was the surprise resignation of CPS Board President
Gery Chico. Chico stated:
Six years is actually a lengthy period of service in this position. Of the 80
prior presidents of this board, only three have served longer
continuously…This is a natural break point. You would like to leave
when there is sufficient time to find a successor, prepare that successor to
go and start the next school year as smoothly as possible.124
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Daley praised Chico for his dedicated service and stated that his departure meant that
other people would have the opportunity to serve. Questions directed towards Mayor
Daley regarding Vallas’ immediate future surrounded Chico’s resignation. Daley was
asked by reporters if Vallas had done a good job and he stated: “I think they have all done
a good job. Like anything else, we can do a better job.” The mayor was then asked if he
wanted Vallas to stay. He said “Yes.” A reporter then commented that his answer was
not a glowing endorsement, and he commented: “I am glowing. What do you want me to
do, put a moon face on?”125
Two weeks later, after weeks of speculation and rumors, Vallas announced that it
would be the end: “Am I going? Yeah, I’m going, OK? Simple as that. I don’t want to
play these games for another year. … I’ve tried not to respond to the anonymous this and
the anonymous that or the high-level sources close to the mayor this and the close to the
mayor that…”126 Vallas continued: “So you want to know if I’m leaving? Yeah. I’m
leaving. Yeah, I’m gonna be gone. End of story. So put it in the paper tomorrow.”127
Soon after his comments, Daley hinted that the leadership team may have grown
complacent:
When you committed to change, you risk failing. But unless we’re willing
to change, we’ll never succeed. I also hope no one has fallen into the trap
of believing we’ve already done the best that we can. If you believe that,

125

Ibid.

126

John Kass, “Vallas Stuck Neck Out For Schools, Only to Get Axed,” Chicago Tribune, 2001.

127

Ibid.

148
then you’ve given up on our children. And I, for one, will never give up on
any child in Chicago.128
Many people believed that Vallas got a raw deal, and praised his efforts. In
summary, he was praised for “living, eating, and breathing” the job he was given,
achieving six consecutive balanced budgets, a 2.65 billion dollar construction program,
achieving net gains in reading and math standardized test scores over his tenure, banning
social promotions, creating after-school and summer programs and improving the athletic
program. Daley added to the public praise, stating: “Teachers, students and principals
will tell you there’s a new spirit in the Chicago Public Schools. The old sense of
defeatism and failure is a thing of the past.”129 Several letters surfaced in Chicago’s
newspapers thanking and praising Vallas and many contained statements that the mayor
should have retained him and warned him that he had “big shoes to fill.”
The future of CPS was highly discussed in Chicago in June of 2001. Who would
take over the helm of CPS CEO to lead the next wave of reforms? With a balanced
budget, labor peace with CPS teachers, improved accountability, but stagnated
standardized test scores, who would be the right individual to develop programs designed
to produce the reading gains that Daley was looking for? Who would be willing to utilize
non-traditional methods and “think outside of the box?” Daley did not take long to make
his decision. He would select an obscure, unassuming, 36-year-old former chief of staff
to Vallas, Arne Duncan.
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CHAPTER IV
ARNE DUNCAN AND THE NEW WAVE OF REFORM
Background
In June of 2001, Mayor Daley selected Arne Duncan, who functioned as Chief of
Staff under Paul Vallas, to replace him as CPS’ next CEO. Duncan was primarily in
charge of aligning elementary and high schools into clusters and ensuring that each
cluster had a magnet program. The magnet cluster program was created primarily to
attract middle class families to enroll their children in the district who would opt for
private or parochial schools, and to help reduce the cost of busing by featuring high
quality magnet programs closer to their homes. Duncan was also an administrator of the
service learning program. Duncan revealed his motivation behind taking on the
responsibility of CEO after a few months into the job:
This is it for me; I don’t want any other job. It’s a big responsibility,
making sure kids who deserve an education really get one. For a long
time I looked at the public schools as the enemy because they weren’t
doing the job. That’s why I am passionate about this job and come to
work to make sure every child receives an education they deserve.1
The mayor’s choice surprised many, including individuals within the district
office. One top official reportedly stated: “A lot of us didn’t find out about the
appointment until a few minutes before the mayor held his news conference. People
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around here were very surprised. Arne has a lot to learn.”2 Daley explained his
selection, describing Duncan as “someone who starts with an understanding of how to get
things done,” and praised his ability to “work with people and groups with different
views to find the common ground that puts our children first.”3 During a news
conference with Mayor Daley, Duncan claimed that he was ready to improve the
academic progress of the students in the system: “I am optimistic that the public schools
can offer every child a good education. I don’t accept this responsibility lightly. I want
to be an advocate for every child and provide every child with a good education.”4
Arne Duncan graduated magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1987 with
a major in sociology. He played for Harvard’s basketball team where he also functioned
as co-captain. After college, Duncan played professional basketball in Australia for four
years. After his professional basketball career, Duncan ran the Ariel Education Initiative,
which was a non for-profit organization. He was also was part of a team that founded a
public elementary school which was named the Ariel Community Academy.5
In addition to the selection of Arne Duncan as CEO, Mayor Daley selected
Michael Scott as CPS Board President to replace Gery Chico. Scott was previously a top
executive with AT&T and the board president of the Chicago Park District. Also joining
the fold would be the newly elected CTU president Deborah Lynch-Walsh. Her victory
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came after two unsuccessful attempts to unseat the incumbent Thomas Reece. While
Reese enjoyed a seven-year run as president and helped facilitate a period of labor peace
between the union and the Board, Lynch-Walsh announced that there was dissatisfaction
with the old guard: “It’s a new day for the Chicago Teachers Union. … Many of our
members felt there was not respect, that reforms were being done to them instead of with
them.”6 The new triumvirate of Duncan, Scott and Lynch-Walsh would direct the next
wave of CPS reforms.
Duncan’s tenure as CPS CEO would be marked mainly by his handling of five
major issues: Improvement of student performance in reading, the closing and
consolidating of schools, funding issues, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the
Renaissance 2010 plan launched by Mayor Daley. While Paul Vallas took the office of
CEO aggressively from the very beginning, Duncan worked behind the scenes and did
not provide a high volume of media statements as his predecessor. This style would
immediately draw some criticism from local media outlets, who wondered if Duncan was
operating with a sense of urgency. Duncan answered those criticisms in a written
statement published in the December 21st issue of the Chicago Tribune, in which he took
a shot at Paul Vallas by stating that self-promotion was not his principal concern:
Perhaps some would say that I have erred by concentrating on substance
over style, and on making headway rather than headlines. Informing the
public of our many initiatives surely is an important task, and one on
which I will work even harder in the months to come…But ultimately, our
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success or failure will be measured on the basis of the ongoing progress we
make, starting with student performance.7
Throughout his tenure, Duncan would utilize written communications as a primary means
of informing the public of his opinions regarding decisions and policies.
Duncan called the post of chief education officer the most important in his
cabinet. In August of 2001, he appointed Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins to the position.8
Eason-Watkins was the principal of McCosh Elementary school, who led her school to
standardized test scores that were double what they were when she began. Duncan
stated: “That is exactly the model I’m looking for. I’m passionate about incremental
change over time.”9 Duncan claimed that Eason-Watkins was an authority in reading and
stated that he planned to utilize her to help him produce the innovative reading programs
that the mayor asked for. During his tenure, Eason-Watkins would serve as a catalyst
behind the educational initiatives at CPS.
The End of Interventions
One of Duncan’s first attention-grabbing decisions came with the announcement
that CPS would end the practice of intervention, a practice that Vallas implemented
towards the end of his tenure.10 A school slated for intervention would undergo a process
where central office performed an evaluation of all teachers and unilaterally determined if
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a teacher would be dismissed for non-performance. Duncan disassembled Vallas’
intervention teams, stating: “Last year, it wasn’t always clear who was on first base. I
want to find the best ways to use our scarce resources and support our teachers, principals
and students.”11 Duncan held meetings with CTU president Deborah Lynch, before
announcing the decision.
Early Education Initiatives
The Implementation of CPS Reading Specialists
The first major academic initiative of Duncan’s tenure would be implemented to
address a problem that Mayor Daley wanted central administration to fix immediately:
the fact that only one-third of CPS students could read at grade level. The new plan
required that every elementary school spent two hours per day teaching reading, and high
school students with low reading scores would also have two hours of reading classes per
day. In addition, reading specialists would be sent to the schools to work directly with
school staff as well as students. Duncan commented on the individuals that he planned to
send to the schools: “The people we are going to send are not going to be the principal’s
best friend or some Joe Blow either. This is going to be an elite corps of people focused
on one subject.”12
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Small Schools Initiative
An initiative that began before the tenures of Vallas and Duncan, the creation of
“small schools” was intend to provide students with smaller class sizes, more attention
from school staff, and a safer school environment. At the beginning of Vallas’ tenure,
small schools were more specifically characterized, stating that no more than 200-350
students would occupy an elementary school and no more than 500 in a high school.13
The small schools would also feature a self-selected faculty, have a great deal of
autonomy concerning curriculum, budget, organization, and personnel, possess a
coherent curricular focus which provided continuity across the grade levels, and an
admissions policy which required student and parental commitments to the school
mission. Under those guidelines, a small number of small schools were opened under
Vallas’ tenure without much scrutiny from Vallas.
In August of 2001, Mayor Daley and CPS announced that they would begin
taking larger, failing high schools and splitting them up into smaller schools. Daley
provided an explanation for the initiative: “Despite all of our efforts, many children in
our high schools are not prepared. We won’t be building new school buildings, we will
be creating smaller, independent schools within existing buildings.”14 Duncan also
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weighed in: “We want to take the successes we have had with small schools and
duplicate that success across the system.”15
Expanded Report Card
Shortly after Duncan took over the CPS CEO post, Mayor Daley and Duncan
attempted to downplay the significance of the high-stakes test scores that was a hallmark
during Vallas’ tenure. Daley stated: “Test scores may not improve as much as we would
like.” Duncan agreed that testing should be “a piece of the equation, not the entire
equation.”16 In November of 2001, Duncan announced that CPS would use a new
“accountability report card” which would continue to post state test results, and also other
information such as school dropout rates and teacher qualifications. Duncan described
the purpose of the new report cards: “This is not an attempt to divert attention from test
scores, but to put tests in perspective. You don’t buy a car or a house and just look at the
door. This will give a 360-degree view of a school.”17 Duncan went on to state that he
wanted his success or failure to be measured by the newer wider accountability scale:
“Do I want to be judged on this? Absolutely.”18 Duncan believed that the new report
cards would allow for the tracking of the results of individual student growth which he
hoped would be considered when the state determined the criteria for probation. Duncan
stated: “Schools may look good in terms of the percentage of students who are
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performing at national norms or meeting standards, but are their individual students
really gaining? If a teacher can take a bunch of third graders all reading at the first-grade
level and move them up two grade levels, now that’s an enormous thing to do.”19
Duncan and Board President Michael Scott also spoke of using incentives to help
motivate students to improve.
Duncan Eliminates Jobs
At a meeting located at the Illinois governor’s mansion in November of 2001,
educators, business leaders, legislators and higher education officials gathered to develop
strategies to discuss how to improve the quality of the state’s teachers. When the topic of
additional pay for teachers arose, Governor George Ryan challenged the group to come
up with plans that involved more than just money: “We can talk all we want about putting
more money into our classrooms, but a classroom full of eager students will not succeed
without a good teacher. The harsh reality is we face limitations in the coming years,
there won’t be a lot of new money. Real education reform involves more than money.”20
Duncan would soon have to adapt to that thinking. In December of 2001, Duncan
announced that the Department of Learning Technologies would be eliminated. The
department was responsible for helping schools integrate computers and the Internet into
curriculum. Duncan stated: “We are trying to streamline the bureaucracy in the central
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office, and we are not done. The duties of Learning Technologies can be handled in
other departments, across our entire system.”21
The next round of cuts was soon to follow. In February of 2002, Duncan
announced plans to cut approximately 80 non-teaching positions. Duncan stated: “This is
more streamlining of the bureaucracy that I have been talking about…I take saving the
taxpayers money very seriously.”22 Daley praised Duncan’s decision regarding the cuts.
However, Shirley Woodward, a former principal who was removed from her school and
reassigned to duties at central office, claimed that the system wasted funds in other
administrative areas. She claimed: “I just sit around all day and read the newspapers and
I get paid…And I’m not the only one out there like me either. There’s at least three
teachers at Austin (High School) who don’t do anything.”23 Duncan denied that the
system was wasting money on administrative salaries and did not comment publicly on
Woodward’s statements.
In April of the same year, Duncan froze the hiring of what was called “nonessential” employees in central office, as well as spending on consultants, travel and
advertising for the rest of that school year. Duncan explained that the freeze was done in
preparation for a lack of funding from the state. Duncan made it clear that he did not
want funding issues to directly affect classrooms:
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None of this impacts the schools. This is all central office. We’re preparing
for the worst, although we’re absolutely committed to that not happening.
We’re doing everything we can to streamline the central office so nothing
we do impacts what’s most important, our classrooms.24
Duncan explained that the freeze was the result of a lack of property tax revenues
received from the state, which was a result of the federal government’s economic
stimulus act. He also cited a reduction of investment returns, as well as an increase in
health care costs.
Within a month, Duncan announced deeper cuts to fill a 170 million dollar gap in
funding. The cuts would be made in the central and regional offices in a variety of
different departments. Duncan claimed that even if the state continued to fund Chicago
at the current levels (at that time), there would still be a funding gap because of rising
costs. CPS leadership began to wonder out loud why one of the richer states in the
country was almost dead last in educational funding. Duncan expressed his disgust: “It’s
not just embarrassing. It’s shameful. We cannot absorb deep cuts without affecting our
core educational program.”25
By the end of the month, Governor Ryan announced that he had no choice but to
cut education funding, due to a reduction in state revenues of over one billion dollars.
Duncan responded: “Academically and morally, this is the wrong thing to do. Any
decrease in state education funding will be extraordinarily difficult for us to absorb, and
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will negatively impact teaching and learning across the state.”26 Despite the funding
gap, CPS approved a 4.6 billion dollar budget, which was slightly higher than the budget
allotted for the previous year. The new budget included the creation of Area Instructional
Officers (AIO) whose task would be to directly supervise academic instruction in
schools. Along with the AIO positions, additional reading “coaches” were added to serve
all schools, and would be directly supervised by AIO’s.
CPS Sports
Just as his predecessor, Duncan was passionate about being involved in the
district’s sports program. Also, just as Vallas, Duncan expressed a desire for CPS sports
to be equal to sport programs in affluent districts: “I want to compete with the New Triers
and Evanstons of the world. I really want participation in the Public League to be a
tremendous source of pride for all our students that they are a part of something special,
something different.”27 Duncan continued to express his passion about the importance of
extracurricular activities:
Playing sports and being part of a team absolutely shaped who I am, my
character and sense of values. You learn leadership, hard work,
unselfishness and teamwork. If we are really serious about young people
being productive citizens, those are skills they need to learn, and they are
not easy to teach in the classroom…I want to understand what our
competition looks like, how we can be more competitive with them—and
not just in basketball. I want to be very, very competitive with them in the
range of opportunities and teams and number of participants, and most of
all in the quality of experiences we offer.28
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He would exhibit his passion in a proposal sent to the Illinois High School
Sports Association (IHSA). He proposed that public league schools play in the regional
and sectional postseason tournaments rather than its own qualifying tournament. The
significance of the proposal was its financial implications. By hosting its own qualifying
tournament, CPS avoided having to pay ISHA’s tournament qualifying fees. The league
would then have to pay tens of thousands of dollars for each team in the district to enter
the tournament. Also, CPS would lose revenues generated by hosting tournament games
at Chicago’s United Center, the home stadium of Chicago’s professional basketball and
hockey teams. Duncan defended the use of additional resources: “If we are doing the
right things, that’s an investment we’re happy to make. If we’re providing more quality
opportunities for our kids, it’s a tremendous use of our resources.”29 Duncan argued that
although the fierce state competition would initially overwhelm CPS athletes, student
athletes would become more competitive though the process.
Duncan’s Collaborative Approach
Before sending the sports proposal to IHSA, Duncan announced that he would
seek input from others before making a final decision: “After that (making a presentation
to the IHSA board) I will make a final determination on whether to make a formal
proposal to the IHSA. Before then I will be talking to principals, athletic directors and
coaches to get their feedback on the idea…”30 Duncan displayed evidence of several
instances of collaborative decision making from the very beginning of his tenure. One of
29
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the first major instances of collaborative decision making took place before making a
decision regarding the disbanding of intervention teams. Duncan met with CTU president
Lynch to gather her input before making a decision. He also agreed to hold meetings at
each of the five schools that were in intervention status to discuss alternatives to improve
instruction.
Duncan’s collaborative approach would also be extended to Local School Council
members. In February of 2002, Duncan advocated for parent participation on LSC’s
before elections: “Now, more than ever, we need parents and the community to step to
the plate. Our children’s future relies on your involvement. This is where the important
decisions are made.”31 Duncan’s statements were in direct contrast with Vallas’
treatment of LSC’s, who did not show evidence of involving them in decision making
and fought to take some of their powers away during his tenure. When the filing deadline
for LSC elections approached, and the turnout proved to be low, Duncan extended the
deadline. He rationalized: “Since the election is still so far out, there was no reason not
to give everyone more time so we can get more people involved. We have to have strong
local involvement to create strong schools.”32
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Teacher Retention
Teacher retention in the Chicago Public Schools would be an issue during
Duncan’s tenure. For the 2001-2002 school year, CPS had to fill approximately 3,000
teaching positions. One of the issues that would be raised on several occasions was the
residency requirement for teachers. As a part of CPS policy, the residency rule required
CPS teachers to live in the district in order to teach in the district.33 It was argued that the
residency requirement effectively limited the teacher hiring pool by excluding top quality
teachers that did not reside in Chicago. Duncan initially did not believe that the
residency requirement had to be altered.
Another issue contributing to the teacher shortage was the tightening of the
certification policy. Uncertified teachers would typically be utilized in hard to staff
content areas, special education, and in hard to staff schools where teacher turnover was
rampant. Duncan proposed a two-year limit for the city’s uncertified teachers to pass
state teacher examinations.34 Duncan contended: “The bottom line is in all of this is there
is simply no room in our system for teachers who are not fully qualified to teach in their
respective subject areas.”35 Substitute teachers made up a large percentage of the
unlicensed teachers, who did not have an education degree at all, but still functioned as
regular teachers.
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In December of 2001, Duncan proposed that in areas where there are teacher
shortages, teachers should be allowed to apply for a one-year exemption from the
residency requirement. Duncan stated: “This is one of a series of innovative strategies
we plan to bring the best teachers to Chicago.”36 He also stated: “At the end of the day, I
want the best teachers in front of our students. That’s the most important thing.”37 Union
President Lynch was critical of the proposal, arguing that suburban teachers who took a
position in CPS could lose their exemption if the teacher shortage no longer existed. She
contended: “If they were being serious about addressing the shortage of teachers, they
would just lift the requirements altogether. That would be the best thing.”38 The policy
was approved without debate.39
Food Safety
In December of 2001, the Chicago Tribune newspaper published a report alleging
that rodents and bugs infested CPS kitchens and cafeterias, and food was routinely
mishandled causing student illnesses.40 The in-depth report alleged that incidents that
were suspected as being food poisoning instances were not reported to state or federal
officials. It also alleged that least affluent students were more at risk for contamination.
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The report also contained statements from parents that alleged that their children were
diagnosed with food poisoning but the principal failed to act on allegations.
The report continued to cite that CPS was the largest school district in America to
privatize its meal program, but it caused a situation where the individuals who were in
charge of training staff to keep the lunchroom facilities in sanitary condition and maintain
proper food temperature did not have authority over the lunchroom staff. In addition,
another private firm handled the rodent problems. Also, school overcrowding was cited
as a problem related to food safety. Some schools had to convert their lunchrooms into
classroom spaces, causing them to prepare their food off-site, and have it delivered to the
school. In many instances, the transport vehicle did not provide proper warming
temperatures for the food, and the food was not properly covered.
The report claimed that there were many instances of food poisoning that
sickened students, but school authorities claimed that they were not able to link any
illnesses to school meals. Part of the problem was related to the fact that such a small
amount of students at any given time would display signs of illness while the vast
majority of the school’s students would eat the same meal without signs of illness. That
pattern would cause inspectors to note that they could not determine if a complaint was
justified in those instances.
The Tribune report caused a public relations nightmare, and Duncan would have
to act swiftly. The next day following the report, Duncan announced a series of reforms
that would address the issues raised by the report. The reforms included more
inspections of school kitchens and cafeterias, better training for food staff, and a thorough

165
examination of the food service contracts by CPS top management. Duncan stated:
“Nothing is more important than the health and safety of our children. We are absolutely
committed to doing what is necessary to ensure that.”41 Duncan and team members met
with the Chicago Department of Public Health Commissioner John Wilhelm, and
determined that school officials would get immediate access to data related to suspected
food-borne illnesses. Duncan stated: “In the past, we would get these reports in batches
and we were not hearing of problems in a timely manner. The communication has to be
immediate.”42 Duncan also stated that he would launch a wholesale review of the city’s
meal plan program and look “at the best practices around the country to evaluate what we
need to do.”43 He also stated that his staff would hold mandatory meeting with principals
to discuss food service procedures and would require that principals directly supervise
their kitchen workers and ensure that they adhered to proper procedures.
Duncan Closes Three Schools
Although Duncan ended the practice of intervention, the less-severe reconstitution
reform measure would be utilized a great deal. This practice would begin with the
closings of the worst performing elementary schools in the city—Terrell, Williams, and
Dodge.44 All three schools were chronically low ISAT test performers. Although Vallas
utilized reconstitution on a number of occasions when he determined that a school was in
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educational crisis, this would mark the first time in CPS history that schools would be
closed for poor academic performance. Duncan stated: “We don’t believe these schools
as they currently exist, will ever measure up. There are better education alternatives
within walking distance.”45 The decision invoked instant praise from the United States
Secretary of Education Rod Paige: “Schools exist for one reason: student achievement.
This is a model that people should pay attention to. For too long and in too many
communities, we’ve subsidized failure.”46
Union president Lynch felt that Duncan went against his word that he would not
close schools that school year. She retorted: “This is no partnership. They want to look
like they are doing something instead of the years of hard work that it takes to turn
around a school.”47 Within a month, she led CTU efforts in a proposal to take
responsibility for the improvement of the three schools slated to close. The union
intervention plan would be for the purpose of stalling the closure of the schools while the
union implements programs to raise academic achievement. Duncan commented on their
efforts: “I’m interested and open to the union’s idea. The key for me is that I want them
to show me that they have the necessary support of the staff at the schools.”48 Duncan
would not rescind his decision to close the three aforementioned schools but claimed that
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he would be open to the union helping to overhaul schools that would be considered
for closing in the future.
No Child Left Behind
Representing the largest change in federal education policy in over 35 years, and
the subject of great debate and controversy, the Senate passed a bill that included
educational reforms that would drastically affect school performance accountability by
implementing mandatory testing requirements and harsh sanctions for poor performance.
The short title of the bill would be named “The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.”49 Its
acronym, NCLB, would be often used to reference the act. Education reform was on U.S.
former President George Bush’s campaign agenda when running for office. Bush
described NCLB: “These historic reforms will improve our public schools by creating an
environment in which every child can learn through real accountability, unprecedented
flexibility for states and school districts, greater local control, more options for parents
and more funding for what works.”50
The hallmark of the No Child Left Behind Act was that it was originally designed
for the stated purpose of “improving the academic achievement of the disadvantaged.” In
section 1001 of the act, the statement of purpose is outlined:
The purpose of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal and
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at
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minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards
and state academic assessments.51
According to NCLB, this purpose would be accomplished by:


Ensuring that high quality academic assessments, accountability
systems, teacher preparation and training, curriculum and instructional
materials are aligned with state academic standards



Meeting the educational needs of low-achieving children in the
nation’s highest poverty schools, limited English proficient children,
migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian children,
neglected or delinquent children, and young children in need of
reading assistance



Closing the achievement gap between high and low performing
children, particularly between minority and non minority children and
advantaged and disadvantaged students



Holding schools, local educational agencies and states accountable for
improving the academic achievement of all students, and identifying
and turning around low-performing schools while providing
alternatives to students in such schools to enable the students to
receive a high quality education



Distributing and targeting resources sufficiently



Improving and strengthening accountability, teaching and learning by
using State assessment systems



Providing greater decision making authority and flexibility to schools
and teachers in exchange for greater responsibility for student
performance



Providing children an enriched and accelerated educational program,
including the use of school-wide programs or additional services that
increase the amount and quality of instructional time



Promoting school-wide reform and ensuring the access of children to
effective, scientifically based instructional strategies and challenging
academic content
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Elevating the quality of instruction by providing school staff with
substantial opportunities for professional development



Coordinating services with other educational services, and other
agencies providing services to youth, children and families



Affording parents substantial and meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children52

Initially, Duncan stated that he was generally pleased with the bill because it
provided a major increase in funding for Title I funds, whose purpose was to help local
education agencies provide a quality education to disadvantaged students. However,
Duncan would soon find himself frustrated with the execution of the various provisions
of the act, including the provision to provide students in failing schools with alternative
placements and the provisions which stipulated how Title I funds were to be spent.
Problems with Student Transfers from Failing Schools
In July of 2002, Chicago would begin its struggle with the NCLB provision which
required that upon request, students be allowed to transfer out of a failing school to a
higher performing school. The obvious problem was approximately two-thirds of all
CPS schools posted failing scores on the previous year’s ISAT examination. This would
severely limit the choices for parents who opted to apply for a transfer. Duncan spoke
out: “You could give every kid a bus and bus them all over the city, but that’s not going
to improve the quality of education in Chicago. Our goal here is to continue to
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strengthen neighborhood schools.”53 CPS would take advantage of loopholes in the
law, which put caps on transportation spending and allowed for district to exempt some
school from transfers. CPS convinced state legislators to pass a bill that effectively
barred students from transferring into schools that were crowded, and exempted the
majority of the city’s magnet and selective enrollment schools from taking students.
These loopholes ultimately narrowed the “student choice” provision to schools that only
performed slightly better than their home school.
Reform groups such as Designs for Change admonished CPS officials, claiming
that Duncan was not following the spirit of the law by failing to provide a wider number
of options. Don Moore, director of Designs for Change argued: “This plan falls short of
honoring the federal commitment to leave no child left behind. Most troubling, this plan
makes it impossible for students to attend many of the best schools located on the city’s
North, Northwest and Southwest Sides.”54 Duncan justified Chicago’s plan:
We fully support the spirit of the law, but there is a practical reality here
that we have to deal with. If every student in every school exercised
choice, there would be a great deal of chaos in the system. We simply
don’t have enough space for the students, and we do not think busing kids
across the city is the answer for better schools. Our goal is to help every
neighborhood school become one of choice.55
For students that were not offered choice, Duncan planned to spend federal funds on
tutoring programs, reading initiatives and professional development for teachers.
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In August of 2002, it was determined that roughly seven percent of all eligible
CPS students requested transfers. Duncan stated that the number of applicants was about
what the board expected: “The number of families who have applied so far is right in line
with what we anticipated. I think it wasn’t larger because fully one-third of our students
are already exercising choice. Chicago already has the most extensive choice options of
any major urban district in America.”56 Observers noted that the relatively small turnout
was a result of Chicago’s restriction of the school choices for students. Chicago School
Board President Michael Scott gave a different viewpoint: “Sometimes stability is more
important than mobility.”57
Just prior to the start of the 2003-2004 school year, the scramble to find spots for
student transfers continued. Superintendents across the country complained that NCLB
provisions provided nice goals, but unrealistic. Duncan began to take shots at federal
funding: “If the federal government is now going to suggest that we provide enhanced
services, I’d like to see enhanced funding. While I agree with the idea in theory, it is
unrealistic because there are not enough resources.”58 The district experienced similar
issues with figuring out how to accommodate transfer requests. For that school year,
there were roughly 19 applicants for every available seat in a better performing school.
Duncan continued to promise to improve neighborhood schools: “We will work as hard
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as we can to make all those schools better.”59 Mayor Daley also expressed frustration
with the requirements of NCLB: “Don’t give us more legislation. Just give us some
money.”60
Issues With Tutoring
An additional component of NCLB required that schools that received Title I
funds must offer extra tutoring in addition to opportunities to transfer.61 In September of
2003, CPS officials claimed that they could only afford to provide tutoring for roughly
one-fifth of all eligible students. Duncan argued that CPS did not receive enough federal
money to provide the tutoring: “The reality is, this is an underfunded mandate.”62 The
expectation from the state superintendent was to use other federal monies to help pay for
tutoring. Duncan claimed that federal monies were being spent on existing programs to
help children such as reading and math specialists and after school programs. He
commented: “It’s not like it’s money sitting around not being spent. Every single dollar
we have is going into providing the additional support our children need.”63
Another issue related to the required tutoring component of NCLB would be the
low number of students that would initially sign up for the extra help. CPS officials
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argued that they aggressively recruited parents with fairs, radio ads as well as
collaboration with churches and community groups. Parents claimed that they were
given a very short amount of time to fill out complicated paperwork. Non-English
speaking parents were not given paperwork in their native language. Duncan decided
that he would set up district sponsored tutoring programs for those students: “We can’t
wait any longer for parents to come to us.”64
By the end of October of 2003, during the 47th annual fall conference of the
Council of Great City Schools, Mayor Daley expressed frustration with the No Child Left
Behind Act, making several inflammatory statements against it. He argued that the
lawmakers did not formulate the law from the proper perspective:
The law is not written into concrete. I firmly believe this law has to be
looked at from the eyes of the students and those that are out here in our
school system…When it come to Washington D.C., talking about school
reform, they didn’t have to talk to anybody in the country with the
exception of Washington D.C. They could’ve walked about eight blocks
and went to a local school and asked the principal and asked the
administrators asked the teachers: what about education? How can we
improve education?”65
Representative John Boehner, chairman of the U.S. House Education and the Workforce
Committee had a response: “No Child Left Behind focuses federal resources on ensuring
that disadvantaged students are learning. Congress will not amend the law to leave these
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students behind. The federal government promised to dramatically increase federal
spending for education and we are meeting that promise.”66
By December of 2004, CPS learned that the federal government demanded that
they cease to provide their own tutoring programs and utilize outside tutors or risk losing
federal funding. Their rationale was that Chicago had failed to show sufficient
improvement in using their own teachers and staff to provide tutoring services. Previous
to the federal government’s directive, a frustrated Duncan stated:
It infuriates me when bureaucrats in Washington make laws and set rules
that make no sense and, in the end, harm kids. The way the law is being
implemented creates disincentives and discourages those who are trying to
do the right thing. It is wrong morally and intellectually, and it harms
public education.67
Duncan initially refused to comply with the upcoming directive. Duncan refuted the
demands and stated:
Halfway through the school year, to deny children who most need help is
staggering to me. It shows how disconnected the federal bureaucrats are
from the reality of teaching kids in urban areas. I plan to continue to serve
these children and work with the feds to help them come to their senses.68
By the time that U.S. Government ruled that CPS would have to outsource their tutoring
program, Duncan became so infuriated with the barring of the usage of federal funds that
he threatened to sue the U.S. Department of Education. At a news conference, he stated:
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“We’re not backing down because this tutoring program is so important to our
children. We hope we can sit down and talk with them and that cooler heads will
prevail.”69
Duncan argued that the deadline of replacing its own tutoring programs with
private ones would not be feasible because outside agencies would not be prepared
enough to send enough qualified individuals to provide proper tutoring services. In
addition, private tutoring would cost between double and triple the amount that it had
currently cost the district. Duncan stated: “We are providing the most cost-effective,
efficient and popular tutoring program. Now, they are telling us that we’re not qualified
to provide tutoring to our own students…I cannot believe that this is the law that
promises to leave no child behind.”70 Eugene Hickok, a U.S. undersecretary of
education, responded: “The first thing Arne needs to do is take a deep breath and calm
down. His statements really attempt to play to the concern and fear of parents, saying
they are going to lose services, there are going to be kids on the street. Arne is better
than that, and these kinds of statements are not necessary.”71
Duncan and his team decided that they would forego the federal funding and
continue to provide their own tutoring services. The Illinois Board of Education agreed
to give Chicago grant monies to help offset some of the cost. But the Board would have
to dig deep to find money to pay for the tutoring program. Duncan argued that it would
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be best to run the program without the interruption that would be associated with
finding private companies, and they would not have to pay the additional cost that would
be associated with the change.
By September of 2005, the U.S. Department of Education would have a change of
heart. They reversed the decision and allowed CPS to use federal funding to run its own
tutoring program.72 This allowed CPS to continue to provide tutoring help from private
vendors as well as the district-run program. An elated Duncan claimed that it was a
victory for CPS students: “This is a major victory for students both in Chicago and
around the country. This is the most significant change in policy since No Child Left
Behind was enacted, and it is the right thing to do for kids.”73 The “victory” would come
with stipulations. After one year, CPS would have to allow an independent group to
analyze CPS’ tutoring program to determine its effectiveness, and enroll more students in
the program. Initially, the analysis conducted in 2005 determined that students who did
not enroll in tutoring services outperformed students that did.74 However, the data
showed that the sample size of students who did not enroll in tutoring programs had
higher ISAT scores to begin with. An analysis done in 2009 determined that students
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tutored in CPS’s Aim High program outperformed students tutored by private
providers.75
Every Child, Every School
At the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, Duncan unveiled an education
plan that would illustrate the new goals of the district during the new wave of reform.
This plan was developed as a result of numerous discussion groups with administrators,
principals, teachers, LSC members, parents, students, members of community groups and
social service organizations, and members of foundation, education and civic
communities.76 The plan was called Every Child, Every School: An Education Plan for
the Chicago Public Schools. “Every Child, Every School” would become the district’s
motto, and it emphasized that teaching and learning in all CPS schools would become the
new priorities of the district. Chief Education Officer Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins
oversaw the development of the document.
The process of developing the plan was described within the document, along
with members of the planning and development advisory committee. According to the
document, over fifty discussion groups were held for two hours per session. Participants
were asked their opinions regarding the most important challenges that schools in the
district faced. They were also asked where the district should place their priorities,
barriers to progress, and how to develop sustained school improvement. Discussion
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groups also conducted site visits to various schools to solicit parent, community and
local school staff input. One of the members of the committee was listed as “The
Honorable Senator Barak Obama.” Seven years later, this member would make a
decision that changed the course of Arne Duncan’s career, and altered the educational
leadership for CPS as well as the entire country.
The districts’ new education plan emphasized teaching and learning strategies,
and clearly was a break from the priorities emphasized during the Vallas administration.
Duncan articulated the difference: “From day one, I have not thrown lots of sexy bells
and whistles that sound nice but do not help kids learn. My goal is to be the best urban
school district in America. Nothing easy is going to get you there.”77 The districts new
goals, according to the plan, included the following:
1. Building instructional capacity
2. High quality teaching and leadership
3. Learning communities and professional development
4. Support for student development and postsecondary training and education
5. Schools as centers of communities in partnership with families
6. Strengthening existing high school programs
7. Expanded choice within neighborhoods
8. Accountability to support improvement in all schools78
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Accountability, a hallmark during Vallas’ tenure, was posted last on the list of new
goals. The district’s goals as outlined in the new educational plan remained consistent
during Duncan’s tenure.
One of the key initiatives of the plan was listed under Year 2 (2002–2003) of the
Chicago Public Schools Reading Initiative. Listed as just one of many key initiatives, the
creation of Instructional Areas would dramatically alter the structure of CPS leadership
and accountability within the individual schools. Previous to the 2002–2003 school year,
CPS schools were split up under the supervision of six regional offices. Each region
contained approximately one hundred schools, and provided support on administrative
matters such as bus schedules, disciplinary matters and facilities management. The new
structure would split schools among twenty-four “areas,” and would be led by an “area
instructional officer” (AIO).79 The AIO was to concentrate on issues related to teaching
and learning, and day-to-day operations that were unrelated to instruction were to be
handled by a management support director (MSD) who reported directly to the AIO.
Each AIO would be in charge of an instructional support team. Members of that
team were to have a diverse collection of content experience in reading, math, science
and technology. According to the plan, the instructional support team was to provide:


Assistance in implementing initiatives within the reading and mathematics
framework
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Assistance in implementing the goals and strategies outlined in the
education plan



Instructional coaching and mentoring



Support for building professional learning communities at the school level



Organizing study groups for common problems and providing common
professional development activities



Analyzing student data and monitoring of school improvement plans



Planning and monitoring of the implementation of district level initiatives80

In addition to those supports, AIOs and their teams were to conduct instructional
“walkthroughs” in schools and meet with school leadership teams to discuss progress and
analyze goals. During a “walkthrough,” the team of individuals from the area office
would enter into individual classrooms within a school, and analyze items such as how
instruction was delivered, the instructional goals, how technology was used during a
lesson, student engagement, and student work that was posted. Area walkthroughs
caused a great deal of trepidation among teachers, administrators and parent groups.
Teachers and administrators argued that the board was “micromanaging” them. Parent
groups were fearful that local control of LSCs would be altered by the presence of area
teams. Despite those fears, Area teams remained and reported to the chief education
officer, Dr. Eason-Watkins.
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The Commercial Club Strikes Again
In July of 2003, the Civic Committee of The Commercial Club of Chicago
published a report that summarized the ISAT test scores for the CPS in 2002, and argued
that the district “had a long way to go” to meet the standards as dictated by NCLB. The
report, entitled Left Behind: Student Achievement in Chicago’s Public School, argued the
following: “Chicago’s system of public schools is radically dysfunctional. The problems
lie in the system, and the system must be changed.”81 The report also contained
disaggregated data related to impoverished students, and argued that the data exhibited
high correlations between poverty, ethnicity and test scores.
There was an argument within the report that correlation did not lead to causation.
The authors argued that there was not credible evidence that proves that children from
families of low socioeconomic status or from particular ethnic groups have a lower
capacity to learn. The authors pointed out that evidence existed that all children can learn
when they are exposed to high-quality teaching consistently. They contended that
Chicago’s schools did not have a high number of quality teachers, as evidenced by the
high percentages of teachers without proper certification. One important factor
contributing to the lack of quality teachers was a poor evaluation system, according to the
report. Teachers were not given incentives for great performance, nor were they paid less
for weak performance.
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The authors of the report noted that the problems with the system were not the
fault of Duncan or the Reform Board of Trustees. The authors described Duncan as a
talented and dedicated CEO, and the Board as intelligent, conscientious volunteers. They
attributed the problem to the system itself:
The problem lies in the system, which lacks competitive pressures pushing
it to achieve desired results. It responds more to politics and pressures
from the school unions than to community or parental demands for
quality. Schools, principals and teachers are largely insulated from
accountability or responsibility for results. The system is largely
decentralized with limited ability or willingness on the part of the central
administration to intervene in failing schools.82
To solve the problem, parents would need choice in schools to create effective
alternatives for their children’s education. The authors argued that choice would put
pressure on schools to perform better. Although parents could send their children to
private schools or move to the suburbs, most did not have the financial means to exercise
those choices. To remedy that problem, they proposed that CPS open at least 100 charter
schools in Chicago’s inner-city neighborhoods.
Renaissance 2010
In June of 2004, Mayor Daley and Arne Duncan unveiled Renaissance 2010,
which was a plan which would create a combination of 100 charter schools,
independently operated contract schools, and CPS-run small schools. Mayor Daley
articulated the reason for the overhaul: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of
teachers, principals, parents and students, some schools have consistently
underperformed. We must face the reality that—for schools that have consistently
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underperformed—it’s time to start over.”83 Julie Woestehoff, director of school
reform group Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE) immediately criticized
the plan: “This is a wholesale experimentation on poor children. The problem is the
mayor and the Chicago Public Schools have been doing one initiative after another, and
they’ve been leaving shambles in their wake. Private industry has no proven track record
for fixing schools.”84 R. Eden Martin, president of the Civic Committee, who played a
key role in selling the initiative to Daley and Duncan, was thrilled: “We think it’s the best
development to come along for Chicago—ever—and puts Chicago in the forefront of
school improvement in major American cities. This will offer real choices to families in
Chicago. And in the long term, having these schools will create examples of success and
create pressure on the rest of the system to improve.”85
According to the description of the basic principle surrounding the Renaissance
2010 plan, the goal is “autonomy for accountability.” The schools created under the
initiative would be held accountable for performance by the usage of five-year contracts,
while being given autonomy to create their own unique learning environments.86
According to the Renaissance 2010 website, the basic principles and the goals of the
initiative were that:
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Every new school is held accountable to a 5-year performance plan or
agreement



Every school’s achievement is measured by a standard set of metrics, beyond
test scores



Schools enjoy freedom over: curriculum, length of school day and school year
and budget

Goals


Strong test scores



Active parent involvement



High attendance



Low mobility rate



Low teacher turnover



High graduation rate



High college attendance87

In order to create the schools under the Renaissance 2010 program, CPS would
have to close some underperforming schools. One of the first areas slated for the closure
of schools was on Chicago’s south side. In July of 2004, plans were unveiled to close 20
of 22 schools in the area, and replace them with Renaissance 2010 schools with expanded
programs in buildings with state of the art equipment. The area had recently consisted of
high-rise housing-project buildings, but was transforming into an integrated, mixedincome neighborhood that was not far from downtown Chicago. Some community
87
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advocates and planners claimed that CPS was moving ahead without gathering the
input of the community residents. John Ayers, executive director of Leadership for
Quality Education, a Chicago school reform organization, argued: “I don’t think they
would have done it this way in Lincoln Park. It’s just a mistake not to engage the
community … instead of handing it to them and saying ‘Hey, we’ve figured this out
downtown, now give us your blessing.’”88 Duncan’s called the plan a work in progress
that could change based on the community needs: “This is a historic opportunity to
rebuild the community from the ground up. There is always going to be fear. But we
really have the luxury of time here. We can be thoughtful and deliberate, learn from our
mistakes and make mid-course adjustments.”89
In August of 2004, CPS announced that they would use nine million dollars of
federal grant money to create five new magnet schools under the Renaissance 2010 plan.
Duncan stated: “We want to make every neighborhood school a school choice. We have
some good schools here, but we want them to be great schools. We need to invest in
schools across the board.”90 Critics again contended that the Board was moving without
gathering input from the communities about the process. Critics also argued that the
initiative claimed that its objectives were to offer choice in inner-city neighborhoods with
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impoverished children, but the two of the magnet schools in the latest plan were
located in more affluent areas of the city.
Many critics of the reform continued to ask questions about the process, leading
the Duncan and the Board to ask for public feedback regarding future decisions. Duncan
stated: “There are hard choices to make, and there will always be differences of opinion.
There’s no single formula for getting there, but as long as we all have an open mind and a
commitment to work together, I’m confident we will achieve that goal.” Marilyn
Steward, president of the Chicago Teachers Union, announced that she would not offer
ideas: “The plan is moving forward so they are asking us to be a rubber stamp on
something they have already decided to do. We’ll dialogue about improving schools.
That should be our focus.”91
CPS officials quickly realized that funding the Renaissance 2010 project would be
inconsistent. Although the schools received funding from the Board, there were a
number of initiatives featured at the schools that would require additional funding, such
as the longer school day and school year. Renaissance 2010 schools were free from
Union intervention because they were free to hire non-unionized teachers, but that also
meant that they would have to use non-unionized maintenance staff members, which
needed to be paid additional funds to cover a longer school day and school year. The
new schools would also need additional funding for staff development, math and science
programs, reading initiatives, summer school, tutoring, and early childhood programs.
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All of these programs would cost the independent schools more money, which caused
those schools to have to raise a substantial amount of their funding from the private
sector. This practice worried individuals in charge of Renaissance 2010 schools, because
it was not a sustainable model for funding.
A non-profit organization, New Schools for Chicago, came to the aid of the
Renaissance schools. By February of 2005, they raised 24 million dollars to be used
exclusively by the new schools. Arne Duncan praised the efforts: “There are no other
cities where the business community is stepping up with this level of support.”92 The
group promised that they would raise $50 million to help fund Mayor Daley’s vision of
creating the 100 new schools by 2010. Funds were to be used for teacher and principal
salaries, educational materials and professional development costs, and not capital or
rehabbing costs.
Problems with the Small School Initiative
In June of 2006, a report was published entitled Small High Schools on a Larger
Scale: The First Three Years of the Chicago High School Redesign Initiative. The study
was a quantitative analysis of how small schools compared with the rest of CPS schools.
The researchers examined student experiences, teacher experiences, and student
outcomes, such as student absences, on-track to graduate data, dropout rates, and scores
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on the Prairie State Achievement Examination.93 The analysis provided a background
on previous studies concerning small schools, and argues that not all findings are
positive.
The authors of the study argued that characteristics consistent with successful
small schools, such as personalization, interactive and authentic instruction, challenging
curriculum, and equitable student learning opportunities are difficult to promote. In the
case of Chicago, they argue, communal change took place but not a change in
instructional focus. Communal change brought about a decrease in the dropout rate and
student absences, due to a more personalized environment. The lack of a change in
instructional practices was the culprit for the lack of improvement of standardized test
scores in the small schools environment. Duncan expressed encouragement regarding the
improved attendance and dropout rate and promised better academic results: “First you
have to change the culture. Students have to want to come to school and stay in school,
and that is happening. I’m confident the academic achievement will follow.94
Technology Magnet Schools
In October of 2007, CPS announced that they would utilize $22 million dollars in
grant monies to turn another ten elementary schools into new magnet schools. Five of
them would be converted into new technology magnet schools, and the remaining five
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would be converted into various magnet schools of varying themes. The technology
magnet schools would be different than traditional magnet schools. Instead of creating
selective enrollment schools, the schools would either accept students citywide or
function as a “neighborhood school,” where they would accept all students within the
schools’ neighborhood attendance boundary. To gain entry, parents would have to enter
a lottery to be selected. Mayor Daley described the plan: “The magnet makeover plan is
our latest strategy aimed at creating high-quality options for all students across Chicago.
These schools are part of a bigger picture that includes turnaround schools, high school
transformation schools and accelerated programs within schools designed to get more
students ready for the workplace and college.”95
The distinction of becoming a technology academy would bring a vast assortment
of technological enhancements, designed to help teachers infuse technology throughout
the school’s curriculum. Teachers would receive enhancements such as laptop
computers; schools would receive projectors, Apple IPods, and classrooms with sound
enhancements. Another important distinction of the technology academy would be
controversial. Technology academies would fall under the category of a school that was
redefined, which meant that all of the teaching positions within those schools would be
redefined to technology academy teaching positions. With the new distinction, teachers
at those schools would have to reapply for their positions. This reform initiative was
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unique in that it allowed a principal to “handpick” his or her staff, which normally
took place only after a school has been closed and reopened.
Despite teacher resistance, the schools would open in the fall along with 30 other
new schools for the 2008-2009 school year. The district would move rapidly in opening
the new schools under the Renaissance 2010 plan. The new goal would become 150 new
schools by 2010. In addition to the five technology magnet academies, CPS would
announce the conversion of five additional schools into technology academies. These
schools would be a part of the “CPS Technology Magnet Cluster.” The schools that
would be included in the cluster would have to apply for the opportunity to gain that
status with CPS’s Office of Academic Enhancement. These schools would receive
technological enhancements, position redefinitions, and a change in the educational
focus, but would have to continue to serve students currently attending the schools. The
schools that were selected were Dunne, Dvorak, Nicholson, Dumas, and Spencer.96
Notable Events and Decisions
During his tenure, Duncan spent a great deal of time opening new schools and
reorganizing old ones under the Renaissance 2010 initiative, complying with NCLB
provisions and guidelines, and implementing strategies to improve reading performance
across the board. Besides those major issues, Duncan made several other decisions that
reflected his decision making processes:
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A Harvard college mate of Duncan, Steven Levitt, developed a
computerized model that detected patterns that helped identify if certain
teachers provided assistance to students during ISAT testing. The patterns
were discussed in Levitt’s book Freakonomics.97 Duncan launched an
aggressive investigation which determined that there was cheating at seven
schools. The teachers would face firing by Duncan: “We need to stand for
something, to teach values to our students. The overwhelming majority of
teachers do a fantastic job. These are isolated incidents, but we will deal with
them aggressively and honestly.”98



In October of 2002, CPS officials announced that the 60 schools that exhibited
the most improved ISAT scores from the prior year would receive $10,000.
Duncan stated his rationale for implementing the incentive:
For years, people have asked how you can compare a Whitney Young
High School (which admits only high achieving students) to a Harper
High School (a neighborhood school)? They are right. But you can
absolutely compare Harper to itself, and that is what this new system
will do. It is a much more comprehensive approach.99
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In October of 2002, Duncan recommended that the board remove five high
schools from intervention status.100 An evaluation of the schools determined
that all achieved “significant educational progress.” Three of those schools,
Bowen, Orr, and South Shore, were converted into small schools. Duncan
asked that substantial improvement still be made at each of the schools.



In January of 2003, after a fight in the stands among the spectators at a
basketball game hosted at Crane High School, Duncan suggested that
principals limit admission to students with CPS identification and their
relatives. He stated his rationale: “Unfortunately, you have some people
coming in…who are there to cause trouble. We have to eliminate that element
so the vast majority can enjoy the game in a safe and secure environment.”101
Duncan’s suggestion did not become a mandate.



In June of 2003, district-wide ISAT scores showed a decline in reading. In a
statement, Daley expressed confidence in the CPS team and explained the
scores: “Of course we’d like to see every single score increase in every
school, year after year, but we know that’s not realistic. We’ve said all along
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that there would be ups and downs along the way, and this year’s scores
showed exactly that: some ups and some downs.”102


In June of 2003, Duncan eliminated several jobs in a department that he
created when he took over the post of CEO, the accountability office and
research division. All would have to reapply for their positions, and some
would not be rehired. Another 12 would be moved from central office to area
regional offices. Duncan claimed that this move was designed to fit in with
the philosophy of moving resources closer to the schools.
Duncan Removes Principals for Poor Performance

In August of 2003, Duncan decided to remove three elementary school principals
because of poor performance. The schools were Cather, Sojourner Truth and Bethune
elementary schools. Duncan placed these schools on probation in 2002 because fewer
than 25 percent of the students in those schools were reading at or above national norms
on the Iowa test, and have exhibited low student achievement in the recent past.103
Removing a principal for lack of performance was a seldom-used intervention that was
granted to the CPS Board of Education by the Illinois School Code. A principal who was
subject to removal was entitled to a hearing before an independent officer appointed by
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the CEO. Duncan stated: “We’re taking a very hard look at performance. We’re
holding ourselves and them accountable.”104
A Break in Labor Peace
In September of 2002, CPS and CTU leaders announced a deal which would alter
the 1995 Amendatory Act by allowing teachers to bargain issues that were taken away
such as class size, layoffs, and teacher schedules. Duncan stated that the proposal would
ensure that “important labor issues will not get in the way of the more important issue of
educating our children.”105 After the bill was signed into law in April of 2003, CPS
schools opened in September without a teachers’ contract in place. Supposedly, teachers
were not happy with the last contract that was negotiated by former CTU president
Thomas Reece. CPS and CTU agreed not to discuss the issue in the media. CPS had not
had a teacher’s strike since 1987, and had not even been close since Mayor Daley took
over CPS in 1995.
By September, CPS and CTU reached a tentative contract agreement, which
included a four percent salary increase, longer school days, higher health care costs and
duration of five years. Duncan stated: “This means five more years of school opening on
time, five more years of progress in the classroom.”106 However, CPS teachers voted to
reject the tentative contract, and after a lack of progress during mediation discussions,
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teachers authorized CTU delegates to authorize a teacher strike. Duncan felt that
teachers did not understand the settlement offer, which he felt was fair given the
economic conditions: “There would be very few people in the public or private sector
who would turn that kind of deal down. We think it is a good deal, very fair, very
reasonable. But we will continue to negotiate and try to bring this to a good
resolution.”107 Mayor Daley was concerned about a possible break in stability: “If there
is crisis after crisis like we had before 1995, people lose confidence.”108
One of the issues raised was respect, or the lack there of for teachers. Mayor
Daley scoffed at that notion. He argued that taxpayers show respect by paying the bulk
of teacher salaries through property taxes: “If they didn’t have respect, they would tear it
up.”109 Duncan, however, would address the notion directly. Through an article in the
Voice of the People section of the Chicago Tribune newspaper, Duncan attempted to
sway teachers to accept the contract offer while expressing appreciation for their work:
I understand that many teachers feel unappreciated. They work hard and
have tough jobs and face everyday challenges that can never be
appreciated by anyone who has not stood in front of a classroom. Every
day I see the extraordinary hard work teachers do under challenging
conditions. Both Mayor Richard Daley and I know that they deserve
credit for our success over the last eight years.110
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Duncan expressed that there was too much at stake to allow frustrations to interrupt
the educational process, including breaking the confidence that was built in the system.
As the weeks progressed, the NAACP would get involved, urging the CTU and
CPS to try arbitration to avoid a teacher strike. CTU would file an unfair labor practice
complaint against school officials because of letters that had been sent to teachers by
central office designed to sway a strike vote. Finally, with a shortened contract length, a
freeze on health insurance premiums, class size reductions, and the addition of a fourth
“prep” period (a free period for teachers designed for them to prepare lessons, grade
student work or meet with colleagues), a close vote resulted in the approval of a four-year
contract which would mean that a teacher strike would not occur.
Principal Portfolios
During his tenure, Paul Vallas changed the principal selection process, making it
tougher to become a CPS principal. Prospective principals would have to complete
academy training created by the Chicago Principal and Administrators Association to be
qualified for placement on a “principal’s list.” Once placed on that list, the individual
was eligible to be considered for a school principal position by a local LSC. Duncan
would add additional requirements for the purposes of narrowing principal candidates.
Duncan’s rationale: “My goal is not to send dozens of resumes, many of which are
mediocre, and make (local school councils’) already tough job more difficult. I want to
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send extraordinary candidates so they do not have to spend tons of time weighing
through masses of paperwork.”111
The new policy would require that eligible candidates submit a portfolio that
demonstrated various aspects of the individual’s instructional leadership and managerial
experience. Their experience would be judged by a scoring rubric that was developed by
the Office of Principal Preparation (OPPD) and the CPAA.112 The requirements to
become a CPS principal now included the following:
The candidate must:
1. Pre-register with OPPD of intent to apply for a principalship in the Chicago
Public Schools
2. Pass a candidate background check
3. Possess a master’s degree in addition to an Illinois Type 75 certificate
4. Successfully complete a writing sample
5. Successfully complete a rigorous program of study approved by CPS that
relates directly to school leadership and the principalship
6. Successfully demonstrate relevant instructional and managerial leadership
experience113
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Principal candidates who were originally on the “principal’s list” were not
“grandfathered” in, so if they did not complete the requirements, they were taken off of
the list.
Principal candidates who had previously worked as assistant principals, lead
teachers, reading specialists, and area instructional coaches would easily have the
instructional and managerial leadership experience necessary to remain eligible.
However, the change in the principal selection process made it more difficult for teacher
candidates to become principals because of the requirement related to managerial
experience. According to the new policy, individuals who did not gain that necessary
experience would be provided to gain the experience in a performance based internship
program at a Chicago Public School. The internship program had a very limited number
of seats in comparison to the number of candidates.
Changes to the Student Promotion Policy
In March of 2004, Duncan proposed a new promotion policy that reduced the
requirements necessary for student promotion to the next grade. The new policy would
automatically promote students in benchmark grades (3rd, 6th, and 8th) whose scores were
at or above the 35th national percentile ranking in reading, had passing grades, and fewer
than twenty unexcused absences.114 Students would no longer have to post passing ISAT
test scores in math. Another wrinkle to the policy would apply to students who were not
automatically promoted. If students posted ITBS scores ranging from the 24th through
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the 34th percentile, they could be promoted to the next grade if they posted classroom
grades of “B” or better, passing reading unit test scores, completion of their homework
assignments during the school year, posted at least a 90 percent attendance percentage,
and exhibited satisfactory conduct during the school year.115 Those promotion decisions
would be made by the Chief Education Officer. The new policy would also end “double
retentions,” which occurred when a student repeated the same grade multiple times.
The change in policy reignited a controversy surrounding the effectiveness of
retaining students for poor academic performance that started soon after Vallas
implemented the retention policy. The change in the policy significantly lowered the
number of students who would have to attend summer school. Duncan stated: “Our goal
is to reduce the number of retentions in schools with high rates. But obviously, where
children aren’t ready to go on, we absolutely will be retaining them. But we also want to
support them and create more learning opportunities for them.”116 Those who supported
retention wondered if CPS was lowering the expectations for students in regards to math
performance. Duncan stated his position: “I think it is the thing to do educationally.
Reading is the foundation, the skill you need to do everything else. If they can read, they
can make it in the next grade. They can improve in math if we continue to work with
them.”117
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Other Notable Events and Decisions


In June of 2004, Marilyn Steward was narrowly elected president of the
Chicago Teacher’s Union. Upon winning, Steward proclaimed that CTU was
a labor union, not a university, referring to the many school reform efforts
promoted by Lynch.



In 2004, Duncan donated $5,000 in scholarship money from his own personal
funds for two high school seniors. Duncan called it a gift from him and his
wife that would be given each year for their commitment to the community.



In October of 2004, CPS toughened the teacher residency policy, despite the
fact that there was a teacher shortage. The new policy required that school
administrators would have to verify that new employees lived in the city.118
Employees that were found to live in other areas were subject to being fired.
Opponents to the teacher residency policy argued that it made it difficult for
CPS to attract and retain high quality teachers, and new teachers couldn’t
afford to live in Chicago. Duncan defended the residency policy in a letter
published in the Chicago Tribune in November of 2004:
Since 1996, we have required our teachers to live in Chicago, a policy
some see as an obstacle in recruiting and retaining the best teachers.
The facts, however, suggest otherwise. Every year our schools are
performing better, the stacks of resumes grow and our teacher-vacancy
rate drops. We received a record number – 15,000 – teacher
applications this year, up 67 percent from two years ago, and our
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teacher-vacancy rate is less than 5 percent, a significant accomplishment
for a system of 26,000 teachers.119


In late 2004, CPS unrolled a new screening tool called DIBELS to screen
kindergarten students that may be at risk for reading difficulties. Chief
Education Officer Barbara Eason-Watkins proclaimed that the tool would
provide a uniform method of collecting data on primary aged children in order
to trigger intensive attention for those students.



A program for pregnant teens and teen parents, “Cradle to Classroom,”
implemented by Paul Vallas, was ended by Duncan, despite the fact that it
was considered successful and its cost was mostly reimbursed by the state.
The program provided care for the infants of teen mothers and boasted that the
vast majority of the participants of the program did not get pregnant again
before graduation. Duncan did not believe that the school system was
equipped to handle the responsibility of providing that service: “When a girl
gets pregnant, that’s a symptom of 98 things that are going wrong in that kid’s
life. CPS is not a pro at dealing with all those issues.”120



In April of 2005, Duncan would consider cutting 800 teacher positions in
preparation for massive cuts in educational funding. Duncan empathized with
other districts in the state:
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The pain we’re feeling in Chicago mirrors that of other schools statewide.
The horror stories we’re hearing out there are chilling. That’s
infuriating to me given all the progress we’ve made. It’s simply not
good enough for [the state] to say ‘We tried.’ Our children can’t afford
to wait no longer.121


In 2005, standardized test scores revealed that nearly 44 percent of all
Chicago Public School students were meeting national norms for reading, the
highest percentage in the district’s history.



Also in 2005, CPS decided to stop issuing the Iowa tests. Instead, the district
implemented three short reading assessments called Standard Learning First.
Duncan gave his rationale: “These assessments are a tool for teachers, not a
punitive measure. Testing is important, but we want to test … in a way that
gives our teachers and our principals useful information about their
students.”122



For the beginning of the 2005 school year, Duncan implemented an incentive
plan designed to encourage better attendance. CPS students could win prizes
such as IPods, computers, concert tickets or movie passes for improving their
attendance. Duncan gave his rationale for this plan: “I’m a firm believer in
rewarding hard work. We want to do everything we can to encourage families
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to do the right thing. The reality of it is that not everyone has the
mentality (that school is an obligation).”123


A Chicago Tribune article written on May 20th of 2006 alleged that high
schools that had accepted students from schools that had closed under the
Renaissance 2010 initiative struggled with violence issues as a result of the
meshing of the different students from different areas. The article alleged that
CPS had not properly prepared the teens to transition into their new schools.
Duncan responded to the article by defending the decision to close the high
schools in a letter published in the June 2nd issue of the Chicago Tribune:
The process of closing and phasing out high schools has been a tough
one. Drastic changes such as these, which impact so many families,
are always difficult. We have been and will continue to be thoughtful
and careful in planning the transition to new schools for the affected
families, and we have committed to limited the number of freshman
going to any single new high school… But we will continue to close
and phase out schools that have become schools of last resort for their
communities…124



Board President Michael Scott resigned after five years of service. Rufus
Williams, then head of a financial consulting agency that catered to athletes
and entertainers, and former chief financial officer for HARPO Entertainment
Group, a production company owned by Oprah Winfrey, was selected to
replace him.
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On July 12, 2006, the Chicago Tribune reported that 62 percent of CPS
students “passed” the ISAT examinations.125 However, the article pointed out
that city and school officials allegedly attributed the gains to the Illinois State
Board of Education (ISBE) making the test easier to pass, and because
students were given more time to take the exam. Duncan took exception to
the comments and wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune which detailed his
view of how progress was made:
The fact that the percentage of kids meeting these standards rose by an
unprecedented 15 points clearly shows that the strategies we have
diligently pursued for several years now are working—a back-tobasics curriculum through the reading initiative, an end to social
promotions, an expansion of pre-school and after-school programs,
and better recruiting and training of teachers and principals.126
Principal Firing – Duncan Takes Side

When Duncan first assumed the position of CPS CEO, he spoke about the
importance of community involvement, and displayed outward support for local school
councils. Vallas, on the other hand, challenged the power of LSCs and attempted to
assume veto power on some of their decision-making powers, particularly related to the
retaining or dismissal of school principals. However, after the contract of Curie Metro
High School principal, Jerryelyn Jones was not renewed after a 6-2 LSC vote in March of
2007, Duncan would take the side of the ousted principal, which sent a message that he
was against the decision of the Curie LSC.
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Duncan told a group of individuals who were protesting the decision that he
wanted to “clone her” in order to have effective principals such as Jones at more schools.
Duncan stated: “This is one we’re losing a lot of sleep over. Curie is a great school with
a great principal. This is very, very troubling to us. But I don’t have any easy
answers.”127 At that time, Curie functioned as an “autonomous” school, meaning that the
principal was able to exhibit more freedom in decision making because of the school’s
success. Curie sustained improved student attendance, higher test scores and lower
dropout rates under Jones’ tenure as principal. With all of the school’s accolades,
advocates for Jones wondered why her contract was not being renewed. Tom Ramos, the
LSC chair at Curie gave a vague answer: “I think she’s a fine lady. I don’t have a
problem with her. And I don’t think she’s a bad principal. Just because they are a very
good principal doesn’t mean you have to retain them.”128
Mayor Daley even weighed in on the issue, showing support for the ousted
principal and questioning the absolute power of local school councils when it came to
terminating principals. Daley remarked that Jones was one of the best principals in the
school system, and stated that she “has done a tremendous job” (at Curie) and called
Curie a “great, great school. Every year, attendance is up, academic performance is
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up.”129 Julie Woestehoff, executive director of PURE felt that Daley was using this
situation to advance an already existing agenda to destroy LSCs.
Duncan personally met with the Curie LSC chairman Ramos to attempt to
mediate the situation. As a result, Ramos announced that he planned to reconsider his
vote to replace Principal Jones. Duncan gave his rationale for taking sides: “This is not
about personality. I’m not doing this because I like Jerryelyn. I’m doing this because
she’s doing a great job of making an effective school better.”130 Ultimately, Ramos was
removed from his post of LSC chair after being found guilty of soliciting commissions
from a Curie contractor. Duncan promoted Jerryelyn Jones to serve as a regional high
school official who oversaw 15 to 20 CPS high schools.
More Notable Events and Decisions


Duncan and the CPS leadership team decided to close two additional schools
under the Renaissance 2010 reform plan, LeMoyne Elementary and Harvard
Elementary Schools.131 LeMoyne Elementary would be closed for good, and
Harvard would be turned over to a private management company who would
“turnaround” the school – replacing all teachers and administrators with new
staff members, but keeping the children in place. Duncan stated: “This truly
is a day of celebration and a new beginning for the students and families at
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Harvard. This school is in desperate need of a fundamental change. We
owe it to the students to do better.”132


In May of 2007, Duncan recommended that the Board of Education adopt a
new policy on the closing of schools.133 The policy outlined reasons for
school closings due to non-academic reasons, academic reasons, and a need
for a change in educational focus. There were two notable changes to the
policy on closing schools. One would be the closing of schools due to a need
for change in educational focus, which allowed for the extensive reassignment
of school faculty and staff which would allow a principal to rehire her or his
entire staff. The second would be a provision that prevented the closure of a
school if that school had a new principal who had been in place for two years
or less.



CPS teachers agreed to a five-year labor contract that included a four percent
wage increase.



In September of 2007, CPS reported a figure of 93 percent attendance for the
first day of school, the highest ever for the district. Duncan and school board
president Rufus Williams visited homes of students who did not attend.



In February of 2008, CPS would vote to close or consolidate eighteen schools
due to low enrollment or low performance, causing the need for hundreds of
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students to be relocated and hundreds of teachers would have to reapply
for their jobs or find new ones.134 Supporters of the schools were not happy,
feeling that the Board of Education did not consider the community in their
decision making. One supporter stated: “We need to fire all of you and get an
elected school board. CPS, you are not God…”135 Duncan stated: “We set
out to do what was best for children and would be the least disruptive. What
we got in return was a much stronger plan.”136


As a reward for her strong school attendance record, a CPS student won an
automobile, prompting a debate on the usage of rewards to encourage children
to come to school. Opponents of the usage of incentive for attendance argued
that students should want to come to school because they love learning, not
because of rewards. Duncan responded to those opponents: “We’re never
going to apologize for that. It’s really important for kids to be in school every
day. You could have the best teachers in the world, the greatest curriculum,
but if they’re not in school, it doesn’t matter.”137
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CPS also developed a pilot program to pay the freshmen at twenty CPS
high schools cash for “good” grades. As a part of the program, a student
could receive $50 per grade of “A,” $35 per grade of “B,” and $20 per grade
of “C.” Students would receive half of the money immediately, and the other
half upon graduation. Duncan stated the reasoning behind the program: “The
majority of our students don’t come from families with a lot of economic
wealth. I’m always trying to level the playing field. This is the kind of
incentive that middle-class families have had for decades.”138
Senator James Meeks Proposes CPS Student Boycott

Throughout his tenure as CPS CEO, Duncan lobbied the state of Illinois for
additional funding for the district on several occasions. In April of 2003, Duncan joined
forces with several suburban superintendents to lobby state legislators for more funding,
including Harry Rossi of the Northbrook-Glenview district, Jim Steyskal of Central
Stickney and Jon Mink of West Chicago. Duncan also has several quotes on record that
illustrated his passion regarding his opinion regarding funding inequities.
In August of 2004, Duncan spoke on the state government’s unwillingness to ease
the school funding system’s reliance on property taxes: “Unfortunately, as everyone here
knows, the state system for funding education is seriously and fundamentally flawed.
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Until the legislature fixes that, we’ll have to turn to our taxpayers.”139 In February of
2005, Duncan discussed funding issues: Every year, we talk about the problem. Every
year, we sweep it under the rug and balance the budget on the backs of children. It can’t
go on forever.”140 In February of 2006, Duncan wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune in
which he related school funding issues to equity for children:
Our children are being hurt because Illinois underfunds education, forcing
schools to rely on local property taxes. As a result, the poorest districts in
Illinois spend less than $5000 per child while the wealthiest districts spend
up to $23,000. At $6500 per child for basic education, Chicago is near the
bottom, forcing tax hikes each year since the mayor took control of the
schools in 1995.141
In May of 2007, Duncan optimism regarding increased funding for schools that
year would vanish after believing that the state was close to providing additional funding:
“Every year, we face rising costs and deep uncertainty over what dollars will be coming
from Springfield. And every year that’s meant patchwork budgets and program cuts and
property tax hikes. Our schools, our taxpayers and our children deserve better.”142 In
February of 2008, Duncan again gave his opinion about school funding in Illinois: “Our
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schools are desperately underfunded around the state, and every child is not getting
the education they need to compete and succeed in life.”143
In August of 2008, Duncan would gain a powerful ally in his battle for
educational funding. Illinois State Senator James Meeks, one of Chicago’s most
influential pastors and head of Illinois’ legislative black caucus, proposed that families of
CPS students should keep their students from attending CPS schools and instead to
attempt to register their children in schools in a nearby wealthy north suburban district.
Although Meeks and Duncan were united in their belief that inequities were evident in
the funding formula for the district, Duncan did not want the boycott to undermine CPS’
efforts to improve attendance: “I am very grateful for the attention [Meeks] has brought
to this issue. But I think we can fight his battle and win this battle without doing
anything that puts students on a course of behavior that is self-destructive.”144
Over a thousand students and parents met outside New Trier High School in
Winnetka, Illinois to participate in the protest. A sign was posted in the windows of the
school in anticipation for the boycott: “Welcome to New Trier CPS Students.” Students
were provided with water and cookies and were allowed to attempt to register, though the
effort was purely symbolic given the fact that students had to live in the district to be
allowed to attend. Many parents and students at New Trier made comments in support of
the efforts to bring attention to educational inequities, and some spoke about the question
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of culture. One parent was quoted in speaking about a culture of wanting to learn and
wanting to be in school as being just as important as money in a school district.
The debate regarding the antidote for schools that serve a high number of students
of low socio-economic status is a long-standing one. The debate sparked by the boycott
proposed by Meeks brought up the issue of funding versus culture. While many
individuals who spoke or wrote about the issue were in agreement with the need for
additional funding for CPS schools, some individuals were of the opinion that money
wasn’t the only issue that plagued CPS students. Richard D. Kahlenberg, a senior fellow
at The Century Foundation, immediately weighed in on the issue. Kahlenberg wrote a
book prior to the boycott called All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools
through Public School Choice, which discussed this very issue. At the beginning of his
book, he argued that:
…all schoolchildren in America have a right to attend a solidly middleclass public “common school.” They may not have a right to middle class
parents, or a right to live in a middle-class neighborhood, or a right to a
middle-class income or life-style. But every child in the United States—
whether rich or poor, white or black, Latino or Asian—should have access
to the good education that is best guaranteed by the presence of a majority
middle-class student body.145
After Meeks announced plans of the boycott, Kahlenburg made the argument that
Chicago students needed middle class environments more than higher per capita
spending: “It’s an advantage to have peers who are academically engaged and expect to
go to college; parents who actively volunteer in the classroom and hold school officials
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accountable; and highly qualified teachers who have high expectations.” Despite the
differing opinions on the matter, the boycott lasted two days, and ended on the promise
that Governor Rod Blagojevich would meet with Senator Meeks. Governor Blagojevich
ultimately argued that he did not have the power to re-write the school funding formula
and that the state legislature had to be convinced to do it.
The Nation’s New President Chooses a New Secretary of Education
In 2008, a young charismatic Illinois senator named Barack Obama would be
elected to become the 44th president of the United States of America. Obama would
make history in becoming the first African-American president of the United States.
After he won the election, speculation began to surface regarding his plans for the post of
Secretary of Education. Duncan was a friend to Obama and played basketball with him
on occasion, and he served as an adviser to the Obama campaign on educational issues.
Duncan was considered a less controversial choice of all candidates considered by
Obama because they saw eye to eye on many important educational issues. Both felt that
teachers should be paid more, and should earn more for better performance. Both also
felt that teachers should be held accountable for their performance, and school districts
should have the ability to get rid of ineffective teachers.146 In December of 2008,
President-elect Obama selected Duncan as his pick for Secretary of Education.
Paul Vallas immediately weighed in on Obama’s selection:
He has the brains, courage, creativity, and temperament for the job. And
he’s very close to the president [-elect], which is an important thing,
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too…I told him to go for it. He’s got an opportunity to really impact millions
of lives in a really positive way. Arne has the capacity to bring people
together—he’s always demonstrated that skill—but he’s a reformer.”147
So who was this, Arne Duncan? Outside of Illinois, Duncan was a very little known
figure. Duncan’s tenure as CPS CEO would soon be summarized for the rest of
Americans, and included the following:


Improved CPS first day attendance levels from 76 percent to 93 percent



Led the district to steady incremental gains on state standardized tests, with 65
percent of CPS’s elementary students meeting or exceeding standards by 2008



Closed, consolidated or turned around 61 schools while opening 75 new
schools under the Renaissance 2010 initiative



Improved the high school graduation rate by six percentage points



Consistently lobbied for additional educational funding; spoke out against
NCLB mandates



Launched a program to pay students for good grades



Implemented an incentive plan for students with improved attendance



Discontinued the popular Iowa test, using the ISAT test as a sole indicator of
student academic achievement.
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Split the district into smaller academic “areas,” placing area officers in
charge of smaller clusters of schools and sent reading specialists to schools to
help teachers improve student reading performance



Implemented an “accountability report card,” which reported student
performance in greater detail



Implemented a system rewarding schools with additional funding for
improved student academic performance

In 2009, Duncan while being asked about his plan for the improvement of the
academic achievement of students in the nation, Duncan was asked about mayoral
control. Duncan was asked to describe the connection between mayoral control and
improving student learning. Duncan’s response included the following:
It’s not always the right answer. It’s a piece of an answer. It’s not a
magic bullet. In some places, it might be the wrong answer. But I would
argue that in large urban cities with a history of fairly dysfunctional school
systems, the work is so hard and the challenges are so intractable that you
have to have strong leadership at the top to give you a chance to get
there…The best person I can think of to rally all those different sectors
together to achieve that is the mayor.148
In regards to the No Child Left Behind Act, which Duncan has been on record for
criticizing, there has not been a reauthorization as of this writing. However, Duncan has
promised that the nation would “get accountability right” and eliminate prescriptive
interventions, measuring academic growth instead of current performance levels, and
how schools are closing the achievement gap.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS
This chapter will analyze the words and actions of CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne
Duncan through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority. This analysis
section will not argue for or against any particular source of authority; instead, this
analysis will utilize the framework to organize the words and actions of the two CEOs to
determine if they are in congruence with what was intended for the CEO model for CPS
leadership. This analysis will make certain assumptions that will be listed here in
preparation for the analysis:


Major decisions made and described in the previous chapters are the under the
leadership of each CEO, and are therefore treated as decisions made by the
CEO themselves. Even if a top official made the decision and the CEO
merely signed off on it, it will be treated as a decision made by the CEO
himself.



The Board and the CEO will be considered unilateral for the purposes of the
analysis. Beginning with the Amendatory Act of 1995, the Board was
reduced to five members, and the Mayor gained the ability to handpick each
of them as well as the CEO. This did not mean that they were always in
agreement when it came to decision making. However, the unique unity
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forged between the Board and the CEOs as a result of all being selected by
the mayor created a unified decision making entity. Decisions will be
considered collaborative when outside entities are included.


Decisions will be judged based on the source of authority that the CEO
utilized to ensure the compliance of CPS employees regarding the decision.
The decisions will fall into a particular source of authority based on “why”
they should follow the directive. For example, if a CEO unilaterally created
and implemented a homeless education program without input from
stakeholders, and it requires that teachers and administrators work an
additional hour each school day, this would be considered a bureaucratic
decision, but requires that people follow it because of their moral obligations
to the school/district. This decision would fall under the moral source of
authority.
Paul Vallas: Words and Actions

Words/Action(s) - “No one. No one is to order anything new unless it is
specifically authorized by me.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis - Upon taking over as CEO, Vallas knew that he had inherited a fiscal
mess, and CPS would have to gain credibility as a fiscally responsible district in order to
gain additional funding. Lifting the autonomy of the manner in which Chief Officials
could spend money would set the precedence for belt-tightening in all aspects of the
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district. It also sent a message to taxpayers that Vallas would take the spending of
taxpayer dollars seriously.
Words/Action(s) - “There will be no more coffee and rolls paid for out of the
schools budget. And there is plenty of furniture here. We don’t need any desks or
cabinets built. We don’t need anything new.” A food and beverage policy followed.
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic
Analysis - After learning that almost $100,000 was spent on refreshments for
meetings in half a year’s time in central office in 1995, Vallas unilaterally put an end to
that practice, and set guidelines regarding when Board money could be used for food.
Words/Action(s) – Shuttered CPS’s main shop facility located at Central Office
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic
Analysis - Before Vallas took office, CPS provided full time employment for
laborers such as carpenters and painters. Vallas found that they charged a premium for
services rendered to schools. He decided to exercise an authority granted to him by the
new laws embedded in the amendatory act which allowed him to privatize those services.
This would mean that services were put up for bid, which would result in savings for the
district.
Words/Action(s) – Ended heating of main garage at central office, instituted travel
policy, instituted telecommunications policy
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic
Analysis - Vallas found more instances of wasteful spending and instituted
policies which provided a check and balances system of spending funds.
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Words/Action(s) – Downsized Desegregation Commission to seven members
and subjected the new commission to the school board’s ethics guidelines
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Vallas found additional instances of wasteful spending after auditing
the Desegregation Commission. Vallas found that he would need to closely monitor
special interest groups which had gone unmonitored in the past to ensure that funds were
spent in accordance to Board guidelines.
Words/Action(s) – Cutting of over 1700 positions
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Within weeks of assuming the post of CPS CEO, Paul Vallas balanced
the budget, constructed a teacher’s contract which included high salary increases, and
freed up additional funding for additional programming. This would require a careful
analysis of the non-teaching personnel by Vallas and his team. Vallas found that by
trimming the bureaucracy, he could accomplish two important feats: freeing up additional
monies, and repairing the public’s confidence of how CPS spent monies.
Words/Action(s) – The promotion of J.W. Smith to oversee the sports program for
CPS high schools
Source of Authority – Psychological, Moral
Analysis – It would have been easy to ignore the CPS sports program amidst the
financial crisis that CPS was embedded in upon Vallas’s assumption of the CPS CEO
post. Vallas argued that CPS students should have quality sports programs like their
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affluent suburban peers, and they would serve as incentives for students to stay off
the streets.
Words/Action(s) – Declaring Larry Jackson ineligible to play basketball upon
transferring to a CPS high school from another district
Source of Authority – Professional, Moral
Analysis – With this decision, Vallas utilized a committee to examine this issue
and used their recommendation to influence his decision: “J.W. and the principals’
committee gave me no reason to decide otherwise. This was not a question of eligibility;
it was a question of ethics.” This decision was designed to send a message to the entire
district that if a student is to be involved in CPS Sports, they are to follow a strict code of
rules and guidelines. This also sent a message that star athletes would not receive
preferential treatment.
Words/Action(s) – Ten day suspension of Landon Cox from coaching and
assistant principal duties at King High School: “I’m putting all the coaches on warning.
This has to be cleaned up once and for all. The first time they mess up, it’s a suspension.
The second time, they get fired as coaches and could lose their teaching jobs.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Vallas utilized the bureaucratic source of authority to address Cox’s
failure to follow policy. Cox received consequences for his non-compliance of the rules.
The suspension of Cox would serve as an example to the district that no one would be
able to break rules with impunity.
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Words/Action(s) – “There is a big problem with busing. People don’t like it,
and it causes confusion. I’m not comfortable implementing it. What I want to do is meet
Monday and assess overcrowding school by school and come up with alternatives that
will minimize the need to bus.” The purchase of 20 mobile units to help relieve
overcrowding soon followed
Source of Authority – Professional
Analysis – Vallas and his team initially decided that busing would be the easier
approach to alleviating the overcrowding that was taking place in schools. Instead of
sticking to their decision upon hearing criticism from parents, the team would come back
to the table and use the criticism to take a double look at the problem from a school by
school basis and decide on a solution that was best for the communities involved.
Words/Action(s) – “What if a school principal is absent and a gang is taking over
the third floor of a school? We can’t just sit around and wait for 20-some (parent) groups
to reach consensus. We’re not trying to be vindictive or dictatorial. We’re not trying to
undermine school reform. But we can’t sit around fiddling while Rome burns.” This
statement was made in defense of the passing of a policy related to how a school would
be determined of being in “educational crisis.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – With the approval of the educational crisis policy, Vallas would gain
the power to decide if a school would receive intensive intervention from central office,
the principal fired and the LSC members removed if certain conditions existed as
outlined in the policy.
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Words/Action(s) – In 1996, Vallas determined that several of Chicago’s
lowest achieving schools were in educational crisis. “You can call it whatever you want,
but we have the authority to take action when schools are not functioning for whatever
reason and that’s what we’re going to do.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Reform groups and community members were outraged about the
changes that were taking place at schools that were determined to be in educational crisis.
Vallas exercised his right to make those decisions and placed probation teams in those
schools that were to help the schools produce positive student outcomes.
Words/Action(s) – Changing the principal selection process: “These principals are
brain surgeons—they are molding the minds of our children. If you have a bad principal,
you are going to have problems no matter how good a local school council is.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic, Professional
Analysis – The decision to revamp the principal selection process in itself was
bureaucratic in nature. Vallas had made many public statements against LSCs, and this
decision was considered a move that was made to limit the powers of LSCs in regards to
principal selection. The process of developing the new principal selection process was
rooted in professional authority. Vallas and his team collaborated with the CPAA to
create an academy for leadership training.
Words/Action(s) – Ending social promotion: “Social promotion was a disaster,
and we can see it with the dropout rate, which is 42 percent. When you’re talking about
social promotion, there’s no pressure on the child or the school to reach the standards you
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much reach before you go to the next level. So what social promotion did was take
away the incentive for the kid and the system to ensure what the kids should be doing,
and it also devalued our diplomas.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Considered one of the hallmarks of Vallas’s tenure, he determined that
additional accountability was necessary on the student level. He determined that the
advancement to the next grade should be based on student academic readiness, rather
than the student’s age. Students who did not have the test scores and grades to advance
would be required to attend mandatory summer school, and the penalty for not
successfully completing summer school would be retention in the grade.
Words/Action(s) – Implementation of reconstitution: “This is a pretty bold step,
but we have schools that are not showing progress and not improving and we have to use
every instrument at our disposal. Sometimes you just have to start over.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – This was another measure that was utilized to intervene in failing
schools. Vallas used this measure to combat low test scores, poor attendance, high
dropout rates, and when he determined that a school did not follow improvement plans.
Reconstitution was controversial because the utilization of this measure sent a message
that the lack of performance for teachers within a school contributed to the school’s
failing status.
Words/Action(s) – Promotion of Englewood Principal Tommye Brown to post of
director of alternative schools: “He had heart surgery, and he wanted a promotion, and he
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wanted to take over the alternative schools, and I’m not going to deny it to him. He’s
earned it.”
Source of Authority – Psychological
Analysis – Vallas’s decision to promote Tommye Brown after he requested a less
stressful job was a reward for his hard work for the district.
Words/Action(s) – Vallas takes over Clemente High School for safety reasons:
“I’m taking over the school. The bottom line is that Clemente has brought this on
themselves. We have been very patient with Clemente. Clemente is going to have its
independence of politics. The political exploitation of Clemente students is over.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – After a potential principal candidate turned down the position because
of death threats from a violent Puerto Rican gang, Vallas acted swiftly by taking over the
school and inserting his own interim principal. The goal was to rid the school of the
political exploitation of students by special interest groups.
Words/Action(s) – The development of a character education program: “I’ve had
a religious upbringing where values and ethics and morals were being reinforced. The
most dynamic personality outside my father was our parish priest. He’s an institution.
He’s kind of our moral guiding light. There are so many individuals like that in our
communities who have for all practical purposes been barred from our schools.”
Source of Authority – Moral
Analysis – Vallas had made references to his religious upbringing on a number of
occasions, and freely spoke about partnering with parochial schools. Vallas felt that there
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was not enough emphasis placed on the teaching of ethics, values and morals in CPS
schools.
Words/Action(s) – Modification of the magnet school program: “People across
the city have felt for years that only the elite get into magnet schools. What we are trying
to do here is demystify the magnet school program.”
Source of Authority – Moral
Analysis – Vallas proposed a plan that would mandate that magnet schools would
have to reserve 30 percent of the enrollment for students who lived in the neighborhood.
Opponents were outraged, contending that it defeated the purpose for magnet schools.
Vallas would ultimately have to compromise, and the number of reserved slots was
reduced to 15 percent. Vallas provided neighborhood students with the opportunity to
attend school with higher performing students that they may not have gotten otherwise.
Words/Action(s) – Vallas launches program which kept some schools open during
the winter holiday break (1997) and hired parent workers to help escort children from
Robert Taylor Homes to school: “I’m not suggesting here that what we’re offering is
going to solve all the problems. We’re making a contribution. If the kids aren’t in
school, they’re not going to get educated. If we have to go out and get them escorted,
then that’s what we’re going to do.”
Source of Authority – Moral
Analysis – In response to violent outbreaks in the communities surrounding the
Robert Taylor Homes, Vallas implemented programs in schools over the winter break to
help keep students safe. He also hired parent workers to escort children to school when
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school resumed after the winter break. Vallas personally assisted in the efforts, which
prompted many other community volunteers to join.
Words/Action(s) – Vallas implements the SMART program
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – The SMART program served as an interim intervention for first time
offenders of serious student disciplinary violations. The SMART program was a
necessary intervention that was to function as a punitive measure without expelling the
student or putting them into alternative schools which were overcrowded.
Words/Action(s) – Altered promotions policy to give principals and regional
officers input regarding the retention of a particular student.
Source of Authority – Professional
Analysis – The previous promotions policy dictated that test scores, grades and
attendance were the sole indicators of a student’s promotion status. After altering the
policy, an exception could be made for a student who was on the borderline by principals
and regional officers.
Words/Action(s) – Vallas installs new busing plan for certain magnet schools to
save money: “The basic policy is, in effect, done. If people want to communicate their
displeasure about the busing policy (at public hearings on the budget) they can. But this
is already our policy.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Despite parental disagreement with the new busing policy, Vallas
unilaterally decided to install a newer plan that saved the district millions.
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Words/Action(s) – Vallas was given the authority to choose an interim
principal when a school’s LSC is deadlocked in reaching a decision.
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Vallas publicly vocalized that he was not in favor of the selection
process of principals: “I’m trying to reduce the selection of bad principals and prevent
good principals from being intimidated or influenced by overzealous members of LSCs.
This isn’t anything new, because I’ve been talking about this for four years.” This policy
gave him another manner in which he could influence the selection of principals.
Words/Action(s) – Vallas places six schools under his direct supervision, with the
implementation of a measure called intervention: “Intervention may prove to be the most
controversial because intervention allows you to go in and selectively remove staff for
non-performance. After you do the evaluation, you can dismiss individual teachers based
on the evaluation.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – The intervention process differed from reconstitution in that Vallas
and his team could individually evaluate teachers and dismiss for non-performance based
on their determination. They did not have to conduct interviews with teachers.
Words/Action(s) – Proposed that the Board adopt a standardized curriculum
created at central office: “The studies have indicated that the schools where we go in and
dictate curriculum are the schools that seem to be doing the best.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
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Analysis – After Mayor Daley express dissatisfaction with stagnant test score
improvement and continued poor student performance in reading, Vallas suggested a topdown solution which would require that central office create and dictate the curriculum
for all CPS schools. His argument was that the probationary schools were making gains,
but the other schools are all doing different things, which was the cause of inconsistent
performance.
Arne Duncan: Words and Actions
Words/Action(s) – Duncan sent reading specialists to schools to work with
teachers to improve instructional practices in reading: “The people we are going to send
are not going to be the principal’s best friend or some Joe Blow either. This is going to
be an elite corps of people focused on one subject.”
Source of Authority – Professional
Analysis – This decision was intended to utilize the professional source of
authority. Duncan’s initial remedy for the improvement of reading was to utilize
individuals who were specialists in reading to help teachers to improve instructional
practices. However, many teachers felt that the implementation of reading specialists
was a bureaucratic move, because some felt that they did not need additional assistance to
teach reading, some felt that specialists reviewed strategies that they had already learned
in previous professional development sessions, and some felt that central office sent
reading specialists to evaluate their teaching strategies, creating a relationship of mistrust
between teachers and reading specialists.
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Words/Action(s) – Elimination of the Department of Learning Technologies:
“We are trying to streamline the bureaucracy in the central office, and we are not done.
The duties of Learning Technologies can be handled in other departments, across our
entire system.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Duncan began the process of trimming positions at central office in
order to “save taxpayer’s money.”
Words/Action(s) – Duncan froze the hiring of non-essential employees, as well as
spending on consultants, travel and advertising: “None of this impacts the schools. This
is all central office. We’re preparing for the worst, although we’re absolutely committed
to that not happening. We’re doing everything we can to streamline the central office so
nothing we do impacts what’s most important, our classrooms”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Duncan continued to make cuts in preparation for a reduction of
funding from the state. Duncan characterized the positions that were cut as non-essential.
The argument was that none of the cuts would impact the schools.
Words/Action(s) – Seeking input before making a final decision regarding the
submittal of a sports proposal to the ISHA: “After that (making a presentation to the
IHSA board) I will make a final determination on whether to make a formal proposal to
the IHSA. Before then I will be talking to principals, athletic directors and coaches to get
their feedback on the idea…”
Source of Authority – Professional
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Analysis – In this instance, Duncan displayed that he was willing to utilize a
collaborative approach when it came to making certain decisions. In talking with
principals, athletic directors and coaches before making a sports-related decision, Duncan
solicited the input of the professionals who were experts in athletics.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan imposed a two year limit for uncertified teachers to
pass state teacher examinations: “The bottom line is in all of this is there is simply no
room in our system for teachers who are not fully qualified to teach in their respective
subject areas.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Upon taking the helm of CPS CEO, one of the major problems for the
district was teacher retention. Hard-to-staff schools regularly had to staff classrooms
with uncertified teachers, subs and aides. By tightening the certification policy, Duncan
ultimately exacerbated the teacher shortage issue by creating additional shortages.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan proposed that teachers in areas of teacher shortage be
allowed to apply for a one-year exemption from the residency policy. “This is one of a
series of innovative strategies we plan to bring the best teachers to Chicago.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Opponents of this proposal argued that a one-year exemption would
not attract teachers from other areas because they would be forced to move to the city.
Some potential teacher candidates did not want to move to Chicago. CTU president
Lynch wanted the requirements lifted altogether.
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Words/Action(s) – Duncan’s response to allegations of CPS’s lack of food
safety by the Chicago Tribune: “Nothing is more important than the health and safety of
our children. We are absolutely committed to doing what is necessary to ensure that.”
Source of Authority – Technical rational, Professional, Bureaucratic, Moral
Analysis – Duncan took a multifaceted approach to developing solutions for the
food safety issue that arouse as a result of a series of investigations by the Chicago
Tribune. Among the solutions, he and team members met with the Chicago Department
of Public Health Commissioner to identify solutions and determined that better
communication between the department and central office was necessary. He also
planned to launch a review of the city’s meal plan and look at the best practices around
the country to determine how they would make necessary changes. Also, he required that
central office meet with principals to discuss food service procedures and required that
principals directly supervise kitchen workers.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan closes three schools: “We don’t believe these schools
as they currently exist, will ever measure up. There are better education alternatives
within walking distance.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – For the first time in CPS history, schools would be closed strictly for
poor academic performance. When Duncan announced that he would end the practice of
reconstitution, many believed that he would not close schools. However, the district
would quickly learn that Duncan would ultimately reconstitute more schools than his
predecessor.
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Words/Action(s) – Implementation of the Every Child, Every School
education plan: “From day one, I have not thrown lots of sexy bells and whistles that
sound nice but do not help kids learn. My goal is to be the best urban school district in
America. Nothing easy is going to get you there.”
Source of Authority – Professional
Analysis – Duncan’s education plan was the result of the collaboration between
central office and numerous stakeholders. The new plan placed teaching and learning at
the forefront of reform efforts. Duncan remarked that his approach would not include
lots of “sexy bells and whistles,” but strategies that would help kids learn. One key
initiative would be the creation of instructional areas. Schools would be split among 24
instructional areas, and each would be led by an AIO. The creation of the AIO ultimately
increased accountability to a degree that CPS had not ever experienced. For the first
time, there would be the systematic and consistent monitoring of schools by the area
offices. Principals would be directly supervised by AIOs, which was another aspect that
school based administrators had to adapt to. Some principals considered the area office
as watchdogs for central office. The creation of instructional areas provided a new layer
of accountability for neighborhood schools.
Words/Action(s) – Mayor Daley’s statement regarding the implementation of the
Renaissance 2010 plan: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of teachers,
principals, parents and students, some schools have consistently underperformed. We
must face the reality that—for schools that have consistently underperformed—it’s time
to start over.”
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Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – The Renaissance 2010 plan was a plan that would create 100
Renaissance schools which would operate differently from existing CPS schools. The
schools would function as charter schools, independently operated contract schools, and
CPS-run small schools. The major difference between Renaissance schools and existing
schools was that Renaissance schools would be granted additional autonomy in exchange
for increased accountability. The creation of the small schools would involve the closing
of many underperforming CPS schools. Opponents to the Renaissance 2010 plan
contended that Mayor Daley was behind the plan, intending to close traditional
neighborhood schools in order to create elite privately run schools that would attract
middle class whites back to Chicago.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan launched an investigation to determine if there was
cheating on ISAT tests at seven schools: “We need to stand for something, to teach
values to our students. The overwhelming majority of teachers do a fantastic job. These
are isolated incidents, but we will deal with them aggressively and honestly.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – This is an example of the motto: “What isn’t inspected isn’t
respected.” With school closure decisions based on ISAT test performance, the district
found that it would have to closely monitor standardized testing for cheating by teachers
in fear of losing their jobs.
Words/Action(s) – CPS awarded the 60 schools that exhibited the most improved
ISAT scores $10,000: “For years, people have asked how you can compare a Whitney
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Young High School (which admits only high achieving students) to a Harper High
School (a neighborhood school)? They are right. But you can absolutely compare
Harper to itself, and that is what this new system will do. It is a much more
comprehensive approach.”
Source of Authority – Psychological
Analysis – In order to facilitate improvement efforts, Duncan utilized a utilitarian
method of motivating schools to improve.
Words/Action(s) – Elimination of several jobs in the accountability office and
research division. All would have to reapply for their positions, and many were not hired
back.
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – Duncan’s rationale for this move was to move resources closer to the
schools
Words/Action(s) – Duncan removed three elementary school principals because
of poor performance: “We’re taking a very hard look at performance. We’re holding
ourselves and them accountable.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – The removal of principals because their schools performed poorly was
a very controversial and seldom used intervention strategy. Once a principal was subject
to removal, he or she was entitled to a hearing before an independent officer appointed by
the CEO. This almost ensured that the process was a unilateral decision by the CEO.
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Words/Action(s) – The requirement of portfolios for principal candidates:
“My goal is not to send dozens of resumes, many of which are mediocre, and make (local
school councils’) already tough job more difficult. I want to send extraordinary
candidates so they do not have to spend tons of time weighing through masses of
paperwork.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – With this decision, Duncan argued that he wanted to send more
qualified candidates for LSC consideration in the selection of school principals. Vallas
used a similar rationale when he changed the principal selection process. Ultimately, this
decision gave provided the CPAA with the ability to screen and provide LSCs with the
potential candidates that they would be able to select from, which reduced their input into
the process. Additionally, several potential candidates became ineligible for principal
consideration because it became harder to gain the necessary administrative experience
that the portfolios required.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan donated $5,000 in scholarship money for two high
school seniors
Source of Authority – Moral
Analysis – In this instance, Duncan is modeling a core value to employees in the
district, which is related to his belief that all students should have the opportunity to
learn.
Words/Action(s) – In 2004, CPS toughened the teacher residency policy: “Since
1996, we have required our teachers to live in Chicago, a policy some see as an obstacle
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in recruiting and retaining the best teachers. The facts, however, suggest otherwise.
Every year our schools are performing better, the stacks of resumes grow and our
teacher-vacancy rate drops.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – With the new residency policy, school administrators would have to
verify that new employees lived in Chicago. Opponents argued that the residency policy
was not appropriate for CPS, but Mayor Daley did not want to adjust the policy for CPS
employees because he would have to adjust it for other city departments, which could
cause an exodus of middle class city workers from the city to the more affordable
suburbs.
Words/Action(s) – Implementation of DIBELS screening assessment tool
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – For the purposes of uniformity, the district implemented this
assessment tool in order to collect data regarding the reading levels of primary aged
students. Teachers were initially resistant to the tool because many used their own
assessment instruments to assess student reading levels, and felt that DIBELS did not
sufficiently assess all areas.
Words/Action(s) – Duncan ended a program for pregnant teens and teen parents
implemented by Vallas: “When a girl gets pregnant, that’s a symptom of 98 things that
are going wrong in that kid’s life. CPS is not a pro at dealing with all those issues.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
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Analysis – The “Cradle to the Classroom” program was considered successful
as well as cost-efficient.
Words/Action(s) – In 2005, Duncan implemented an incentive plan designed to
encourage better attendance for students: “I’m a firm believer in rewarding hard work.
We want to do everything we can to encourage families to do the right thing. The reality
of it is that not everyone has the mentality (that school is an obligation).”
Source of Authority – Psychological
Analysis – Opponents of the usage of incentives argued that CPS was sending a
bad message by “bribing” kids to come to school. Duncan argued that “hard work”
should be rewarded.
Words/Action(s) – In 2005, CPS stopped using the IOWA test as a form of
student assessment and replaced it with three shorter reading assessments called Standard
Learning First: “These assessments are a tool for teachers, not a punitive measure.
Testing is important, but we want to test … in a way that gives our teachers and our
principals, useful information about their students.”
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
Analysis – The state mandated ISAT test lessened the need for the district to
utilize two major standardized assessment tests. However, the need for additional data
prompted Duncan to adopt the Learning First assessment tests.
Words/Action(s) – In 2007, Duncan changed the policy on the closing of schools
by specifically outlining reasons why a school could be closed.
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic
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Analysis – One important change to the policy on the closing of schools was
the need for change in educational focus. A school slated to undergo a change in
educational focus would allow for the principal of that school to re-interview and rehire
his or her entire staff. This created a situation where the principal could circumvent the
normal process of removing a teacher. This is an example of bureaucratic decision
making on the school level.
Words/Action(s) – CPS implemented a pilot program which would pay the
freshmen at 20 CPS high schools a sum of money for “good” grades “The majority of our
students don’t come from families with a lot of economic wealth. I’m always trying to
level the playing field. This is the kind of incentive that middle-class families have had
for decades.”
Source of Authority – Psychological
Analysis – This serves as another example of Duncan’s usage of rewards to
motivate students to perform.
Summary and Conclusions
Research Questions
In examining the CEO model under the leadership of Paul Vallas through the
framework of Serviovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, Vallas utilized Sergiovanni’s five
sources in decision making analyzed in this dissertation at the following rates:
Bureaucratic: 60 percent; Psychological: 7 percent; Technical rational: 0 percent;
Professional: 13 percent; and Moral: 17 percent.
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Research Question 1: Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority, what were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought
from the CEO position for Paul Vallas during the years of 1995-2001
Upon taking over the leadership helm of CPS under the new revamped CEO title,
Paul Vallas was expected to perform the duties of the new position under guidelines that
were outlined in the Amendatory Act. The 1995 Amendatory Act directed the CEO to
increase the quality of educational services, reduce the cost of non-educational services,
develop a long-term financial plan which would balance the budget, streamline the
bureaucracy, and enact policies that ensured that the system ran in an ethical as well as
efficient manner.
Mayor Daley made statements which revealed the characteristics that he would
expect from the CPS CEO. First, the CPS CEO would have to address the overall
management of the district, as well as central office: “You have to change management,”
Daley said. “There’s a lot of management problems there.”1 He also revealed that how
he wanted the CEO to address special interests groups surrounding the district: “Business
as usual is over. The special interests will move to the back of the line. The bureaucrats
who stand in the way of change will be removed and their powers dissolved.”2 Daley
also vocalized the importance of cutting costs in order to balance the budget: “We must
continue to fight for every dollar in Springfield, because the state has not met its
(funding) responsibility. But clearly we must also make progress here in controlling
1
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costs before expecting any further help from the state.”3 Daley would also lend his
opinion regarding the retention policy during Vallas’ tenure. After being asked if
students would be retained for a second year in a row, Daley responded: “I will not
socially promote children to high school, to allow them to drop out and go on…You want
to promote them? You go promote them. And then you’ll see them in the criminal
justice system and you’ll be complaining about your taxes.”
Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, all of the
characteristics that were revealed by the Mayor fell under the bureaucratic source of
authority in that they were all related to finance, resource allocation, and management.
Furthermore, his opinion regarding the manner in how to deal with students who would
be retained for a second time called for a bureaucratic approach in regards to making
promotion determinations.
In examining the CEO model under the leadership of Arne Duncan through the
framework of Serviovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, Duncan utilized Sergiovanni’s
five sources in decision making analyzed in this dissertation at the following rates:
Bureaucratic: 69 percent; Psychological: 12 percent; Technical rational: 3 percent;
Professional: 15 percent; and Moral: 0 percent.
Research Question 2: Through the Lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority, what were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought
from the CEO position for Arne Duncan during the years of 2001-2008?

3
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Upon taking the helm of CPS CEO, the district experienced a state of financial
stability, due to the work of Vallas. Mayor Daley was ready for the district to go in
another direction in relation to student performance. At the end of Vallas’ term as CEO,
reading scores had not improved at the same rate as they had during the first years of his
administration. Daley stated that schools would need to utilize non-traditional ideas and
think “outside the box” to help improve student performance:
When you go into a school, you see kids who deal with technology faster
than any of us, who can sing a rap song better than anyone else, but they
have a problem reading…With every child there is ability. How do we get
it out of them?... I think we have to go outside of the box.4
Daley would also reveal his opinion regarding how the district should address
failing schools. After unveiling the plans surrounding the Renaissance 2010 initiative,
Daley stated: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of teachers, principals, parents
and students, some schools have consistently underperformed. We must face the reality
that—for schools that have consistently underperformed—it’s time to start over.”5 Daley
also endorsed the magnet makeover plan, which would transform neighborhood schools
into “magnet-style” school options: “The magnet makeover plan is our latest strategy
aimed at creating high-quality options for all students across Chicago. These schools are
part of a bigger picture that includes turnaround schools, high school transformation
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schools and accelerated programs within schools designed to get more students ready
for the workplace and college.”6
Daley’s expectations of the CPS CEO position for the time period of 2001-2008
were from both the professional and bureaucratic sources of authority. In regards to
“thinking out of the box” when it came to the improvement of teaching and learning
strategies, Daley wanted for the leadership team to utilize non-traditional thinking to help
bolster student achievement. Duncan would enlist the assistance of several different
individuals to help him accomplish that sort of thinking and to implement those ideas.
From a bureaucratic standpoint, Daley endorsed the closing and reorganization of
schools.
Research Question 3: Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority, how did Paul Vallas fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for
the CPS CEO position?
Based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO position, which was
formulated by stipulations in the 1995 Amendatory Act, Paul Vallas experienced great
success in fulfilling the role of CPS CEO, but hit a wall when it came to formulating
teaching and learning strategies. He accomplished this by first restoring public
confidence in the district by displaying financial prudence and responsibility. He quickly
identified instances of wasteful spending and discontinued those practices. He fired
union laborers and established systems which required that CPS solicit bids from private
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companies in order to retain services in a cost-efficient manner. He led by example
by demonstrating that he would not waste taxpayer dollars with expensive drivers and
food budgets for meetings. He distributed equipment that was collecting dust in
warehouses that CPS had to rent, which saved the district some money.
Vallas made tough personnel decisions in order to free up money to settle the
teacher’s contract and to create necessary programs to support student learning. He
realized that he could trim positions at central office to accomplish that goal. By cutting
positions at central office, Vallas fulfilled two expectations outlined by the Amendatory
Act: Streamlining the bureaucracy, and balancing the budget. This move also helped to
restore the public’s confidence in the district, as evidenced by the increased credit rating
awarded to the district as a result of Vallas’ efforts. Vallas knew that CPS would not be
able to ask for additional funding until it illustrated that the district would spend the
money that it was allotted responsibly.
Vallas made decisions that reflected that the district would operate in an ethical
and efficient manner in a number of ways. Vallas enacted revamped ethics policies for
LSC members, sport coaches and players, as well as special interest groups who worked
with CPS. Vallas ran the district in an efficient manner with decisions such as the
sharing of school buses, the allocation of resources, and his monitoring of the district’s
finances.
Vallas believed that improvement would be realized through accountability.
Vallas demanded accountability from everyone, including students and parents. Vallas’
ending of social promotions was considered one of the hallmarks of his administration, as
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well as controversial. Opponents of retention cited research that indicated that
students who were retained were not likely to improve performance and were more likely
to drop out of school.
The majority of decisions made by Vallas that were analyzed in this dissertation
were made from the bureaucratic source of authority. Given the stipulations identified
for the CEO position in the Amendatory Act, bureaucratic decision making was
inevitable. To properly manage a bureaucracy, there must be tough, bureaucratic
decision making. The closing and reorganization of schools reflected bureaucratic
decision making designed to strike fear in individuals to influence them to perform better.
Vallas admitted that he was not opposed to utilizing fear to stimulate performance: “Is
fear a factor? Well, if fear is synonymous with accountability, then I’ll take fear
anytime.”7 The usage of fear to motivate performance meant that there was a
fundamental belief that the goals of the supervisor and the subordinate were not the same.
If teachers “do their jobs,” then their school would not be closed. The usage of
reconstitution and intervention struck fear throughout the district, and impacted schoolbased decision making as a consequence. Fear of sanctions became the “stick” by which
all employees would follow. Performance would be stimulated through the use of fear.
If schools fail, teachers could lose their jobs. Tenured teachers who were historically
protected by the CTU would also be subject to losing their positions.
At the end of Vallas’ tenure, student performance results became stagnant. This
reflected that improvements in teaching and learning involved the bulk of the CPS
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workforce: teachers. Fear of sanctions had reached its limit. Paul Vallas had not
effectively developed programs which affected how teachers taught and how students
learned.
Research Question 4: Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of
Authority, how did Arne Duncan fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for
the CPS CEO position?
Based on the combination of expectations for the CEO role outlined in the
Amendatory Act and new expectations for the role as dictated by Mayor Daley, Arne
Duncan also experienced great success in the fulfillment of the role of CPS CEO.
Duncan was charged with moving the district forward by focusing on teaching and
learning strategies. Duncan relied on the professional source of authority to accomplish
this. He began by hiring Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins to function as his Chief Educational
Officer. Eason-Watkins was the former principal of McCosh Elementary School, who
was known as a dynamic leader that led her school to great gains on their standardized
tests. Duncan would use her expertise to help shape the educational reforms that were
put in place during his tenure.
Duncan’s Every Child, Every School education plan was also an example of his
usage of the professional source of authority. Mayor Daley demanded improvement in
student reading performance, and this plan was designed to meet that challenge. The plan
was formulated with the assistance of LSC members, parents, students, community
members, social service organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. Eason-Watkins
oversaw the development of the plan. The development of instructional areas was a
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major component of the plan. With instructional areas, the Area Instructional Officer
was created, which provided another layer of instructional leadership for schools. The
new instructional area model required that AIOs report directly to Eason-Watkins, which
provided her with an increased influence on instructional practices of individual schools.
Overall, 69 percent of decisions made by Duncan that were analyzed in this study
were made from the bureaucratic source of authority. The No Child Left Behind Act
brought stipulations and sanctions that greatly affected decision-making, particularly in
struggling urban districts. The fear of sanctions that could be imposed by the district was
used to motivate teachers and administrators to improve student performance just as the
fear of sanctions that could be imposed by the federal government were designed to do
the same. The fear of school closure would become even greater under the tenure of
Arne Duncan due to the implementation of Renaissance 2010.
With the implementation of Renaissance 2010 coupled with the powers given to
the CPS CEO as outlined in the 1995 Amendatory Act, the district utilized the
bureaucratic source of authority to provide sanctions that were supposed to motivate
employees within the district to increase student outcomes. CPS schools that were poor
performers were constantly made aware of the fact that their school could be closed.
Teachers learned that there were several ways that they could lose their jobs, through
reconstitution, a change in educational focus, and school closings. Some CPS employees
wondered if Mayor Daley was truly trying to improve schools, or increase the middle
class population in Chicago by creating schools populated with higher performing
students, for the purposes of promoting gentrification.

247
Mayor Daley demanded that CPS leadership think “outside the box” to
develop programs that would increase student performance. During his tenure, Duncan
displayed several instances of non-traditional programming and ideas while
implementing programs for CPS students. Beginning with the small schools initiative,
the school within a school concept was utilized to help individualize the educational
program for high school students in the district. Small schools would normally feature a
special area of interest, such as communication, technology, entrepreneurship or college
prep. The schools featured a smaller student body (500 students or fewer), and lower
student to specialty staff ratios than traditional schools. Students in small schools often
wore uniforms, which further strengthened the unifying themes of the schools. The small
school concept was designed to give students a more personalized educational experience
in high school, where some students get lost in the shuffle.
The specialty magnet schools, as well as magnet cluster schools were further
examples of non-traditional thinking in the management of the district. Daley stated that
students dealt with technology faster than adults, and the technology magnet cluster
schools provided students with the opportunity to utilize technological enhancements
during their learning experiences. Schools within the technology magnet cluster
emphasized the integration of technology within the curriculum. Teachers at technology
academies were to receive a minimum of 90 hours of professional development related to
technology integration. Those schools were allotted smart boards, projectors, enhanced
classroom sound systems, laptop carts, teacher laptops, as well as Elmo® devices.
Principals at those academies would also spend their own discretionary funds to provide
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their students with additional technological enhancements. Spencer Technology
Academy, located on Chicago’s west side, even has a virtual gymnasium, featuring 15
Nintendo Wii® video game systems. Teachers who wanted to utilize the virtual
gymnasium would work with a technology coordinator, who would help them to develop
lesson plans designed to use the game systems to enhance their lesson.
Despite receiving criticism, Duncan utilized the usage of incentives as an
additional means to exhibit “out of the box” thinking. His usage of incentives supported
the overall usage of the psychological source of authority. Schools received incentives
for growth on ISAT results. Students received cash for grades, and one student even won
a car as a reward for her attendance, even though she was not old enough to drive at that
time. Duncan argued that students could not learn if they were not in school. Despite the
criticism, Duncan continued to utilize incentives, and attendance climbed to the highest
that it had ever been in the history of the district.
Research Question 5: How did the leadership styles of the Paul Vallas and Arne
Duncan compare through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority?
In terms of leadership styles, the two CEOs were different in approach but similar
in function. Vallas took the office of CPS CEO with a brash, direct style and
implemented aggressive changes from the beginning of his tenure. Duncan, on the other
hand, took a more laid back approach, preferring to work behind the scenes during his
first months. Vallas was extremely transparent with his decision making and the changes
that he implemented during his tenure, and was extremely media-friendly, providing the
media with several interesting quotes. Duncan was not as transparent with the rationale
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behind decision making, and was not as media-friendly. Duncan only provided media
outlets with short responses to questions, and preferred to communicate through writing.
Vallas exhibited the characteristics of a very decisive decision maker. When
faced with situations which required a solution, Vallas delivered quickly and efficiently.
Vallas displayed this by quickly balancing the district’s budget and ensuring that the
district would experience labor peace with the quick settlement of the teacher’s contract.
As situations and circumstances presented themselves, Vallas developed policies
designed to solve the problems that were presented as a result.
Although Vallas showed some instances of utilizing the professional,
psychological and moral sources of authority, he mainly led under the bureaucratic
source of authority. Vallas did not display many instances of collaboration when it came
to decision-making for major issues experienced by the district. The decisions that were
made by Vallas that had the greatest impact on the district were made without the input of
other stakeholders in the district. Some of Vallas’ quick decisions would have to be
restructured after being challenged.
Duncan displayed a sharp contrast in style from Vallas. Duncan admitted that he
needed to work on being more transparent regarding the direction that he planned to take
the district, but he never really seemed comfortable with being vocal about the districts’
plans and his decision-making. Duncan claimed that he did not throw “lots of sexy bells
and whistles that sound nice but do not help kids learn,”8 This implied that he believed
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that Vallas’ approach to running the district was to implement programs that “looked
good on paper,” but lacked substance and quality.
Duncan was more adept with utilizing “specialists” to help advance his
educational agenda. Beginning with the hiring of Eason-Watkins to the post of Chief
Educational Officer, and the role he defined for the position, Duncan exhibited that he
was willing to share decision-making responsibilities regarding educational initiatives.
Duncan also utilized reading specialists to help teachers learn new strategies to improve
reading instruction. The creation of instructional areas led by the newly-created AIOs
provided another layer of instructional leadership which displayed Duncan’s willingness
to utilize specialists. Before the creation of instructional areas, the district was divided
into six regions, each of which contained close to 100 schools. The regional officers
provided support on management issues such as the scheduling of buses, disciplinary
issues and facilities management. The new structure split schools among 24 areas, which
would provide an AIO for instructional matters, and a management support director who
took care of all management related matters and reported to the AIO. The AIO was
empowered to make decisions for the purposes of improving instruction in their areas.
Duncan was very active in closing and reorganizing schools. Although he was
more willing to listen to supporters of the particular school who fought to keep the school
open, and allowed CTU to get involved with the improvement of schools before closure,
Duncan ultimately closed more schools during his tenure than Vallas did. The
bureaucratic source of authority utilized in these instances was very powerful. The
decision to close individual schools was bureaucratic, and the impact of their closures
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sent a strong message to the district that no one was safe and no one was untouchable.
Vallas would remove principals and LSCs mainly if he determined that improvement
efforts were not being followed. Duncan closed schools for non-performance, which was
a first in the history of the district. For the first time, teachers and administrators would
not be able to say “Well, we tried, but our kids can’t learn.” Teachers and administrators
would be held accountable for student performance, regardless of their socioeconomic
status, their environment, or their past performance. This was extremely frustrating for
district employees who did not quite know how to address those issues.
The Renaissance 2010 plan exacerbated the already existent fear among district
employees by setting a preemptive plan for the closing and reorganization of schools.
Not only would schools face sanctions for poor performance, but there was now an
ambitious plan in place to restructure schools and displace teachers. Teachers and
administrators felt even more insecure regarding their careers with CPS, and also felt that
the improvement effort placed the total blame of poor student performance solely on
teachers. The bureaucratic decision to close schools for poor performance coupled with
the psychological impact that the fear of school closure had across the district contributed
to the lowering of the morale of teachers and administrators district-wide.
Research Question 6: What implications does the CEO model have for school
governance and school leadership?
This study has illustrated how the CEO model implemented by CPS has affected
school governance and school leadership outcomes both explicitly and implicitly. From a
school governance standpoint, the CEO was granted powers by the business-influenced
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1995 Amendatory Act that granted the two CEOs the authority to make decisions that
previous superintendents were not able to make. The new CPS CEO was given a bit
more latitude to make decisions affecting the district similar to CEOs in the private
industry. Three important similarities were related to resource allocation, finance and
relation with the board of directors. In chapter two, the nature and scope of the
accountabilities reserved to CEO positions in private industries were summarized. The
accountability of the CEO to resource allocation required that the CEO establish a
strategic framework for the allocation of the resources of the corporation. The finance
accountability required that the CEO ensured the soundness of the organization’s
financial structure, monitored indications of the company’s financial health, determined
the company’s present and future capital requirements, and arranged for outside
financing. The relations with the board of director’s accountability required that the CEO
gained the board’s full understanding, constructive review, or final approval of
management policies, direction and objectives. Beginning with the tenure of Paul Vallas,
the CEO model would affect how those three areas would be managed after the 1995
Amendatory Act.
The CEO affected resource allocation by ensuring that the district’s limited
resources were efficiently allocated. Vallas determined that the best way to allocate
resources was to protect teaching positions as best as possible while reducing the higher
paid administrative positions within central office. Vallas also allocated resources
efficiently by using the powers outlined in the Amendatory Act to privatize noneducational services. This required that Vallas fire union workers who traditionally held
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careers with CPS for decades. From then on, services rendered would require that
private companies bid for the contract, which saved the district millions of dollars.
From a financial perspective, the CEO was required by the Amendatory Act to
develop a long-term financial plan that reflected a balanced budget for each year.
Previous to the Amendatory Act, the district’s finances were in a constant state of flux.
The district employed poor financial practices which consistently left the district in debt,
and put the district in a situation where it could not always make ends meet, causing
many teacher strikes. During the tenure of the two CEOs, the district has enjoyed an
unprecedented period of labor peace as a result of sound financial practices. During
Vallas’ tenure, the credit rating of the district was increased, which saved the district a
great deal of money by allowing the district to borrow more money at a reduced rate.
Although the Amendatory Act did not grant the district additional funding, it allowed the
CEO more flexibility in how to allocate and spend funds. Displaying prudence in
handling the finances of the district helped the district gain additional funds in 1997, and
set the stage for future outside financing because of the district’s new reputation for
sound financial decision-making.
In regards to board relations with the CEO, the CEO model included a board that
was reduced and handpicked by the mayor just as the CEO, which helped to reduce
friction and increased the amount of productivity in regards to decision making among
the board. Although critics of the new governance structure argued that board merely
functioned as a rubber stamp for the CEOs decisions, it undeniably allowed for quicker
decision making which allowed for the quicker implementation of initiatives. Now, when
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there were problems in the district, the CEO could quickly implement a solution
instead of waiting for a massive board to come to a resolution.
In private industry, the CEO can fire an employee for poor performance. In the
CPS bureaucracy, it was not as easy to dismiss a poor performing teacher. The process
for teacher dismissal was often long, and extremely costly to the district. However,
school closures for poor performance gave the CEO some semblance of the ability to
influence the contents of the workforce just as CEOs in private industry. As outlined in
the Amendatory Act, the CEO was granted the power to close schools for a number of
reasons, including poor student academic performance. The fear of school closure did
help to raise the level of accountability on teachers and administrators. However, higher
performing teachers that taught at a school that could close were not as likely to stay or
apply to teach at those particular schools. Teachers did not want the stigma that would be
attached to them if their school closed. Research shows that the need for great teachers
increases in schools with students who are performing below standards. The unintended
effect of school closures contributed to a large number of unfilled positions in schools
with struggling students.
The CEO model also implicitly affected school leadership outcomes. The major
actions of the CPS CEO that had the greatest impact on school leadership was the
increased emphasis on test scores, the fear of school closure, the implementation of the
AIO and area offices, and the changing of the principal selection process.
Beginning with the tenure of Paul Vallas, the increased emphasis on student test
performance created a sense of urgency never before felt across the district. On one
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hand, teachers would be held accountable for ensuring that their students learned.
Teachers could no longer make “excuses” for why students were not performing, and
teachers could not lower the bar in regards to student expectations. On the other hand,
the increased emphasis on standardized testing caused principals to change how they led
teachers. Standardized testing, which was previously utilized to provide educators with
consistent data regarding student mastery of content, now became high-stakes tests.
Normally, a test is considered “high-stakes” based on the consequences for the test taker.
However, in this instance, poor test results would carry serious consequences for the
schools. Those negative consequences may have been a factor in causing principals and
local education agencies to cut back programs in the arts, cut recess, social studies, and
science courses in order to make the time for high-stakes test preparation. The emphasis
on high-stakes test scores also may have caused principals to endorse direct instructional
techniques in some instances which included an endless amount of practice tests. The
fear of negative consequences that arose from high-stakes testing that were emphasized
by central office were now emphasized by principals, which greatly affected teaching and
learning by deemphasizing teaching methods that fostered genuine student understanding.
Student circumstances were also deemphasized. Teachers in low-income areas who have
students with real barriers to learning such as poverty, crime-ridden neighborhoods,
inadequate living situations, language barriers and special needs would now be required
to teach with little support to address those barriers. This caused teachers to rely on “drill
and kill” methods, and drove good teachers who entered the field to help students, out of
the profession.
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The increased emphasis on high-stakes test scores also greatly affected the
instructional focus of the principal because of the conversion of the principal’s contract to
a performance-based contract which took place as a result of the Chicago School Reform
Act of 1988. Previously, principals were a part of the teacher’s union, and gained tenure
just as teachers did. Under the performance-based contract, principals now were issued
four year contracts. The principal’s performance was mainly tied in to standardized test
results. If a principal did not adequately raise test scores, their contract may not be
renewed.
The fear of school closure also affected school leadership outcomes by using the
power of fear as motivation for performance. Principals now constantly warned their
staff that their schools could close if students did not perform well on their tests.
Professional development opportunities for teachers would be related to increasing test
scores. In many cases, principals would look the other way if teachers “helped” students
while taking standardized tests. New ideas, collaborative teaching methods, projectbased learning, real-life experiences for students, and differentiated learning were all
deemphasized because of the fear of school closures.
The implementation of the AIO and the area office support personnel also
affected school leadership outcomes. The AIO was the instructional leader for a cluster
of schools in their area. To ensure that Board of Education mandates were being
followed, area teams led by the AIO performed school walkthroughs at least twice per
year. The walkthrough process was a very uncomfortable process for many teachers.
Teachers felt that the process was designed to catch them doing something wrong. The
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process involved a team of up to nine area team members who would walk into a
teacher’s room and record several aspects of the classroom including the objectives of the
lesson, technology usage, the amount of student work displayed in the classroom, student
engagement, student behavior and many other items. After conducting several
walkthroughs within a school, the AIO would compile all recorded data and give it to the
principal, with a deadline as to when corrections should take place. Failure to correct
areas of need within the timeframe would result in sanctions imposed on the principal.
With the principal faced with sanctions for the improvement of teacher areas of
need, in many cases, the principal would utilize the same method to motivate teachers to
correct areas of need. If the teacher did not correct areas of need, then they faced
sanctions. This created a model which encouraged the usage of the bureaucratic source
of authority to motivate teacher performance. This also caused a great deal of resistance
between teacher and area teams, as well as teacher and principal. It was “us” (the
teacher) versus “them” (the area teams, school administration). The general feeling in
most instances, was that the principal and the area teams were “out to get them.” This
caused teachers to be very defensive towards suggestions for improvement. Many
teachers did not feel that supervisors wanted them to improve in their craft, but rather,
supervisors only wanted to catch them doing something wrong so that they could dismiss
them. This affected teacher creativity in the classroom, made teachers extremely afraid
of making mistakes, and caused teachers stay within their comfort zones. The area teams
that were intended to support instruction were seen as Board watchdogs by administrators
and teachers.
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The changing of the principal selection process ultimately gave principals
power to allow teachers to gain the necessary experience to become eligible for
consideration in regards to principal positions. In Illinois, a principal candidate must
have a valid Type 75 certificate issued by the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE).
In addition to this, CPS required that principals who are interested in becoming a
principal were on the “principal’s list.” During Duncan’s tenure, he required that
prospective principals complete a portfolio process prior to being considered for the list.
As part of the requirements for the portfolio, prospective principals needed administrative
experience documented in their portfolios. Some teachers found it difficult to gain the
necessary experience if their principals did not give them the opportunity. In some
instances, principals would not allow prospective principals to gain administrative
experience for personal or political reasons. This greatly reduced the pool of eligible
principal candidates.
In some instances, the pool of candidates was so small that LSCs would be
deadlocked in making a decision. Vallas gained the authority to insert interim principals
in those instances. Many times, area coaches were selected to serve as interim principals.
This caused a greater amount of distrust between area teams and principals. Many area
coaches were aspiring school administrators, but yet, as area coaches, they maintained of
supervisory authority over school administrators. The changing of the principal selection
process caused it to become highly political and directly affected the type of leaders that
led CPS schools.
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Conclusions
This study examined the tenures of CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan to
determine the skills, knowledge and dispositions required of the CPS CEO position, and
examined the sources of authority utilized in decision-making for the CPS CEO model.
Both CEOs primarily utilized the bureaucratic source of authority for decision-making as
well as to motivate the employees of the district. Wong and Sunderman, who performed
an analysis of the CPS system, argues that bureaucratic organization can facilitate
effective management by creating an efficient means to perform financial and
management related tasks, and gives top administration the ability to address the
collective interests of the system as a whole. In this analysis of the CPS CEOs,
bureaucratic decision-making contributed to the success of the district in regards to
improving the way in which resources were allocated and the improvement of the
financial health of the district. Wong and Sunderman also argue that the exclusive focus
on bureaucratic aspects of administration causes a tendency to equate the size of the
organization with efficiency.9 This tendency could be the cause of the utilization of
downsizing by both CEOs.
Wong and Sunderman also contend that bureaucratic organization is the proper
structure in regards to the completion of financial and managerial functions that are
required in order to run a school system as large as CPS. A system as large as CPS
requires a system by which to monitor the activities of the various departments
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throughout the district. An example of the lack of sufficient supervision was the
Desegregation Commission that Paul Vallas downsized. The commission spent taxpayer
dollars on expensive dinners, massages, and other extravagant items. Without a system
to monitor those departments, Vallas found that the members of the commission spent
funds without displaying fiscal responsibility. Utilizing the bureaucratic source of
authority seemed appropriate for management and financially intensive tasks for the
district.
However, when it came to teaching and learning, the bureaucratic source of
authority utilized to motivate district employees was only somewhat effective.
Ultimately, if district success was primarily judged by standardized test scores, then the
decision-making models that were utilized was largely effective in increasing test scores.
However, if district success was judged by high school readiness, ACT test scores, high
school graduation rates, and postsecondary figures, then the district would not be
considered very successful. Under the CEO model, student learning outcomes have
improved, but the achievement gap has not been sufficiently closed.
Recommendations for Further Research
Based on the research and the findings of this study, other recommended areas of
research were identified. One area for further research is to compare the CPS CEO
model with the Chancellor model utilized in New York City since 2002. The New York
City school system has been credited for making a dramatic turnaround, and has been
hailed as a national model for big city urban school districts.
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Another possibility for further research is to examine 90/90/90 schools (90
percent minority, 90 percent on free and reduced lunch, and 90 percent of students who
are reading at or above grade level), and examine the leadership model through the lens
of an interpretive framework such as Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority. Is there
more of a tendency to utilize professional and moral as primary sources of authority in
those systems?
Another possibility for further research is to conduct interviews of CPS principals
during the tenures of Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan to analyze how the CEO model
affected their decision-making practices on the school level. Did they utilize
bureaucratic, psychological and technical-rational sources of authority primarily, or were
they able to utilize professional and moral authority? If it was the latter, how did they do
it?
A final recommended area for further research is to examine CEO Ron Huberman
and the performance management model. How does the model affect student learning
outcomes? How does the model affect the practices of teachers and administrators within
CPS? What sources of authority were emphasized during his tenure? Does the emphasis
of data collection and analysis help to improve student high school readiness and lower
high school dropout percentages?
Epilogue: The Future of CPS
Ron Huberman
At his first board meeting in January of 2009, Ron Huberman, the new CPS CEO,
was booed by a packed audience at his first board meeting. The audience called him an
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educational novice and a political appointee of Mayor Daley. Huberman graduated
from the University of Wisconsin, after which he entered the Chicago Police Academy
and was quickly promoted to Assistant Deputy Superintendent, making him one of the
youngest officers to reach that rank. While working as a Chicago Police Officer,
Huberman obtained master’s degrees in Business Administration and Social Service
Administration from the University of Chicago.
In 2004, Mayor Daley appointed Huberman as Executive Director of the Office of
Emergency Management and Communication. In 2005, Mayor Daley appointed
Huberman to serve as his Chief of Staff. In that role, Huberman implemented a system of
performance management which accentuated results and accountability. In 2007,
Huberman was appointed as President of the Chicago Transit Authority before accepting
the post of CPS CEO in 2009. In February of 2009, Michael Scott returned to serve
another stint as Board President, after Rufus Williams resigned.
Performance Management
Upon taking the post of CEO, Huberman told teachers and administrators on a
number of occasions that he was not a professional educator, nor would he attempt to
figure out how to become one. In meetings with administrators upon taking over as
CEO, he explained that the overarching goal of the district is to aspire to be the best
urban education system and to prepare Chicago’s students to compete locally, nationally
and globally in the 21st century. Efficient and effective management of the organization
is the cornerstone of creating an effective learning environment according to Huberman.
The framework for effective school management begins with building an infrastructure to
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support a performance-based educational system that is focused on developing and
incorporating 21st century world-class standards, he stated.
Before the beginning of the 2009-2010 school year, Huberman explained the
performance management process to all CPS administrators, and how he planned to
implement it.10 He explained that a culture of excellence is attainable at all levels when
there is support for innovation, decision making is based on evidence, the organization is
willing to face the brutal facts, there is a general belief that the organization could do
better, and a process and the tools are in place to support those items. He believes that
those principles can work in a variety of different organizational settings, including the
Chicago Public Schools.
Huberman’s goal is to employ a top to bottom performance management system
that encompasses central office and schools. His “top down bottom up” framework
places executives at the top of the chain, then officers, then principals, and finally
teachers. Huberman, using principles from Jim Collins’s book Good to Great, stated that
the right people need to be on the bus, the wrong people need to be off, and the right
people need to be in the right seat in order for the organization to move in the right
direction. Though the performance management process, individuals in the organization
are to focus on student achievement primarily, by utilizing real-time information to
remain focused on outcomes, and efficiently use resources.
Huberman argues that although there is a plethora of data available, school
leaders need organized data that is immediately usable. Huberman has implemented a
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color system to help organize data into problem performance, average performance,
and excellent performance. To indicate the level of student performance, red indicates
poor, yellow for average, and green for excellent. Performance goals are broken down by
student achievement, high school readiness, school climate, and staff quality and
development. Under each subcategory, there are several items that indicate how the
school is performing, such as the percentage of students retained in grades 3, 6, and 8 for
student achievement, the percentage of graduates enrolled in high school for high school
readiness, the number of suspensions and expulsions per 100 students for school climate,
and the percentages related to teacher attendance for staff quality and development. The
goals for each school are to perform in the “green” for all subcategories.
In order to improve performance, school teams must meet regularly to review
data. Upon reviewing data, teams are to address issues presented by the data, address
previous action items, look at trends, remedy obstacles, and make decisions about future
goals. Performance management meetings feature the executive staff on one side of a
large table, the department who is reviewing relevant data to the left of the executive
staff, the support departments to the right of the executive staff, and relevant data is
displayed in front of everyone. On the area level (area district offices), the Chief Area
Officers (CAO) are on one side, principals are to the left, support departments to the
right, and data in front. On the school level, the principal is on one side, the grade level
team is to the left, support departments (reading and math coaches, technology team) is to
the right, the data is in the front. During the meetings, the executives present problematic
data, and the review department answer questions related to the data. The review
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department must be prepared to explain why poor performance is taking place.
Support departments can be called upon as well if a support service did not take place, or
was ineffective. The goal is to make decisions about improving student achievement
based on data. If a practice is deemed ineffective, it should end immediately.
To uncover the root of causes for poor performance, Huberman implemented a
practice called “deep dive.” Deep dives, much like peeling layers of an onion, he
explained, is designed to look deeply into an issue to find the root of poor performance.
To accomplish this, missing information is to be identified by answering five “why”
questions. Asking five “why” questions generally makes the respondent extremely
uncomfortable, because it requires that the respondent thinks well beyond the surface
regarding problem areas. It can seem as if the respondent is being singled out. However,
in order to face the “brutal facts,” the deep dive is designed to ensure that the respondent
is aware of all of the factors that are behind poor performance.
CEO Ron Huberman believes that school based performance management
sessions will aid schools in using data to improve student outcomes. In order for schools
to conduct school based performance management, resources needed to be provided for
schools. Huberman noted that schools lag behind other industries in the use of
technology, so to correct this, a school-by-school technology audit would be conducted
and laptop carts as well as wireless technology would be allocated for all schools. Also,
central office provided funding for extended day meeting time and area offices received
data coaches and analysts to support schools.
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Suicide of Board President Michael Scott
In November of 2009, the body of Michael Scott was found with a single gunshot
wound to the head along the North Branch of the Chicago River. The Cook County
medical examiner ruled it a suicide and the Chicago Police Department reported that
Scott died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Questions surfaced regarding
how such a public man with no signs of depression would kill himself. Scott is survived
by his wife and their two children.
Mayor Daley Announces That He Will Retire
On Tuesday, September 7th, Mayor Daley announced that he would not run for a
seventh term. Many speculated why the popular mayor decided to call it quits. Daley
stated:
Its time, everybody is replaceable in life, no one is here forever. I knew it
was my time. I was not afraid of any election…I don’t work on an
election, I work on what to accomplish as an incumbent and I’ve done that
for years. You know like anything else, it’s time, it’s personal, there
wasn’t one reason at all and it’s hard for people to understand that and this
was the best kept secret in Chicago.11
Daley’s announcement sent a shock throughout the city of Chicago. CPS employees
began to speculate about the future of CPS. A little over a month after his announcement,
local newspapers reported that CEO Ron Huberman planned to step down as CPS CEO
before the 2010-2011 school year is over. Huberman has since denied that he had such
plans. One thing is for certain: the future of CPS is uncertain.
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Researcher Opinion on the Effectiveness of CPS CEO Model
An argument regarding the CEO model and its ability to produce positive student
outcomes would not be fair without discussing student barriers to success. An
overwhelming majority of Chicago Public School students are born to families of a low
socioeconomic status. These families lack some or all of the financial, social,
environmental and educational supports that children in families of a high socioeconomic
status have. Crnic and Lamberty discussed the impact of socioeconomic status on a
child’s readiness for school:
The segregating nature of social class, ethnicity, and race may well reduce
the variety of enriching experiences thought to be prerequisite for creating
readiness to learn among children. Social class, ethnicity, and race entail a
set of 'contextual givens' that dictate neighborhood, housing, and access to
resources that affect enrichment or deprivation as well as the acquisition
of specific value systems.12
Parents may not have the ability to read or do simple math computations, which disallows
them to help their children with their lessons. Some parents are considered “homeless,”
which means that they may live in a shelter, or they may live with other family members.
The living quarters for some of those children are not conducive for the completion of
homework assignments. The living arrangements of homeless families often change, and
with each change, the student is transferred to another school where he or she has to
make new friends, meet new teachers, and make up for lost instructional time. Parents
may also lack information about childhood immunizations and proper nutrition. Some
students come to school after eating a bag of potato chips for breakfast.
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CPS students of a low socioeconomic status may not have acquired the value
systems that students of a higher socioeconomic status have. Kalenberg argues that
students need middle class environments more than higher per capita spending. If this is
true, then the improvement of schools is a social justice issue. In order for all students to
experience middle class environments, the families would need to adopt middle class
values. This proposition is a very complex one. Elements of the CEO model are
necessary when managing urban schools if there is not an emphasis on achieving social
justice. Social justice is not just a school issue, it is a societal issue. Without the
additional supports necessary to properly address social justice issues, the CPS CEO has
to effectively manage a large bureaucracy which serves a highly disadvantaged
population with limited resources.
To improve teaching and learning outcomes, leadership should aspire to transition
from the bureaucratic and psychological sources of authority to the professional and
moral sources of authority. While the bureaucratic source of authority is effective in
establishing hierarchy, rules and regulations, communicating mandates and outlining role
expectations, it is ineffective in inspiring the kind of commitment that is necessary of
teachers to counteract the barriers that exist for students of low socioeconomic status.
With limited resources, the district cannot pay teachers for all the time that is spent
working with students before and after hours. After 15 years of bureaucratic decisionmaking and the fear of school closure as a motivational tool, the data shows that CPS
students are rarely successful after high school. Teachers and administrators, with the
threat of losing their jobs, are still struggling to close the achievement gap.
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The CEO model has brought about a sense of accountability that has not been
experienced in the past in the CPS district. However, until social justice is achieved, CPS
teachers will need to perform above and beyond the call of duty in order to help bridge
the achievement gap. To inspire individuals to perform at that level, motivational
techniques must advance past the “comply or face consequences” level. Sergiovanni
argues that if we were to add professional and moral authority as primary sources of
authority to the others, then what people follow, and why they are to follow it would
change.13 Based on the current CEO model, what teachers follow are bureaucratic
mandates from central office and the area office. The answer to why they follow them is
“because the CEO said so” (fear of losing job, school closure). If people are to be
inspired to a level of deep commitment that is necessary for the production of positive
student outcomes, then the “what” and the “why” needs to change. According to
Sergiovanni, adding the professional and moral sources of authority means that people
follow shared values and beliefs that define us as a community, and it is done because it
is morally right to do so. In this instance, who is followed, changes from the CEO
(management) to the individual members of the collective community.

13

Sergiovanni, 32.
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